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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Legislatures are among the least trusted political institutions in the world; but they 
are the heart of liberal democracy: no legislatures, no democracy.  How are democracies 
to survive and prosper if citizens distrust one of its bedrock institutions? With this 
preoccupation in mind, this dissertation relies on a multi-method approach to explore the 
determinants of trust in legislatures in 18 countries of Latin America,1 the region of the 
world where legislatures are trusted the least. 
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the reasons for 
studying trust in legislatures among Latin American citizens, followed by an outline of 
the theory proposed. Next, a description of the data and methods employed is presented. 
Last, in the final section, a road map of the dissertation is provided. 
 
Why It Matters 
 
Low levels of trust in institutions of representation can hurt the prospectus for 
democracy in several ways. Distrusting citizens are more likely to seek access to politics 
by non conventional ways such as contacting politicians directly or through direct action, 
or by voting for outsiders and anti-party or anti-establishment parties (Dalton and Weldon 
                                                 
1 The countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 
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2005). On the other hand, individuals who trust their institutions of representation are 
more prone to reject authoritarian regimes than their less trusting fellow citizens (Mishler 
and Rose 1996). In extremis, low trust individuals are more supportive of illegal and 
unconventional forms of political participation (Blakelock 2006; Dalton 2006). Latin 
America  has seen the emergence of electoral authoritarian leaders in the context of 
weakened institutions of representation, with the cases of Fujimori in Peru and Chavez in 
Venezuela being paradigmatic examples  (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006; 
Mayorga 2006; Tanaka 2006). 
The low levels of confidence in political institutions have been deemed a 
worldwide phenomenon (Dalton 1999; Dalton 2006; Norris 1999b). Legislatures, courts, 
and presidents receive decreasing levels of support from citizens across the world 
(Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999a), being legislatures the least trusted political institution 
(WVS 2006). Although some authors argue that less than optimal levels of trust might 
actually be good for democracy in the sense that they reflect citizens being critical of 
their political systems (Norris 1999a) or because they can promote political mobilization 
(Gamson 1968), the mainstream research points at the low level of trust in political 
institutions as potentially problematic for consolidating democracy (Dalton 1999; 
Newton and Norris 2000).  
 
 
The Missing Connection 
 
 
 Across Latin America, legislative bodies present a lot of variation: they are called 
different names (“Asamblea” in Costa Rica, “Congreso” in Colombia, or “Parlamento” in 
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Uruguay); in Central America they are unicameral, while in the Southern Cone all 
legislative bodies are bicameral; their number of members ranges from 57 in Costa Rica 
to 599 in Brazil.2 Despite these differences, Latin American legislatures share a key 
feature: the connection between citizens and their institutions of representation is 
currently missing, or under risk of being missing. Individuals trust their legislatures very 
little; the representational linkage has been or is under serious threat of being broken in 
most Latin American countries (Boidi 2008). Political parties and legislatures are usually 
blamed for this crisis of political representation (Achard and González 2004; Córdova 
Macías 2004; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006).  
 In this context, my research aims at explaining the reasons for this missing 
connection between citizens and their institutions of representation. I argue there are four 
main determinants of trust in legislatures: citizens’ views of the processes that occur 
within the institution, the institution’s performance as perceived by citizens, the image of 
political parties that taints the views toward the legislatures they staff, and the features of 
the party systems existing in the countries. More specifically, the depiction of trust I offer 
stands on four main hypotheses: 
i) Views of congressional processes: more complex than a paradox. Citizens’ 
views toward the processes that take place within the legislature affect the levels of trust 
conferred to it. Contrary to previous research pointing to citizens’ paradoxical rejection 
of congressional democratic processes as the source of disregard for the institution, I 
argue that views of these processes actually enhance support for legislatures. Trust in the 
parliament only decreases when these processes are perceived as taken to their extreme.  
                                                 
2 For a complete list of the main characteristics of the legislative bodies in Latin America see Table I.1 in 
Annex F. 
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ii) Poorly evaluated performance. Citizens’ evaluation of the job done by the 
legislatures impacts the levels of trust in the institution. The better the evaluation of 
performance of legislatures and legislators, the higher the levels of trust conferred.  
iii) The contagion from the parties. Political parties provide the personnel 
legislatures are staffed with. Therefore, the images individuals have of parties should 
have some impact on the attitudes they have toward legislatures. The contagion from the 
parties upon legislatures would operate in a rather straightforward manner: the poorer the 
images of parties, the lower the confidence in the parliament.  
iv) The party system. Political parties serve as the link between the represented 
and their representatives. At the country level, there are certain features of the party 
system that indicate parties being responsive to their voters and to citizens in general. 
Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living in polities which such characteristics 
will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in countries with less responsive 
parties. Specifically, I argue that the effective number of political parties, their degree of 
polarization, and the extent to which political parties have stable roots in society, all have 
an impact upon citizens’ levels of trust in legislatures.  
  
Data and Methods 
 
 This research relies on a multi-method approach that combines the analysis of 
public opinion data from 18 countries of Latin America with semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups. This research design allows me to combine the advantages of large-N 
approaches with the assets of small-N, qualitative oriented techniques, bringing together 
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the best of each tradition. Quantitative approaches, by relying on larger number of cases, 
are more powerful in theory testing and external validity (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994; Lijphart 1971). Qualitative research, on the other hand, has been characterized by 
focusing attention in few units, allowing to gain deep understanding of each one. In this 
sense, its main assets are theory development and internal validity (Collier 1995; 
Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Tarrow 1995).  Along the tradition of the discipline, the goal 
of my research is to explain and to predict behaviors regarding citizens’ trust in 
legislatures. In order to achieve such a goal, I see no better way to go about design than 
combining the strength of qualitative tools to gain understanding with the potential of 
quantitative techniques for theory testing and generalization of findings.  
 
Case Selection 
    
Latin America is the region of the world where legislatures are trusted the least. 
Figure I.1 presents the average levels of trust in legislatures by region of the world from 
the third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey.3 Trust in legislatures is expressed 
as a numeric value that ranges from 0 “No confidence at all,” to 100 “A great deal of 
confidence.”4 Latin America clearly stands out by having the lowest average, almost 25 
points below Asia, the region of the world where parliaments are trusted the most. 
                                                 
3 In order to maximize the number of countries, the two most recent waves of the World Values Survey are 
explored. Considering only the last wave yields the same results: Latin America is the region of the world 
where legislatures are trusted the least. 
4 Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the national parliament in a scale ranging 
from 1 “A great deal of confidence” to 4 “None at all.” The original scale has been inverted for greater 
values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the 
inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates “none at all” and 100 “a great 
deal of confidence.”  
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Figure I.1. Trust in Congress, by region 
 
Latin America is also a region where democracies are still under their way to 
consolidation, a way that has not been traveled without difficulties, especially for the 
institutions of representation. In more than one instance during the recent past, citizens of 
Latin America have gone to the streets to literally “oust” their rulers chanting “Throw 
them all out, not a single one stays.” González (2006) has tallied nine “severe political 
crises” involving institutional weakening or rupture in seven countries in Latin America 
to date since 2000 (Paraguay 2000, Peru 2000, Argentina 2001, Venezuela 2003, Bolivia 
2003 and 2005, Ecuador 2000 and 2005, and Nicaragua 2005). Even if the clamor to 
“throw them all out” seems to be a protest against the whole system, a demand to start 
over, the outrage is directed to the institutions of representative democracy. The targets of 
the complaint are the political parties and the legislatures, as they are the agents in charge 
of organizing, channeling, and representing interests in the public sphere. In such a 
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context, looking at what is driving the public disregard toward legislatures is a key task in 
order to understand and attempt to fix the broken representational linkage.  
 
The Quantitative Approach 
 
The public opinion data comes from the AmericasBarometer 2008 round by the 
Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University. This project 
has conducted public opinion surveys on political attitudes and behaviors in Latin 
America since the 1970’s. In this research, I employ data for 18 countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. In every country, at least 1,500 nationally representative (urban and rural), 
face to face interviews were conducted. The data collection took place from December 
2007 to April 2008.5 
As a member of LAPOP, I had the unique opportunity to include a set of 
questions directly related to the dissertation research.6 Some of these questions were 
drawn or adapted from previous studies, while some of them are original. All of them 
were carefully reviewed by the LAPOP team and were pre-tested on the field in every 
country, a procedure that aims at ensuring interviewees’ understanding of the probe. I 
personally conducted pre-tests at the initial stages of questionnaire design in Mexico and 
                                                 
5 For more details and technical information, see Appendix B. 
6 A set of 8 questions related to attitudes toward congress and political parties was included. A sample 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix C. The questions exclusively designed for my research are: EPP1, 
EPP2, EPP3, EC1, EC2, EC3, EC4 and M2 (all of them appear on page 10 in the sample questionnaire). 
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Venezuela in November 2007, and later on in Honduras in December 2007, and in 
Uruguay in March 2008. 
To the original AmericasBarometer dataset with the public opinion survey, 
information on institutional features and ecological data for each country have been 
added.  These data come from several different sources. Two research assistants compiled 
and coded the information during May 2008. Their tasks were carefully explained and 
directly supervised by me. All the information was collected from at least two different 
sources in order to guarantee consistency across sources.  
  
The Qualitative Approach 
 
The high-quality standards LAPOP follows on its surveys ensure that the public 
opinion data is exempt from many of the problems often found when doing public 
opinion research in Latin America (Seligson 2005). Nonetheless, there are weaknesses 
that are inherent to the research technique and that posit limitations on the analytical 
leverage they provide (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Zaller 1992). As Geddes posits it, large-
N approaches have many advantages, “multiple regression is an excellent tool for testing 
hypotheses, it is not always a good image to have in mind when trying to explain 
something complicated, because it focuses attention in the identification of causal factors 
rather on how causal factors work" (Geddes 2003, 23). In this sense, more qualitatively 
oriented techniques offer a nice addition to the research design by allowing more detailed 
exploration of what is behind individuals when they provide the answers they give in the 
context of the interview.  
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With the aim of untangling more than the “top of mind considerations” 
individuals may be reflecting on their answers, a series of focus groups and semi-
structured interviews were carried in Ecuador and Uruguay. Ecuador has clearly been the 
country where legislatures are trusted the least, which has had serious consequences for 
its democratic stability  (Pachano 2006). At the other extreme, Uruguay is one of the 
countries were legislatures are trusted the most.7 Unlike Ecuador, Uruguay has had a long 
tradition of democratic stability within the frame of an institutionalized party system 
(González 1995) 
The selection of countries so dissimilar in their political features resembles the 
strategy of most-different case selection (Lijphart 1971; Savolainen 1994). However, the 
purpose of the selection of these two countries is not to apply a strict comparative 
method, but to complement the public opinion data analyses by untangling the causal 
mechanisms behind the hypotheses formulated.  
The qualitative methods employed consisted of focus groups and interviews with 
citizens and elites (scholars, politicians, businessmen) in both countries, but it also went 
beyond those particular techniques. Fieldwork activities included watching local media, 
buying and reading local press, talking to taxi drivers and shop dependents, all of which 
constituted a sort of ethnographic approach (Mason 2002, 55).  
Fieldwork took place in Montevideo and Canelones, Uruguay, in May 2007 and 
February-March 2008, and in Quito, Ecuador, in April 2008.8 During the first stage of 
                                                 
7 The data from the 2006-7 round of AmericasBarometer survey used to craft the research design of this 
project showed Uruguay as the country where the legislature was trusted the most. The 2008 round data 
show that Mexico is now where the legislature is trusted the most, with Uruguay in the second place, for a 
small margin. 
8 Fieldwork activities were approved by Vanderbilt IRB on March 2007 (IRB #070240). A copy of the 
approval notification can be found in Annex A. 
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fieldwork in Uruguay, in May 2007, I held several interviews with scholars (3), 
politicians of all levels of government and partisan background (5), and businessmen (2). 
Also in 2007 I held three formal interviews with young citizens and one focus group with 
middle-aged women. In addition to this, I maintained numerous informal conversations 
with individuals and groups of all socioeconomic extractions. The topic of these talks, as 
well as that of the more formal interviews, was their attitudes toward the political parties 
and the legislature. The second stage of fieldwork in Uruguay comprised two focus-
groups and countless individual informal interviews. In both focus groups the participants 
were middle-class, middle-aged adults.  
Fieldwork activities in Ecuador were more concentrated. I held four interviews 
with politicians of all extractions, three interviews with scholars, two interviews with 
political consultants, and four interviews with businessmen. In addition to that, I held 23 
semi-structured interviews with citizens of all social and economic extractions (some of 
the interviews were individual and some of them were in groups of no more than 3 
participants).  
 
Road Map 
 
 In the next chapter, a survey of the literature on citizens’ attitudes toward 
parliaments is presented and the main theory of this dissertation is outlined. The chapter 
begins with an overview of the ways in which citizens’ views toward legislatures have 
been studied worldwide; special attention is paid to the dependent variables often 
explained and to the several kinds of explanatory factors identified. Later, I make a case 
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for analyzing trust in legislatures as indicator of support for the institution in the Latin 
American context, and I develop on the four hypotheses explaining what drives trust in 
legislatures: citizens’ views of the legislative processes, evaluations of congressional 
performance, images of political parties, and characteristics of the partisan context in 
which those individual attitudes take place. 
Chapter III and Chapter IV are devoted to testing the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter II. In Chapter III, I explore the incidence upon trust in legislatures of each of the 
individual-level factors: views of congressional processes, performance evaluation, and 
views of political parties.  The chapter begins with the discussion of the dependent 
variable –trust- and its measurement. Next, each of the three main explanatory factors is 
depicted, and its bivariate relationship with confidence in the legislature discussed. Then, 
alternative explanations of trust are explored. The chapter ends with a multivariate 
analysis of the determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin America and the discussion of 
the main findings. In Chapter IV, I analyze the features of the party system considered 
key to the development of trust in legislatures among citizens of Latin America: the 
effective number of political parties, the degree of polarization of the party system, and 
the extent to which political parties have stable roots in society. The impact of these 
contextual-level variables is assessed vis-à-vis one another, and the individual-level 
determinants explored in Chapter III. 
Chapter V is the final chapter. It begins with a discussion of the ways in which 
low levels of trust in legislatures can hurt democracy in contemporary Latin America. A 
second section discusses a series of actions aimed at improving trust in legislatures given 
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the findings in the previous chapters. The third and final section discusses new avenues 
of research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CITIZENS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD LEGISLATURES 
 
The study of citizens’ attitudes toward assemblies springs from a broader field of 
inquiry on representation. The scholarly research on citizens’ views toward institutions of 
representation in general, and legislatures in particular is fragmented.  The most 
comprehensive efforts to link theory and empirical evidence is concentrated in the field 
of American politics, and therefore circumscribed to the American Congress and its 
congressmembers (Bianco 1994; Cooper 1999b; Hibbing and Larimer 2008; Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969; 
Patterson and Caldeira 1990; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). 
 In comparative perspective, most scholarly work has focused on regions of the 
world other than Latin America, and legislatures are not the center of the analyses; rather, 
they are often studied as part of a pool of political institutions. An exception to this is 
Hibbing and Patterson’s 1994 piece on trust in the parliaments of the transitional 
democracies of East and Central Europe (Hibbing and Patterson 1994). The same group 
of countries is analyzed by Mishler and Rose (1997), although their work targets the 
broader institutional context, focusing only tangentially on the legislatures. Similarly, 
Norris (1999b) and Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton (2000), discuss support for legislatures as 
part of their analysis of citizens’ democratic attitudes in industrial democracies. 
To my knowledge, views toward Latin American legislatures have been object of 
little scholarly attention. In their work on the connections between trust and quality of 
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democracy in Argentina and Mexico, Cleary and Stokes (2006) contend that those 
individuals who live in more democratic regions are more trusting of institutions than 
their fellow citizens, but this, again,  is a finding not specific for congress.  
Other studies follow exclusively theoretical or descriptive approaches. Thus, 
Nuñez Nascimiento (2004) explores the current levels of trust in legislatures in 
Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Chile, but her piece does not go beyond the 
description of the observed trends. Similarly, Moisés 2005´s essay (Moisés 2005a) 
discusses the scope and implications of the low levels of confidence in political 
institutions in Brazil. In another article, the author (Moisés 2005b) suggests that trust in 
political institutions is driven by performance evaluation of such institutions. The same 
argument is held by Turner and Martz (1997), who analyze data from the 1995 round of 
the Latinobarometer on confidence in political institutions in eight countries.  
 Maiwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez’s thorough study of the reasons behind 
what they call a crisis of democratic representation is probably the most comprehensive 
work on the topic for the Latin American context, although only circumscribed to the 
Andean countries (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006). Mainwaring’s 
concluding chapter on the impact that state deficiencies have had upon the decaying 
levels of trust in political parties and legislatures also points to the performance 
evaluation explanation for the current low levels of trust (Mainwaring 2006). 
The reduced number of previous studies on the topic and the fact that it has never 
been studied before for the pool of 18 countries here covered, make this dissertation a 
unique contribution to the ongoing discussion on the role and limits of institutions of 
representation in the region. The scarcity of previous research, however, pushes the 
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search for theoretical backgrounds from other contexts, especially from the more prolific 
research in the field of American politics. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the ways in which citizens’ views toward 
legislatures have been studied worldwide. Special attention is paid to the dependent 
variable often explained and the explanatory factors identified. Next, I propose an 
analytical framework to look at citizens’ attitudes toward legislatures by concentrating in 
trust as the main dependent variable. I argue that trust is driven by four main forces: 
citizens’ views of the legislative processes, evaluations of congressional performance, 
images of political parties, and the features of the party system in which those individual 
attitudes take place. 
 
Citizens’ Views of Legislatures 
 
Worldwide, public esteem for legislatures is not widespread. Scholars have 
identified a series of possible explanations for this disregard for congress, either specific 
to legislatures or in connection to broader attitudes toward political institutions (looking 
also at presidents and courts) or institutions of representation (including political parties).  
Before digging into the explanations, a mention to what has been explained -that 
is, the dependent variables involved- is of order. Public appreciation for legislatures has 
been usually measured in terms of feeling thermometers (Asher and Barr 1994; Born 
1990; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997), job approval 
(Asher and Barr 1994; Bowman and Carll Ladd 1994; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 
1997; Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Larimer 2008; Parker 1977; Patterson and 
Magleby 1992; Patterson and Caldeira 1990; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992), and 
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trust (Asher and Barr 1994; Cook and Gronke 2005; Cooper 1999a; Hibbing and 
Patterson 1994; Mainwaring 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997; Newton 1999; Patterson and 
Caldeira 1990; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992).1 As a quick reading of the 
references suggests, many of the pieces rely in more than one indicator of esteem. 
Besides, each of these dimensions can be either studied regarding the institution itself or 
its members. The focus in aggregate trends or individual determinants adds a third 
possible categorization for the existing body of research.  
 
Feeling Thermometers toward Legislatures 
 
Feeling thermometers are widely used in public opinion research as a tool to tap 
general feelings toward individuals or institutions. Feeling thermometer questions ask 
respondents how warm or favorable they feel toward others, and request that feeling to be 
expressed in degrees from 0 (the least warm response) to 100 (the warmest).2 By offering 
such a wide range of options from which to choose, this type of question is praised by 
providing information on the direction (favorable or unfavorable) and intensity (how 
                                                 
1 But also more complex dependent variables (typically, composite indexes of support) can be found. See  
Davidson, Roger H., and Glenn R. Parker. 1972. Positive Support for Political Institutions: The Case of 
Congress. Western Political Quarterly 25:600-612. and Patterson, Samuel C., G.R. Boynton, and Ronald 
D. Hedlund. 1969. Perceptions and Expectations of the Legislature and Support for It. The American 
Journal of Sociology 75 (1):62-76. 
2 Typically, feeling thermometer questions read like this: “I’d like to get your feelings toward some of our 
political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I’ll read the name of the person and I’d 
like you to rate that person using this feeling thermometer. You may use any number from 0 to 100 for a 
rating. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable or warm toward the person. 
Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel too favorable toward the person. If we come to 
a person whose name you don’t recognize, you don’t need to rate that person. Just tell me and we’ll move 
on to the next one. If you do recognize the name, but don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the 
person, you would rate that person at the 50-degree mark.” The Michigan Feeling Thermometer question is 
accompanied by a card where a thermometer is shown. The thermometer is graded and labeled from 0 
“Very cold or unfavorable” to 100 “Very warm of favorable feeling” (Alwin 1997). 
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favorable or unfavorable) of attitudes (Alwin 1997). In this sense, feeling thermometers 
advantage questions that only offer dichotomous categorical answers (approve or 
disapprove) which only allow for differentiation of the direction of the attitude, but not its 
intensity. They also represent an improvement vis-à-vis questions with only three 
categories (approve, disapprove, or nor approve or disapprove) which allow the 
expression of neutrality, but do not permit the distinction of intensity.  
Feeling thermometers, however, are not exempt from problems. Providing the 
respondents with several response categories potentially conveys more information, but 
having so many categories to express the feelings might result overwhelming. The use of 
these scales, thus, might project an exaggerated precision about individuals’ attitudes. 
Nonetheless, feeling thermometers have been proved to be more reliable that 7-point 
scales (Alwin 1997). 
Despite the wealth of information they provide and their reliability, feeling 
thermometers have a downside that goes beyond the technicalities of the measurement 
and how many categories scales should have. By definition, the feeling thermometer 
questions are broad; they provide very little guidance to the interviewee on what kind of 
feelings he is expected to report. What is it to feel warm toward an individual or an 
institution? According to what standards should they report how favorable they feel? It 
can be argued that this lack of constrains is a good thing because it does not frame 
interviewees in any particular way. However, if the aim is to ascertain what the 
determinants of such feelings are, then the broad questions might not be a good idea. The 
broader the question, the wider the range of aspects individuals might be considering at 
the time of providing an answer. And the broader the scope of considerations brought to 
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mind by different individuals, the harder it will be to find patterns of causality in the 
aggregate.  
Thus, feeling thermometers seem to work all right for describing patterns of 
attitudes, but scholars rely less on them when it comes to explanation. As a matter of fact, 
of the four pieces above cited utilizing feeling thermometers, only two of them (Asher 
and Barr 1994; Born 1990) include these in the multivariate analyses.  
 
Job Approval 
 
 
 Job approval questions are the most commonly used proxy to citizens’ sentiments 
toward legislatures in the field of American politics. These questions aim at knowing how 
well citizens believe Congress or congresspersons have done their job. Typically, the 
questions contain a time frame (“lately,” “the last few months,” “the past year”) in order 
to help the interviewee to provide a current evaluation (as opposed to a life-time 
evaluation). The format of the questions is rather standard, asking for an evaluation of the 
job being done and providing the interviewee with an ordinal or interval scale to rate it. 3  
 Whatever their specific format, questions on job approval ratings provide a 
narrower frame to interviewees than feeling thermometers. The reference to the “job” 
stresses that the question is about performance evaluation, therefore giving the 
                                                 
3 Some examples: “How strongly do you approve or disapprove the way Congress is handling its job?” 
Scores range from 1, “strongly disapprove,” to 4, “strongly approve” (Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992, 
316). “Generally speaking, how would you evaluate the job the United States Congress has been doing in 
the last few months? Has it been doing an excellent job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?” (Kimball and 
Patterson 1997, 705). “How would you rate the job done this past year by Congress- excellent, pretty good, 
only fair, or poor? (Patterson and Caldeira 1990, 27). “In general, do you strongly approve, approve, 
disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the institution of the US. Congress, no matter who is in office?” 
“What about the 535 members of Congress?” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 166).  
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respondents hints on what considerations bring to mind in order to answer (Zaller 1992). 
In this sense, the stimulus presented to the respondent is clearer than in the feeling 
thermometers, constricted to one dimension: job.  
 On the other hand, the specificity of the job approval might be problematic in that 
it is too closely bounded to short-term contextual assessments. The opinions reported are 
“weakly crystallized” for many respondents, and they are rather unstable opinions 
(Patterson and Caldeira 1990, 28). Thus, for the job approval ratings to be reliable, 
several longitudinal measurements are necessary. Data availability, therefore, results in 
an obstacle for utilizing the job approval measurements beyond the United States, where 
there exists a long series of data points for the variable. 
 
Trust  
 
 Trust is the least popular of the indicators of support for congress in the United 
States, but it is, nonetheless, more widely used in comparative research. The fact that 
trust presents less variance than the performance evaluation measures (Patterson and 
Caldeira 1990, 30) makes it more suitable for cross-country comparisons for which 
several data points of the same variable are usually unavailable.  
 Typically, trust questions request the interviewee to express to what extent he 
trusts his country’s legislature or what degree of confidence he has on it.4 Some studies, 
                                                 
4 Some examples: “In order to get ahead, people need to have confidence and to feel that they can trust 
themselves and others. To what degree do you think that you trust [the parliament] totally, to a certain 
point, little, or not at all?” (Hibbing and Patterson 1994, 591); “There are many different institutions in this 
country, for example, the government, courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, 
where 1 represents great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of the 
following” (Mishler and Rose 1997, 430); “How much confidence do you have in the following institutions 
– a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?” (Cooper 1999a, 190)  
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though, ask about trust or confidence in congressmembers.5 Trust in the legislature as an 
institution, however, cannot be carelessly equated to trust in its members, since 
individuals tend to have more positive views of the institution than of its members 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 45). Moreover, they tend to better evaluate their own 
representative than the whole body of congressmembers (Asher and Barr 1994; Born 
1990; Fenno 1975; Patterson and Magleby 1992). 
 Trust in legislatures not only provides a more stable measurement of feelings 
toward the institution, it is probablythe best measure to reflect deeper, enduring attitudes 
or diffuse support for the institution (Easton 1965; Easton 1975), a measurement of 
greater relevance when assessing the consequences of trust. As argued by Lowenberg and 
Patterson, “[t]his part of the attitude toward legislatures is theoretically of great 
significance, since it can be a source of public commitment to the institution through 
good times and bad and a basis for public compliance with the enactments of the 
legislatures whether they are liked or not” (Lowenberg and Patterson 1979, 285-6). In 
this regard, trust or confidence in the institution cannot be equated to performance 
evaluation of it. As it will be argued in the next paragraphs, the different nature of these 
variables also speaks to their role in the causal explanation of support for legislatures: 
while trust is an indicator of support, performance evaluation can be one of its causes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 “As far as the people running Congress are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, 
only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” (Patterson and Caldeira 1990, 27). 
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Determinants of Citizens’ Views toward Legislatures 
 
A survey of 16 scholarly pieces that analyze support for legislatures through 
multivariate procedures lends to more than 80 independent variables (potentially) shaping 
sympathy toward parliaments.6  
Many of these independent variables are similar in nature. In fact, after collapsing 
different operationalizations of the same variable and leaving aside the interaction terms, 
the actual number of independent variables can be reduced and grouped in eight 
categories: performance evaluation, nature of legislatures, perceptions toward other 
political institutions, personal experience with the legislature, some classic attitudinal 
variables, sociodemographic characteristics, contextual factors, and “other” variables that 
do not fit in any of the previous groups.  
 
Performance evaluation 
Citizens’ evaluations of the job done by the legislatures affect their attitudes 
toward them. Congressional approval leads to warmer feelings (Born 1990) and to more 
trust (Cook and Gronke 2005). In addition to that, the extent to which legislatures fulfill 
citizens’ expectations about them has also been found to have explanatory power; the 
                                                 
6 The survey covers scholarly work on attitudes toward legislatures that present multivariate analyses of the 
determinants of such attitudes. It includes studies on feeling thermometers, job approval ratings, and trust; 
focus on the institution and on congressmembers; and pieces that deal exclusively with American 
institutions as well as cross-country studies. The pieces surveyed are: Asher and Barr 1994; Born 1990; 
Cook and Gronke 2005; Cooper 1999b; Davidson and Parker 1972; Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; 
Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and 
Patterson 1997; Mainwaring 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997; Parker 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 
1969; Patterson and Caldeira 1990; and Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992. 
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more citizens see their expectations fulfilled, the more they support (Patterson, Boyton, 
and Hedlund 1969) and approve of the institution (Kimball and Patterson 1997). 
Furthermore, approval ratings of legislatures go up when individuals like the 
policies passed by them (Hibbing and Larimer 2003) and feel warmer toward senators 
(Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). In some studies, positive evaluations of the 
incumbent legislator also lead to higher approval of parliament (Kimball and Patterson 
1997). 
  
Personal Experience with the Legislature  
The evidence about the effects of personal contact with the representatives is 
mixed. Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan (1992) found that contact with the legislator 
actually decreased the levels of approval of the institution. One possible explanation to 
this is that had they been satisfied with the job done by the legislature, individuals would 
not have to contact her in the first place. On the other hand, personal contact with the 
incumbent or her team was found to have a positive impact upon feeling thermometers of 
members (Asher and Barr 1994; Born 1990) and upon their job approval (Asher and Barr 
1994). And, conversely, past contact with the challenger is negatively related to both 
feeling thermometer and approval of current members (Asher and Barr 1994). 
 
Nature of Congress 
Scholars have pointed out that there is something inherent to the nature of 
legislatures that hurts the way in which citizens look at them: “… the very activities that 
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characterize Congress and the legislative process –deliberation, debate, and decision 
making- cause it to appear quarrelsome, unproductive, and controversial, and thus 
diminishing it in the public eye” (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997, 176). As a matter 
of fact, those individuals who see little value in debate and little need for compromise 
approve legislatures less than their fellow citizens (Hibbing and Larimer 2003). The 
counterbalance function that legislatures are called to perform is also troubling in the 
public eye in the American context: facing a presidential veto bolsters the approval of the 
institution, but overriding the veto lowers it (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997).  
There is some evidence that legislatures are liked the least when they work the 
most: the more major bills passed and the more intra congress conflict, the least the 
approval (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997). But not everything is bad news for 
parliaments: the more professionalized they are perceived and the better the 
representation they are thought to engage in, the higher the approval (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 1995).  
 
Perceptions toward other Political Institutions 
Perceptions toward other political institutions, especially the president, have been 
found to significantly affect attitudes toward legislatures. In the United States and Latin 
American presidential systems, the president is the most salient political actor, so 
attitudes toward him are likely to spillover to other institutions. Performance evaluation 
of the president has been found to increase support for the legislature (Davidson and 
Parker 1972), performance evaluation (Asher and Barr 1994, Kimball and Patterson 
1997), and trust (Cook and Gronke 2005). Similarly, presidential popularity bolsters 
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congressional approval, but has no significant impact upon trust in congressmembers 
(Patterson and Caldeira 1990).  
Positive feelings toward other political institutions impact perceptions on 
legislatures as well. Trust in legislatures increases with trust in government and with trust 
in the most relevant political parties (Hibbing and Patterson 1994), and so does 
performance evaluation (Asher and Barr 1994). Good images of politicians also boost 
positive attitudes toward legislatures. The perceptions of lack of corruption in 
government and perceptions of politicians not being greedy increase trust in legislative 
bodies (Hibbing and Patterson 1994). 
 
Classical Attitudinal Variables 
 
A myriad of variables commonly assessed as determinants of attitudes toward 
institutions has been analyzed as potential determinants of views of legislatures. Attitudes 
toward other citizens and political parties, perceptions of the economy, political 
knowledge, sense of political efficacy, and political involvement have all been discussed 
as causes of attitudes toward parliaments. 
Thus, citizens who trust other citizens more are more likely to trust legislatures 
(Cook and Gronke 2005; Mainwaring 2006). And similarly, those with bonds to political 
parties (those who have a partisan identification) tend to approve legislators more 
(Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) and to trust more (Cook and Gronke 2005); in 
some cases, it has been demonstrated that partisan identification with a party other than 
the one holding the majority in the legislature actually leads to coldest views in feeling 
thermometers (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997).  
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There is some mixed evidence of the impact of the strength of partisan 
identification. Cook and Gronke (2005) found that the stronger the partisan feeling, the 
more individuals trust political institutions. However, in other studies the relationship 
between the strength of partisanship and sympathy toward legislatures does not attain 
statistical significance (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 
1992). Similarly, ideological self-placement in the liberal-conservative continuum 
reaches statistical significance in some models (Born 1990; Cook and Gronke 2005; 
Hibbing and Larimer 2003) while not in others (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; 
Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). And the strength of 
the ideological self-placement does not achieve statistical significance in any of the 
models that include it (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley and Quinlan 1992). 
Again, the evidence is mixed regarding political knowledge and political 
awareness, being positively associated with support for legislatures in some models 
(Asher and Barr 1994), resulting non significant in others (Asher and Barr 1994; Hibbing 
and Patterson 1994; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) 
and yet being negatively related to positive views of parliaments in others (Asher and 
Barr 1994; Hibbing and Larimer 2003).  
Similar patterns of mixed evidence are found for the political involvement and 
participation indicators (Asher and Barr 1994; Davidson and Parker 1972; Hibbing and 
Patterson 1994; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, 
Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) and for the political efficacy measures (Hibbing and Patterson 
1994; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Mishler and Rose 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and 
Quinlan 1992).  
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On the other hand, and likewise with presidential approval, positive views of the 
economy –both idiotropic and sociotropic- bolster favorable feelings toward legislatures 
(Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Mainwaring 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997; 
Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Patterson and Caldeira 1990). 
 
Sociodemographic Variables 
Sociodemographic variables do not shed much light upon attitudes toward 
legislatures: age is non significant in most multidimensional models (Hibbing and 
Larimer 2003; Kimball and Patterson 1997) nor are race (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; 
Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992) or gender in all 
(Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 
1997; Mainwaring 2006) but one study (Mishler and Rose 1997) . In the same way, 
income turns non significant in the analyses (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). 
On the other hand, the impact of education upon congressional approval has been 
nonsignificant in most cases (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Kimball and Patterson 1997; 
Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969), but it has been found to bolster support for the 
institution insome studies (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Mainwaring 2006) and to 
decrease it in others (Asher and Barr 1994; Cook and Gronke 2005). 
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Contextual Factors 
Political and economical conditions have also been found to affect the public 
mood toward legislatures. Unfavorable economic conditions such as unemployment 
affect negatively both trust and approval of legislatures (Parker 1972; Patterson and 
Caldeira 1990). Occurrence of scandals also decreases support for the institution (Durr, 
Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997), and corruption was found to decrease trust in legislatures 
in the Andes (Mainwaring 2006).  On the other hand, there is evidence that when the 
whole system is threatened from the outside, the “rally around the flag” effect is observed 
regarding attitudes toward legislatures and its members (Parker 1977). 
The media also exerts effects in the aggregate level: the more positive media 
coverage of congress, the higher the approval of the institution (Durr, Gilmour, and 
Wolbrecht 1997). Conversely, appreciation for the institution decays with negative media 
coverage (Patterson and Caldeira 1990). 
Other contextual variables frequently included in multivariate models that attempt 
to explain support for legislatures are: the existence of a divided government and support 
for legislation promoted by the president (Patterson and Caldeira 1990). 
 
Other Variables 
Other variables tested in different models –all of them found to bolster 
appreciation for legislatures- include perceived increased freedom, and perceived 
increased fairness in the country (Mishler and Rose 1997), satisfaction with democracy 
(Hibbing and Patterson 1994), and salience of international issues (Patterson and Caldeira 
1990). 
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This brief survey of the literature seems to point out that everything matters in 
shaping citizens’ attitudes toward legislative bodies. Even when not the more than 80 
independent variables operate the same way for the more different dependent variables 
discussed, the number of explanations is still overwhelming. The first step toward 
parsimony seems to be determining what the most appropriate dependent variable to 
focus on is, to explain attitudes toward legislatures in the Latin American context. Once 
that task is accomplished, then it is of order to move to the discussion of its most relevant 
determinants. Such is the aim of the final section of this chapter. 
 
 
A Theory of Trust in Legislatures in Latin America 
Why Trust? 
 
Trust is the chicken soup of social life. It brings all sorts of good things […]                  
Yet, like chicken soup, it appears to work somewhat mysteriously. 
(Uslaner 2002,1) 
 
The study of trust has entertained scholars for a good time now.  Trust in 
government, trust in politicians, and trust in other citizens have been studied as cause and 
consequence of all good things that take place within democracies. We know trust 
matters (Citrin 1974; Hetherington 1998; Hetherington 2005; Miller 1974), and we know 
it is a positive value (Uslaner 2001, but see Gamson 1968). But, as Uslaner points out, in 
which ways it matters it is somewhat more difficult to ascertain.  
 In this piece, trust is conceived as a demonstration of support for legislatures in 
Easton’s terms (Easton 1965; Easton 1975). Trust can be conceived as an expression of  
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“… a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or 
tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to 
their wants,” which is how diffuse support has been defined by Easton (Easton 1965, 
273).   
This does not mean, however, that I argue trust is how support for legislatures 
should be operationalized. The concept of support is too complex to allow for single-
variable indicators (Easton 1965, Easton 1975). Previous efforts to empirically measure 
system support have relied on several indicators (Klingemann 1999) or composite 
indexes of legitimacy or regime support (Finkel, Muller, and Seligson 1989; Seligson 
2002). Scholars interested in measuring support for legislatures in particular have also 
devised rather complex composite measures of it (Boynton and Loewenberg 1973; 
Davidson and Parker 1972; Mishler and Rose 1994; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 
1969).  
 Trust in legislatures, therefore, is here conceived as one expression of diffuse 
support for legislatures. Following Carlin (2008), trust in the legislature is understood as 
the citizens’ belief in trustworthiness of the national legislature. 
The discussion in the previous section has suggested that trust is the most 
appropriate dependent variable to explore in order to ascertain citizens’ views toward 
legislatures. It is such for both, theoretical and practical reasons. At the theoretical level, 
trust is a wide-encompassing measure of support that allows for digging into general 
orientations toward the institution. Unlike the broader feeling thermometers that 
potentially tap into a myriad of attitudes, however, trust points to a specific attitude. On 
the practical side, trust has proven to be a more stable variable than other indicators of 
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esteem for legislatures (Patterson and Caldeira 1990), thus using single data points for 
trust seems a reasonable choice. 
 
 
The Missing Connection: Its Causes 
 
 I argue there are four main determinants of trust in legislatures: citizens’ views of 
the processes that occur within the institution, the institution’s performance as perceived 
by citizens, the image of political parties that taints the views toward the legislatures they 
staff, and the features of the party systems existing in the countries. More specifically, the 
depiction of trust I offer stands on four main hypotheses: 
i) Views of congressional processes: more complex than a paradox. In 
contravention to the theories pointing to citizens’ paradoxical rejection of congressional 
democratic processes as the source of disregard for the institution, I argue that views of 
these processes actually enhance support for legislatures. Trust in the parliament only 
decreases when these processes are perceived as taken to their extreme.  
ii) Poorly evaluated performance. Citizens’ evaluation of the job done by the 
legislatures impacts the levels of trust in the institution. The better the evaluation of 
performance of legislatures and legislators, the higher the levels of trust conferred. And, 
on the contrary, poorer performance evaluation would lead to lower levels of trust.  
iii) The contagion from the parties. Political parties provide the personnel 
legislatures are staffed with. Therefore, the images individuals have of parties should 
have some impact on the attitudes they have toward legislatures. The contagion from the 
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parties upon legislatures would operate in a rather straightforward manner: the poorer the 
images of parties, the lower the confidence in the parliament.  
iv) The party system. Political parties serve as the link between the represented 
and their representatives. At the country level, there are certain features of the party 
system that indicate parties being responsive to their voters and to citizens in general. 
Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living in polities which such characteristics 
will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in countries with less responsive 
parties. Specifically, I argue that the effective number of political parties, their degree of 
polarization, and the extent to which political parties have stable roots in society all have 
an impact upon citizens’ levels of trust in legislatures.  
 
Views of Congressional Processes: More Complex than a Paradox 
 
Previous research on the link between citizens’ views of the democratic 
procedures that take place in congress and esteem for the institution have resorted to an 
explanation I have called the Paradox of Democratic Representation: citizens would not 
like legislatures because they do precisely what they were intended to: deliberate and 
operate as a counterbalance to presidential power (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; 
Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Unlike the judiciaries, 
legislatures are open and transparent institutions; virtually everything that takes place 
within them can be observed by citizens (Caldeira 1986; Hibbing and Larimer 2003). 
Parliamentary politics are, thus, “painfully visible for all to see” (Hibbing and Larimer 
2008, 9).  
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This is not a novel idea; scholars first pointed this out more than three decades 
ago (Davidson and Parker 1972; Parker and Davidson 1979). The obstacles that the 
nature of the institution represents for its gaining of public esteem have been 
acknowledged in many pieces on attitudes toward legislatures (Hibbing and Larimer 
2008; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Mann and Ornstein 1994; Patterson and Magleby 
1992). Surprisingly, however, it has been empirically tested in just a few, yielding 
significant results in all of them. (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Hibbing and 
Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) 
There is, nonetheless, a qualification to the argument. The force driving the 
disregard for assemblies would not be their democratic processes in the abstract, but the 
way in which they are actually carried out; “…it is not what government does but how it 
does it that seems to be telling” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001, 244). Along the same 
lines, Funk argues there are two dimensions of public disregard for debate: one arises 
from the conflictive nature of the debate, but the other refers to the disregard for the way 
elites perform it (Funk 2001). 
I argue, however, that the Paradox argument needs further specification. 
Advocates of the Paradox overlook the fact that citizens might have differential attitudes 
toward different exercises of the key congressional practices: some debate could be 
acceptable, even desirable in many citizens’ minds, but if deliberative practices are 
perceived to last forever with no consequences, then, their views of one of the keystone 
of parliaments should be tinted of negative feelings. The evidence from the focus groups 
points to a certain level of desired debate and confrontation: 
 
Sometimes, when the issue at stake is worthy, [debate] it is important; the discussions 
have to be important. But I believe that what is under discussion sometimes is not very 
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technical, they end up being trapped into politics and not [paying attention] to the 
technicalities.  
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
 
That all of them [congressmembers] agree? No! No way!  
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
 
 
Thus, it would not be that citizens reject congressional practices tout court, but 
only when they perceive such practices at their extreme. Therefore, views of a congress 
that debates and controls the president do not have to hurt levels of confidence in the 
institution –on the contrary, they might enhance them, given that the legislature is doing 
what it is supposed to by constitutional mandate. However, views of a parliament in 
which there is too much debate and too much confrontation with the executive, and that is 
therefore known for what it prevents rather from what it does, will impact negatively in 
the levels of support for the institution.  
 
  
Poorly Evaluated Performance 
 
 Besides the processes that citizens observe, the products of those processes are 
also an input for general attitudes toward parliaments. Thus, what it is that legislatures 
produce before the citizens’ eyes–regardless of how they do it- should also affect the 
levels of confidence in them. 
 Scholars have encountered that trust in government is affected by dissatisfaction 
with its outcomes (Citrin 1974; Dionne 1991; Fiorina 1992; Miller 1974). Likewise, 
appreciation for legislatures has been found to be  primarily driven by evaluations of its 
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outcomes (Parker 1977). Citizens would not be happy with what comes out of legislatures 
and those negative feelings lower their level of appreciation for the institution.  
 One of the grounds for evaluation of performance is the type of legislation passed 
by congress. If citizens see it as self-interested or irrelevant, then their levels of 
confidence in the institution should decay. 
 
     What we heard of representatives is that they raise their salaries and their 
vacation time. They do not realize we all need money! 
Interviewee A4, Ecuador 
 
      There is not a single transcendental thing that congress has done that you would say 
“How great!” 
Interviewee E3, Ecuador 
 
 
 Previous research has found that the low levels of esteem toward political 
institutions would be driven by the unfulfilled expectations regarding their performance 
(Achard and González 2004; Pharr 2000b).  When this thesis is applied to legislatures, it 
has been found that the difference between expectations and actual perceived 
performance generates dissatisfaction with the institution and negatively affects its 
evaluation (Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969).  
 Under some conditions, the poor approval might be due to inaccurate –often 
magnified- expectations about what a legislature is supposed to do.  Those aggrandized 
hopes might be fed by the legislators themselves: 
People do not know what a representative does. There are candidates that 
offer public works, the little soccer field, the school, the bus stop, a roof for the 
community meetings hall. And they win [the election]. And when they become 
representatives they cannot do those works, because representatives have other 
duties.  
Interviewee E2, Ecuador 
 
 35
 
 Accurate or not, citizens’ expectations about what legislatures should do shape 
their general views of it. Fulfilled expectations will bolster the confidence deposited in 
the institution. Conversely, when citizens perceive legislatures have failed in what they 
expected from them then trust levels will be negatively affected. 
 
The Contagion from the Parties 
 
Political parties are what legislatures are stuffed with. In most countries, 
individuals obtain seats in congress only in partisan basis.7 And parties are often the most 
visible face of legislatures, even more than individual legislators might be. Therefore, 
what individuals think of political parties should influence how they see the legislatures 
they fulfill. Astonishingly, however, views of parties have been mostly absent in 
explanations of esteem for parliaments. 
 Some scholars argue that partisan identification with the political party that holds 
the congressional majority should be associated with more favorable views of the 
legislature. The expectation is that those identified with such a party should feel closer to 
the institution because they have more favorable feelings toward those who staff it. 
(Keele 2005; Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001). The empirical evidence 
supports this hypothesis (Cook and Gronke 2005; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; 
Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). Others argue, 
                                                 
7 Although some countries do allow  independent candidates to run for congressional office. Those 
countries are: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, and Venezuela (AceProject 2008). 
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however, that partisanship should only have mild influence toward views of the 
legislatures (Hibbing and Larimer 2003), pointing to the fact that partisanship is relevant 
only to certain groups of the citizenry (Hibbing and Larimer 2008). 
 Hibbing and Larimer’s (2008) assertion that partisanship is relevant only for a 
subset of individuals holds true for Latin America. According to the AmericasBarometer 
2008, partisans are less than one third of Latin Americans (33%), and they can be as few 
as 16% in some countries, like in Ecuador. Thus, even when partisanship might affect the 
way citizens see legislatures, there are other, more universal attitudes toward political 
parties that might affect the levels of confidence in legislatures as well.  
The conventional wisdom is that parties do a poor job (Córdova Macías 2004). 
They are considered self-absorbed and away from people, and they are seen as corrupt 
entities. Theses views of parties cannot but hurt confidence in legislatures.  
Individuals view parties as organizations pursuing only their own objectives. As 
an interviewee puts it: 
 
Each party works for itself, for its own benefit. 
Interviewee A11, Ecuador 
 
  
Even if they are perceived as helping someone, they are thought to do so 
because they would obtain some benefit from it. Not infrequently parties are seen 
as co-opted by big interests: 
 
During the past 30 or 40 years, political parties in Ecuador have been job 
placement agencies, lobbying agencies, agencies that allowed interests to flow 
from political parties. You could identify –you still can- what party backed which 
bank or business. 
Interviewee E1, Ecuador 
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These images of distant parties are fostered by the perception that they get 
close to citizens only when elections get close to them: 
Only during campaign they [the political parties] reach out to talk to the 
people. 
Interviewee A1, Ecuador 
 
They think only of themselves. They only come to request the vote. 
Interviewee A3, Ecuador 
 
I have never felt represented. I see they have their careers, they are very well 
paid, they have their own prerogatives… And well, that is what they do. They do 
not take into account people’s opinions. 
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
 
 If parties fail to provide the representational link they are supposed to in a 
democratic polity (Sartori 1976), then it seems reasonable for individuals to transmit the 
arising frustration to the institution that typically holds them: the parliament. One of the 
young politicians interviewed in Ecuador exposes this idea very clearly: 
 
  Congress is a reflection of what politicians, political parties, and the 
political structure of the country are. If we have decaying political parties, with 
people linked to corruption episodes, well, that is the congress we have: it is the 
collection of those people. 
Interviewee E14, Ecuador 
 
The generalized poor images of political parties need to be improved for citizens 
to regain esteem in the legislatures where they operate. For this to happen, it seems 
necessary for parties to do a better job and establish a closer representation link with their 
constituents.  
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The Party System 
 
The role of institutions has lately come to center stage in explaining citizens’ 
political attitudes and behaviors (Helmke and Levistky 2006; Norris 1999b; Norris 2004). 
Formal and informal institutions provide the framework in which citizens relate to each 
other and to political institutions (North 1990, 3-6),  therefore circumscribing the 
possibilities for those relationships. 
Previous research has found that the type of system –whether parliamentary of 
presidential- makes a difference in the dynamics through which system support and 
confidence in legislatures are shaped (Criado and Herrero 2007). There is no, however, 
conclusive evidence regarding what type of system leads to greater support (Anderson 
and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999b). In Latin America all regimes are presidential, which 
prevent us from engaging in the analyses of the impact of type of regime 
However, Latin American countries differ greatly in other institutional 
characteristics, such as the party system. At the country level, there are certain features of 
the party system that indicate parties being responsive to their voters and to citizens in 
general. Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living in polities with such 
characteristics will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in countries with less 
responsive parties.  
The number of political parties with representation in the legislative assembly 
shapes the way in which the body operates. In multi-party systems, legislative bargains 
and negotiations can take long, since there are (perhaps too) many positions to conciliate. 
As one interviewee puts it: 
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There are too many [parties]. In the Unites States there are only two. Here, we 
should have two. Otherwise, they do not reach agreements. When one says 
“this,” the other says “that.” 
Interviewee A1, Ecuador 
 
Therefore, as the number of political parties with seats in the assembly increases, 
so would the disaffection with the institution that hosts them, probably seen as 
unproductive or, at least, inefficient. Similarly, as the political positions in the assembly 
are polarized, gridlock will be the most probable outcome and therefore support for the 
institution will decay (Norris 1999b). 
Finally, when a stable party system exists, it means that competition for 
representation has been routinized  (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). If parties have stable 
roots in society, it means they are meaningful to citizens and that they are accomplishing 
(at least partially) their expected functions (otherwise citizens would not continue voting 
for them, or identifying with them). Thus, I expect to find greater levels of trust in 
legislatures among those individuals living in polities where political parties have stable 
roots in society.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 TRUST IN LEGISLATURES: MORE COMPLEX THAN A PARADOX 
 
 
 In the previous chapter it was argued that the relationship between citizens’ views 
of the processes that take place in the Legislature and their expressed lack of support for 
the institution might be more complex than previous theorizing has argued and empirical 
research has found. I argue instead that it is not that citizens reject the democratic 
practices that take place in Congress tout court, but only when they perceive those 
practices to be excessive. In other words, they do not support democracy when its 
practices are viewed as extreme or at least excessive. Rather, as Aristotle argued long 
ago, citizens prefer all things “in moderation,” which is, after all, the argument that 
Almond and Verba made in the classical work that began all modern research on political 
culture (Almond and Verba 1963). 
I have also argued that if confidence in the legislatures is built at least partially on 
the basis of its outcomes, then performance evaluation of the institution and of those who 
staff it should affect such confidence. I hypothesize that positive evaluations of 
legislators and positive views of political parties would increase the overall level of 
support for the institution, as expressed by the level of confidence in it.  
This chapter explores citizens’ attitudes in all these three dimensions: 
congressional processes, performance evaluation of legislatures, and views of political 
parties; their impact upon trust in parliaments is assessed. It begins with the discussion of 
the dependent variable –citizen trust- and its measurement. Next, each of the three main 
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explanatory factors is depicted, and its bivariate relationship with confidence in the 
legislature discussed. Then, alternative explanations of trust are explored. Finally, the 
chapter ends with the multivariate analysis of the determinants of trust in legislatures in 
Latin America and the corresponding discussion of the main findings. 
 
 
Trust in Legislatures in Latin America 
 
 
 
 Low levels of confidence in political institutions have been found worldwide 
(Dalton 1999; Dalton 2006; Norris 1999b). Not only do individuals have very little trust 
in legislatures, courts, and presidents -the pillar institutions of democracy;  they trust 
them less than they used to (Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999a). In this context, 
parliaments hold the dubious distinction of being –by far, in many cases- the least trusted 
national political institution, a position only contested by political parties, the other key 
institution of representation (Dalton and Weldon 2005; Dalton 2000). 
 Legislatures have never been the most trusted of the three branches of 
government; in three of the four waves of survey data available from the World Values 
Survey (WVS 2006), they have been the least trusted institution (Figure III.1), having 
surpassed the midpoint of the scale only during the eighties.1 
  
                                                 
1 The World Values Survey asks its respondents the following: “I am going to name a number of 
organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?”  Valid results range from 1 
“A great deal of confidence” to 4 “None at all.” For the data here presented, the original scale was inverted 
for greater values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means 
values, the inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates “none at all” and 100 
“a great deal of confidence.”  
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Figure III.1. Confidence in political institutions across the world 
 
  
The AmericasBarometer data depict the same patterns for Latin America. 
Legislatures hold the lowest levels of trust (41.3) when compared to the courts (44.6) and 
the presidents (51.0), the only institution that achieves levels of trust higher –though 
barely- than the midpoint of the scale (Figure III.2).2  
 
                                                 
2 The scores reported are the mean levels of trust in the institutions in a scale that ranges from 0 “Not at all” 
to 100 “A lot.” These values correspond to a recoded version of the original scale that ranged from 1 “Not 
at all” to 7 “A lot.” 
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Figure III.2. Trust in political institutions in Latin America 
 
 
 
On the Measurement of Trust 
 
 
 Following  Carlin (2008), in this research trust in legislatures indicates the belief 
trustworthiness of the institution; individuals are thought to trust the institution if they see 
it as a depositary of their confidence. This definition is empirically measured by means of 
a survey question included in the set of questions about trust of the AmericasBarometer, 
which is preceded by the following statement: 
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Now we will use a card. This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score 
that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked 
you to what extent you like watching television, if you don’t like watching it at all, you 
would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you 
would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose 
an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the 
number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]. 
 
 This introductory statement aims at familiarizing the interviewee with the 1 to 7 
scale, what it means, and how it should be used to express his attitudes. The TV example 
serves to practice the use of the scale, without prompting the confidence questions in 
anyway. 
 Individual respondents are handed a card showing a scale as depicted in Figure 
III.3. As for many other questions in the AmericasBarometer and other public opinion 
surveys, the use of the card facilitates comprehension of the scale provided to answer. 
 
Figure III.3. Card used in AmericasBarometer survey 
 
 
Following the same format all questions on trust in institutions have, the question 
on confidence in legislatures says: 
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To what extent do you trust the National Congress?3 
  
 An additional step in helping to ensure comprehension is made by using in each 
country the word most commonly employed by citizens to refer to the national 
legislature. Thus, in Argentina the question refers to “Congreso,” in Costa Rica to the 
“Asamblea Legislativa,” and in Uruguay to “Parlamento.” Likewise, in those countries 
where local legislatures operate, the question specifies it is about the “national” assembly. 
 This question aims at measuring degrees of confidence in legislatures, one of the 
ways in which trust in institutions can be and has been approached (Levi and Stoker 
2000, 476).  Although not specifically designed for this dissertation,4 the question format 
shares common ground with that used in other research. It shares the assumption of 
graded levels of trust  -from none to a great deal- with the operationalizations of Hibbing 
and Patterson (1994) and Cooper (1999a): 
  
In order to get ahead, people need to have confidence and to feel that they can trust 
themselves and others. To what degree do you think that you trust [the parliament] totally, 
to a certain point, little, or not at all? (Hibbing and Patterson 1994, 591) 
 
How much confidence do you have in the following institutions – a great deal, quite a 
lot, some, or very little? (Cooper 1999a, 190) 
 
 The reliance on a 7-point scale rather than on four ordinal categories improves the 
quality of the question in terms of the alternatives offered to the respondent to express his 
feelings  (Alwin 1997; Cox 1980), and also in terms of reliability (Cox 1980). 
                                                 
3 This is question B13 in the AmericasBarometer questionnaire. In Spanish, it reads: “¿Hasta qué punto 
tiene Usted confianza en el Congreso Nacional?” A sample Spanish questionnaire can be found in Annex 
C. 
4 The question of trust in legislatures has been part of the trust series of the LAPOP surveys since the 
1970s. 
 46
Some scholars argue, however, that the continuum from “no trust at all” to “a lot 
of trust” is incomplete because it offers a truncated range of possibilities (Cook and 
Gronke 2005, 785). They argue that the negative side of the continuum should be offered 
as well, allowing for the expression of distrust, as an attitude distinguishable from lack of 
trust (Cook and Gronke, 785; Mishler and Rose 1997, 420). The supporters of this 
perspective ask questions like this: 
There are many different institutions in this country, for example, the government, 
courts, police, civil servants. Please show me on this 7-point scale, where 1 represents 
great distrust and 7 represents great trust, how much is your personal trust in each of the 
following. (Mishler and Rose 1997, 430) 
 
  
One of the strongest arguments in favor of this type of question is that it allows for 
separating mere skeptical from distrusting citizens. For instance, Mishler and Rose 
separate their respondents into trusting (scores of 6 and 7), distrusting (scores of 1 and 2), 
and skeptical (scores of 3, 4, or 5) (Mishler and Rose 1997, 424).  
There are reasons, though, to question this argument in the context of my research. 
On theoretical grounds, the conceptual definition of trust as the belief in the 
trustworthiness of the trustee posits the negative end of the continuum in the lack of 
confidence, equivalent to the “Not at all” option provided in the survey question. It is not 
the intention of this research to separate the individuals into groups according their type –
whether trusting, distrusting, or skeptical- but to dig into how the degrees of trust or 
confidence in legislatures are shaped.  
On a more empirical vein, it is not clear at all how a 7-point scale that ranges from 
1 to 7 –as employed by Mishler and Rose (1997) would capture a bipolar range of 
attitudes toward legislatures, while those typically are measured using a negative to 
positive scale (in this case, the corresponding would be a -3 to 3 scale). Experimental 
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research has shown how results drastically change when using only positive as opposed 
to negative-to-positive scales, even when the same concepts are involved in both 
(Schwarz et al. 1991).  
 Thus, even when the conceptualization of a continuum from active distrust to 
active trust might be an analytical gain for some research enterprises, it does not add 
theoretical leverage to mine, and its measurement remains, at least, problematic.  
 
Trust in Legislatures 
 
  It has been shown that legislatures are the least trusted institution worldwide and 
also in Latin America (Figures III.1 and III.2). This general picture, however, hides 
important variations at the country level. Trust in legislatures is at its lowest value in 
Ecuador, where it only achieves an average of 21.8 points in a 0 to 100 scale, and its 
highest is Mexico, with 55.6 points (Figure III.4).5 It is worth noticing than in only five 
countries does trust in parliaments reach averages above the midpoint of the scale, 
situated at 50 points. Those countries are: Mexico, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, 
Colombia, and Chile.  The differences at the country level are statistically significant, as 
shown by the analysis of variance presented in Table III.1. 
 
                                                 
5 The original values of the 1-7 scale were recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate the analysis. 
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Figure III.4. Trust in legislatures, by country 
 
Table III.1. Analysis of variance. Trust in legislatures by country 
Source Sum of 
squares 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
Mean Sum 
of Squares 
F Prob > F 
Between 
groups 
2689524.91 17 158207.348 192.63 0.0000 
Within 
groups 
23200483.3 28249 821.285117   
      
Total 25890008.2 28266 915.941703   
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More Complex than a Paradox 
 
  
 The Paradox of Democratic Representation refers to the irony that parliaments 
would be disregarded for doing precisely what they are supposed to do by constitutional 
mandate: to debate, to deliberate, and to work as a counterbalance of the president. 
Previous research has shown that the more debate there is in the United States Congress, 
and the more Congress counterbalances the President, the less citizens approve of the 
institution (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997). Similarly,  citizens see little value in 
debate, and therefore they do not approve the institution (Hibbing and Larimer 2003).  
 Funk’s (2001) and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001) argue that popular disregard 
for this legislative practices does not arise from the practices themselves, in the abstract, 
but rather by how they are carried out by legislators. If this qualification to the argument 
is accepted, then the paradox is no longer a paradox: there is nothing inherent in the 
nature of the activities legislatures must engage in that would make citizens hold them in 
low esteem. On the contrary, it would be the way in which such practices are actually 
(mis?) performed that raises the negative feelings toward the institution.  
 Advancing one step further in this line of reasoning, I argue that citizens view 
these bedrock congressional activities in a negative light only when they perceive them to 
be taken to the extreme: when there is too much debate and too much gridlock. And when 
that is the case, then perceptions about those legislative activities affect support for the 
institution negatively. Conversely, when citizens see legislative debate and 
counterbalance within the boundaries of what they deem reasonable, perhaps even 
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healthy, then positive views about such practices should translate into greater levels of 
confidence in the institution.6 
 The evidence from the fieldwork suggests that for some citizens it is clear that the 
parliament needs to engage in debate and control of the executive, and that is even 
portrayed as an obligation of the institution: 
 
 There has to be dialogue because they have to reach an agreement. 
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
  
 For the most sophisticated ones, the link between the legislative activities and a 
healthy democracy is crystal clear: 
 
 Democracy has to exist. And for democracy to exist and to prevent the executive 
from having and overwhelming power, then a legislative power has to exist, and it has to 
fulfill a counterbalance function. It has to investigate, it has to stop [the president] when 
necessary. 
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
 
  
 But these citizens who claim these practices must be carried out for the institution 
to function properly are also dissatisfied with the way they have been performed. Even in 
Uruguay, where –again, according to the evidence from the fieldwork- individuals appear 
to have higher respect for the institutional practices than in Ecuador, citizens are 
concerned, sometimes even angry at how legislative debate is taken to the extreme: 
 
 You see…they took school kids to Congress, they sat [in the legislators’ seats]. 
Thus, the kids were really proud of being there, playing that role. A few days later, the 
gentlemen that occupy the seats engage in a fight, a fistfight.  
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
 
 
                                                 
6 How much debate or gridlock is too much is a subjective matter, and the thresholds probably vary from 
one individual to another. What is important for the argument, however, is that once that threshold is 
passed, then trust is negatively affected by views of congressional processes. 
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In Ecuador, the complaint about a legislature that debates too much is nearly 
unanimous. The clash of points of views has at times reached grotesque levels:  
 
They are all the same; they fight among themselves all the time. I remember once 
when someone pulled out a gun. And they don’t even know what they are fighting for. 
They should look for solutions, but they do not act in that fashion. 
Participant Group Interview 4, Ecuador 
 
 Thus, if the predominant view of legislatures is one of excessive confrontation 
and obstructionism, then it should translate into low levels of confidence. To test this 
hypothesis, it is first necessary to know how it is that citizens view the legislative 
activities that raised the argument of the paradox. Two questions were devised to tap 
citizens’ feelings regarding the quintessential activities parliaments perform: one of them 
aims at attitudes toward discussion and debates, the other toward the check and balance 
to presidential power.   
 
 
To what extent do members of Congress waste time discussing and debating? 
 
To what extent does the national Congress hinder the President’s job? 
 
 
 
 The respondents were asked to express their feelings in a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 “Not at all” to 7 “A lot,” with the aid of a card as shown in Figure III.3. To 
facilitate analysis, the original responses were recoded into a 0 – 100 scale, in which 0 
means “Not at all” and 100 means “A lot.”  
 The wording of the question was conceived for it to reflect not the ideal activities 
assemblies should perform in a democratic polity, but the actual practices carried out by 
the institution and its members, with special interest in tapping the excess that is key to 
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the hypothesis. Simply asking whether there is or should be debate or counterbalance of 
power posits the risk of obtaining responses in the normative side: “yes, there should be 
debate in the parliament,” “the assembly must operate as a counterbalance to the 
president.” Also, there is the risk of the social desirability effect. Social desirability refers 
to present oneself in most favorable light possible (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 
5). Applied to the context of legislative procedures, the social desirability effect might 
make citizens provide favorable responses toward debates and counterbalance of power 
just because they think that is the right thing to say. 
 Thus, the question wording was carefully selected for it to make it clear that the 
questions were about actual performance of those democratic processes asked about. 
Some could argue that the framing of the questions is somehow negative (“waste time,” 
“hinder”). The decision to adopt this wording was founded on the aim of elucidating the 
most negative attitudes toward debates and counterbalance practices. By simply asking 
whether there are debates or counterbalance activities in the legislature, it is not possible 
to distinguish among those who view the activities in a favorable light from those who 
see them negatively (everyone who perceives there is a lot of debate, for instance, would 
provide a high number in the scale, regardless of whether they see this as a good practice 
or a bad one). Thus, adding this somehow negative slant or bias allows those who see the 
current practices of democratic processes in bad light to state it.  
 Finally, the question about legislative debate could be criticized by some for 
being double-barreled because it states “discussing and debating.” If the two activities 
were of different nature (for instance, discussing and passing pork barrel legislation) the 
criticism might be accurate.  Discussing and debating, however, are close knitted 
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activities that go together; they can even be used as synonyms. 7 The decision for using 
both of them was made aiming at providing the clearest possible frame for interviewees, 
reinforcing the idea of what was meant to ask.   
 
Excessive Congressional Debate 
 
Citizens of Latin America believe there is excessive congressional debate 
in the legislatures. The average response for the question “To what extent do 
members of Congress waste time discussing and debating?” is 67.1 (for a 0-100 
possible range), with a standard deviation of 32.1 (for 27,142 cases across the 17 
countries). This mean value is far above the midpoint of the scale (50), which 
indicates most citizens lean toward strong sentiments about congressmembers 
wasting their time discussing and debating. One third of the sample (33.9%) gave 
the most extreme possible response: they believe “a lot” congressmen waste their 
time discussing and debating (Figure III.5).  
 
                                                 
7 Actually, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary they are synonyms; the distinction would be that: 
“discuss implies a sifting of possibilities especially by presenting considerations pro and con […] debate 
suggests formal or public argument between opposing parties.”  Merriam-Webster, Dictionary. 2008 [cited 
September 2008. Available from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discuss.] 
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Figure III.5. Perceived excessive congressional debate, Latin America 
 
 When analyzing the individual country data, we find a set of countries in which 
there is near perfect consensus that legislators waste time in discussion and debate: in El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, the average of agreement with the statement 
reflecting the waste of time by congressmembers is above 75; that is, it is in the upper 
quarter of the scale (Figure III.6). Most of the remaining countries show averages 
between 50 and 75, with the only exception of Venezuela. This country has an 
exceptionally low average for the context: only 40 points.8 
                                                 
8 This figure is not surprising when the actual distribution of power within the Venezuelan legislature is 
taken into account. All of 167 congressmember are either from the President’s party of from a party 
sympathetic to him (Freidenberg 2007, 75). The lack of opposition surely impacts in the perceived levels of 
discussion and debate; if they all are on the same side, it is to expect little perceived waste of time in 
debates.  
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Figure III.6. Perceived excessive congressional debate, by country 
 
 
 Thus, most Latin American citizens believe their legislators waste too much time 
discussing and debating. If the hypothesis above stated holds true, the levels of trust in 
the assembly among those citizens most critical of the excessive congressional debate 
should be low.  
 56
 
26.5
36.3
42.2
47.8
49.7
46.4
36.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
T
ru
st
Not at all 16.7 33.3 50.0 66.7 83.3 A lot
To what extent do members of Congress waste
 time discussing and debating?
Source:AmericasBarometer 2008 N=26,357  
Figure III.7. Trust in legislature by levels of perceived excessive debate, Latin America 
 
 
Figure III.7 depicts the bivariate relationship between perceived levels of 
excessive debate and confidence in the assemblies. Contrary to the argument of the 
paradox, the observed relationship is curvilinear. Latin American legislatures are not 
disregarded as they do what they are supposed to do; rather, confidence increases as the 
level of perceived time devoted to discussion and debate increases. But this positive 
relationship holds only to a point, upon which it turns negative. Consistently with my 
hypothesis about a more complex landscape than that portrayed by the argument of the 
paradox, the negative part of the curve suggests that only when the democratic processes 
–in this case, debate and discussion- are perceived as carried out in extreme fashion is 
that support for the institution drops. 
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The eyeball observed quadratic relationship is confirmed by additional tests. A 
quadratic fit models the data much better than a linear one (see Figure AIII.1 in Annex 
F). Furthermore, when the effect of perceived excessive debate upon trust in legislatures 
is modeled in a polynomial regression function, the quadratic relation is confirmed by the 
statistical significance of the quadratic term (see Table AIII.1 in Annex F).9 
The pattern shown in Figure III.7 is striking in terms of what it suggests about 
citizens’ views of congressional democratic practices in Latin America Congressional 
debate is perceived as excessive by most of them. Even responses in the lower end of the 
scale indicate they believe, to some extent, that legislators “waste time discussing and 
debating.” That belief, however, does not affect negatively trust in the institution except 
for when it is perceived as truly excessive.10 On the contrary, time devoted to discussion 
and debate, yet framed as a “waste” in the question wording, would be valued positively 
given that it bolsters confidence in the institution. The relationship between perceived 
excessive debate and trust in legislatures turns negative only at the highest levels of 
perceived excessive debate. This indicates, again, that it is not the process itself, but how 
it is perceived as carried out to the extreme what affects negatively the support for the 
institution.  
 
                                                 
9 One way of testing a curvilinear relation between variables is to introduce the independent variable of 
interest as a quadratic term in the model (Agresti and Finlay 1999, 544; Gujarati 2003, 226). In this case, to 
test the impact of disregard for congressional debate upon trust in legislatures, both disregard for 
congressional debate and disregard for congressional debate squared are introduced as independent 
variables in a simple OLS model explaining trust in legislatures. As shown in Table AIII.1, the impact of 
the quadratic term is statistically significant, although the disregard for congressional debate itself does not 
reach major explanatory power, given the low Adjusted R-Square of the model.  
10 The change of direction in the relation occurs when the slope has a value 0, the point where trust reaches 
its maximum. This happens when the perception of excessive congressional debate reaches 58. This figure 
is the result of dividing the negative value of the regression coefficient for perception of excessive 
congressional debate by twice the value of the coefficient for perception of excessive congressional debate 
squared (shown in Table AIII.1) as suggested by Agresti and Finlay (1999, 547). 
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In any case, debates and discussion are only one of the democratic processes that 
take place in congress. Further confirmation of the hypothesis linking views of those 
processes and trust in the legislature is sought in the following section.  
 
Excessive Counterbalance Function 
 
The doctrine of separation of powers rules contemporary democracies; in the 
frame of such institutional arrangement, parliaments are called to oversee and control the 
executive. Are assemblies punished by the public when perceived playing this role? I 
argue that such is the case only when they are seen as doing it in excess.   
Latin American attitudes toward the role of parliaments as a counterweight to 
presidential authority seem more moderate than the views they hold toward 
congressional debate. The average of responses to the question “To what extent does 
Congress hinder the Presidents’ job?” is 48.2, with a standard deviation of 30.1 (for 
25,823 interviews). This mean value is slightly lower than the midpoint of the scale (50 
points), which suggests that, on average, Latin Americans do not see parliaments as 
excessively blocking the job of their presidents.  As depicted by the histogram shown in 
Figure III.8, the distribution of responses is approximately normal, with a high 
concentration of cases among the middle values (56.9% of the sample lies in the three 
middle values), and few cases found at the extremes. 
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Figure III.8. Perceived excessive congressional counterbalance, Latin America 
 
 The levels of perceived congressional counterbalance vary significantly by 
country, although the range of variation is smaller than that observed for perceived 
excessive debate. While in Venezuela, Argentina and Honduras citizens do not seem to 
see the Congress as a hinder to the President’s job, in seven other countries (Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and Guatemala) the perceived function of 
counterbalance as a hinder reaches averages that surpass the midpoint of the scale (Figure 
III.9).  
  
I 
 
 60
32.1
35.4
35.6
43.5
44.3
44.8
45.4
49.1
49.2
49.3
49.5
50.9
51.7
52.0
53.9
54.6
55.5
56.0
0 20 40 60
To what extent does Congress hinder
 the President's job?
Venezuela
Honduras
Argentina
Nicaragua
Peru
Paraguay
Uruguay
El Salvador
Panama
Dominican Republic
Colombia
Guatemala
Bolivia
Mexico
Chile
Brazil
Ecuador
Costa Rica
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 N =  25,822
 
Figure III.9. Perceived congressional counterbalance, by country 
 
 
 
 When the link between views of excessive congressional counterbalance and trust 
in legislatures is assessed, the expected relationship is found: trust in legislatures drops 
only when congressional counterbalance is seen as operating at its extreme. 
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 Trust in legislatures grows as the institution is perceived to be engaged in the 
control function, but the relationship shifts to the opposite direction after crossing a 
threshold of perceived counterbalance, after which levels of confidence in the institution 
drop (Figure III.10). Also in this case, it is not the disregard for the parliamentary 
democratic process itself what would drive confidence levels low, but the disregard for 
that process performed in such an extreme manner that it is no longer appreciated. 
 Also in this case the quadratic relationship is confirmed by the fitted models 
(Figure AIII.3 in Annex F) and a polynomial regression function (Table AIII.2, also in 
Annex F). The analysis of the coefficients (presented in Table AIII.2) indicates that the 
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relationship between the two variables turns negative after values of perceived 
congressional counterbalance of 60,1.11  
 In citizens’ views, then, some counterweight is acceptable, but when it turns to 
gridlock then it is no longer seen in a positive light: 
 
[Congress] has to be a counterweight, but it cannot be an obstacle 
Participant Group 1, Uruguay 
 
[The issue of counterbalancing] is a serious problem, it [for the Congress] can be a stick 
in the spokes 
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
 
 
 The preceding analysis suggests that Latin Americans do not reject congressional 
democratic procedures tout court, even when they are asked about them in a relatively 
negative framing. Views of legislatures engaged in debate and in counterweighing the 
power of the president enhances the levels of trust in the institution. However, when the 
perceived levels of debate and counterbalance reach high, then the relationship with trust 
reverses, and it turns negative: too much confrontation (within the legislature and with 
the president) lowers confidence in the institution.12  
 Hence, there should not be a concern about citizens’ rejection of the democratic 
processes that take place in congress and its consequences for trust. For the most part, 
perceptions of a legislature engaged in such processes and trust in it rise together. Trust is 
only hurt when too much debate and too much obstruction to the presidential will is 
perceived. In this sense, this is good news in terms of perspectives for institutional 
support. Views of the institutional processes would not be deterministically sabotaged by 
                                                 
11 See footnote 9 above. 
12 Although the pattern of relationship between each of the two independent variables and trust is similar, 
the variables do not add to a unique index. The coefficient of reliability is too low: Cronbach’s Alpha 
0.528. 
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its own nature, so they can be enhanced, leading -according to the hypothesis- to higher 
levels of confidence in it.  
 
Performance Evaluation 
 
Is has just been shown that confidence in legislatures moves with perceptions 
about how those processes are carried out. A second major hypothesis of this research 
argues that trust is also affected by the views about the products of such processes.  
An institution that fails to produce the outcomes it is supposed to (or those 
individuals expect from it) could maintain the confidence of the public in the short term, 
but consistently low achievement ratings would hurt this link in the mid and long run.  
Why would citizens trust an institution that fails to provide what it is supposed to?  An 
institution that does not deliver cannot be held worthy of trust for long. Thus, in this 
section, the focus of the analysis changes from how legislators do their job to how the 
output of such processes is evaluated.  
A positive evaluation about legislative outcomes can enhance support for the 
institution regardless of how the processes by which that outcome is reached are viewed. 
In that sense, evaluation of what congress does is an independent explanatory factor of 
trust. According to the hypothesis about performance evaluation of legislatures, then, the 
more satisfied citizens are with the job done by the institution, the higher the confidence 
they will deposit in it. 
An Ecuadorian interviewee said he trusted the new Congress more than the older 
one because  
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they are passing good laws. 
Participant Group Interview A7, Ecuador 
 
Conversely, a participant in one of the focus groups in Uruguay expressed her 
disappointment with legislators: 
 
There are too many, and they do not do much 
Participant Group 2, Uruguay 
 
These views of institutional performance are related to the professed trust: they 
trust more when they see the institution doing a better job. Three different, 
complimentary measures of performance evaluation are to be used: importance of the 
laws passed by congress, job approval of congressmembers, and extent to which citizens’ 
own expectations of parliament are fulfilled.   
How important citizens believe the laws passed by the legislature are, expresses 
the perceived relevance of the institution; this is a general indicator of the perceived 
importance the institution has for the country. Certainly, passing laws is not the only task 
performed by congress, but it is surely the most visible one to the general public. Even 
without having abundant information about the specifics on the approved laws, 
individuals hold general views of whether the bulk of those laws are trivial or important 
for the country. As the laws are perceived as important, then the confidence in the 
institution should raise. 
Now, what an individual perceives is important for the country, might bear no 
relationship with what he deems personally important. For instance, a protective measure 
for the importation of agricultural goods could not be considered a law important for the 
country by many, but it can be the only concern of a farmer whose entire business 
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depends on such a law. Therefore, if legislatures are assessed in light of more personal 
concerns -a sort of “pocketbook” evaluation of the institution- then an additional 
indicator tapping into these more personal concerns should be explored. The way to do it 
is to inquire to what extent the institution has accomplished what it was expected to, 
whatever that expectation is in the citizens’ mind. 
The idea that unfulfilled expectations would lead to lower levels of esteem for the 
United States Congress is the driving hypothesis of Kimball and Patterson (1997); it is 
also one of the main findings of Miller and Listhaug (1999) in their study about 
confidence in political institutions in Norway, Sweden, and the United States. The 
approach here is different from theirs in some respects. Kimball and Patterson were 
concerned with expectations about performance of the members, not about the institution, 
as it is the case here. To develop their indicator of to what extent expectations were 
fulfilled, the authors asked a series of question on traits congressmembers should have, 
and then they asked about which one of them they actually had. The difference between 
expectations and actual performance is their indicator of the extent to which expectations 
are fulfilled (Kimball and Patterson 1997, 707-708). Miller and Listhaug, on the other 
hand, relied on the Eurobarometer question of satisfaction with the way democracy works 
in the country as a proxy measure for the degree to which citizens’ expectations are 
fulfilled by the regime (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 205). 
In an approach more similar to that of Miller and Listhaug, in this research the 
difference between expectations and actual performance is not assessed ex-post by the 
investigators but it is left to the interviewee. An additional advantage of this 
operationalization is that it avoids the noise from country-level differences in the 
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important activities or traits congress should have, which might obscure the individual-
level analysis. However, unlike the general “satisfaction with democracy” question used 
by Miller and Listhaug, the extent to which citizens’ expectations are fulfilled are tapped 
by means of a specific question on congressional performance. 
Finally, beyond the evaluation of the importance of the laws and the fulfilled 
expectations, congressional performance is evaluated also through the appraisal of the job 
done by congressmembers. This adds to the previous two measures the assessment of the 
job done by those who staff the institution. It might be argued that the question on 
general expectations already reflects the evaluation of legislators. But this is, however, a 
different aspect of the institutional performance.  
Asking interviewees how well legislators are doing their job changes the focus 
from the institution to the individual members, bringing a new element into 
consideration.13 Surely, one might expect citizens to hope for legislators to do a good job, 
and if they perceive them to do it, then their expectations about the institution should be 
fulfilled, but only in that regard.14 
The first dimension discussed –the importance of the laws passed by the 
legislature- aims at tapping citizens’ general views about the relevance of the work done 
by the institution. The second, the one on expectations, aims at tapping the other end: the 
evaluation of congressional performance in light of the individual concerns and 
expectations. Finally, the third dimension –job approval of legislators- digs into the 
evaluation of those who staff the institution, a distinct assessment from the previous two. 
                                                 
13 Individuals were told to think of members of the legislature as a whole, regardless the parties they 
represented. With this framing, I hoped to avoid the consideration of only a subset of members (such those 
belonging to the majority party or those the interviewee had voted for). 
14 Actually, although positively related, the correlation between the two variables is 0.37 (for N = 25,840). 
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The survey questions specifically designed to tap into these three aspects are the 
following: 
How important are for the country the laws passed by the legislature? 
 
To what extent does the Parliament do what you expect it to do?  
 
Now speaking of Congress. Thinking of members of congress as a whole, without 
considering the political parties which they belong to, do you believe that the 
congressmembers are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, 
poorly, or very poorly? 
 
For the first two questions, the interviewees were told to provide a response with 
the aid of a 1-7 scale as shown in Figure III.1. For the question on congressmembers’ job 
approval, the original five response categories ranged from 1 (very well) to 5 (very 
poorly). To facilitate the analysis, responses to all three questions were recoded into a 0-
100 scale. In all cases, low values, close to zero, indicate the least favorable responses to 
the institution (laws not important at all for the country, expectations not fulfilled at all, 
and very poor job performance evaluation). High values, close to 100, indicate the most 
favorable responses (laws have a lot of importance for the country, expectations are 
fulfilled a lot, and perception of congressmembers doing their job very well).15 
  
Importance of Laws Passed by the Legislature 
 
 If the laws passed by the legislature are deemed unimportant by the citizens, then 
the institution is failing to deliver one of its central functions, therefore eroding a key 
ground of support for itself. On average, however, citizens of Latin America consider that 
the laws passed by their national assemblies are important. The mean response –after the 
                                                 
15 For consistency purposes, the responses to the question on congressmembers job performance were 
inverted, so higher values indicate positive views, as it is the case with the other two variables. 
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recodification of the original scale- for this question is 56.9 (with a standard deviation of 
30.16, for 27,405 observations). That is, the belief in the importance of the laws passed 
by congress surpasses the midpoint of the scale, with a relative majority of individuals 
(20.6%) providing as a response exactly the midpoint of the scale, and half of the 
interviewees answering the highest three values (Figure III.11).  
 As it is usual, however, the average for the continent does not reflect accurately 
the reality for every country. In some countries, such as Uruguay, Dominican Republic, 
Colombia, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, the belief that the laws passed by the parliament are 
important is nearly unanimous (Figure III.12). In other countries, however, such approval 
does not even reach the midpoint of the scale. In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil, most 
citizens do not believe that the laws passed by Congress are important. 
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Figure III.11. Perceived importance of the laws passed by the legislature, Latin America 
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Ecuador is one of the countries with the lowest levels of perceived importance of 
congressional laws. What the elites interviewed there said coincides with the citizens’ 
perception: Congress would not do much good. 
 
Congressional outputs have been extremely poor in the past 15 or 20 years… the 
quality of it has been far less than desirable, and the practices have been absolutely 
regrettable. 
Interviewee E14, Ecuador 
 
Congress has never been an institution that you would say “Congress will solve it.” I 
don’t know… Then something happens and it all turns on its head… We [as 
businessmen] have never looked for Congress for support. 
Interviewee E3, Ecuador 
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Figure III.12. Perceived importance of the laws passed by the legislature, by country 
 
 
Individuals who hold these kinds of negative views toward the outputs of the 
institution are expected to hold low levels of confidence in it. Figure III.13 depicts the 
relationship between the perceived importance of the laws passed by the legislature and 
the levels of trust in the institution. As predicted by the overarching hypothesis on 
 71
performance evaluation, there is a positive relationship between the importance conferred 
to the laws and the confidence deposited in the institution: the highest levels of trust in 
the institution are found among those who perceive its laws as extremely important. 
Conversely, the lowest levels of trust are found among those who do not see the laws 
passed by the assembly important at all. 
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Figure III.13.Trust in legislatures by perceived importance of the laws passed by it, Latin 
America 
 
 
The gap between the levels of confidence in the institution among those who see 
its laws as not important at all (18.2) and those who see those laws as very important 
(51.1) is of more than 30 points (32.9, exactly).  Trust in the institution increases with 
every increase in the perceived importance of its laws, proving the expected positive 
relationship. The only exception is the slight decrease in confidence between the second 
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to last and last levels of perception of the importance of the congressional laws. This 
difference of 1.8 points is not, however, statistically significant. 
 Hence, the bivariate relationship between perceived importance of the laws 
passed by Congress and trust in the institution operates in the predicted direction, with 
the latter increasing with every increment of the former.  
 
 
Job Approval of Legislators 
 
 What legislators are perceived to do should affect support for the institution as 
well. Poorly evaluated congressmembers should affect confidence levels in legislatures 
negatively, since their mere presence in the chamber would contribute to the erosion of 
the trust in the institution itself.  
The average approval rating of legislators for the whole continent is significantly 
lower than the perceptions about the importance of the laws: 42.9 (with a standard 
deviation of 22.4, for 28,009 observations). Almost half of respondents provided an 
evaluation of “regular,” expressed by the midpoint of the scale. Less than 2% of the 
sample gave congressmembers the highest possible evaluation score, but more than five 
times that figure (10.4%) provided the most negative evaluation (Figure III.14).  
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Figure III.14. Job approval of legislators in Latin America 
 
 
 This average value below the midpoint of the scale indicates that the job of 
legislators in Latin America is deemed less than acceptable by the citizens. In only three 
of the 18 countries –Uruguay, Dominican Republic, and Colombia- the mean levels of 
approval for legislators are above the midpoint of the scale, though not for much (Figure 
III.15) 
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Figure III.15. Job approval of legislators, by country  
 
  
For most of the remaining countries, job approval ratings of legislators suggest 
evaluations of performance are lower than acceptable. In most of those countries, the 
ratings are within a range of ten points below the midpoint. However, in Ecuador and 
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Paraguay, the mean approval scores barely surpass 30 points, indicating a much poorer 
perceived performance than in the rest of the continent. 
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Figure III.16. Trust in legislatures by job approval of legislators, Latin America 
 
Figure III.16 depicts the relationship between legislators’ job approval ratings and 
trust in assemblies. The relationship runs in the predicted direction: confidence in the 
institution increases with favorable approval ratings. The gap in confidence levels 
between those who see the legislators doing a poor job (21.2) and those who see them 
doing a very good one (62.9) is of more than 40 points.  
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Unfulfilled Expectations 
 
 The extent to which citizens’ expectations are fulfilled is the third dimension to 
explore along the lines of the perception evaluation hypothesis. Individuals disappointed 
with the legislative outcomes should trust their parliaments less. Unfulfilled expectations 
are a sign that legislatures failed to do what the citizens were expecting them to do. If 
such failure is seen as deceiving, then the levels of trust in the institution should be 
negatively affected. 
 On average, citizens of Latin America do not see their expectations about 
congress fulfilled by the institution. The mean response to the question about fulfilled 
expectations is 37.3 (with a standard deviation of 27.9, for 27,648 observations), clearly 
below the midpoint of the scale -situated at 50 points. While only 3.5% of Latin 
Americans said congress does what they expect it to do “a lot,” more than 20% stated that 
congress does not fulfill their expectations “at all,” the two extreme values depicted in 
Figure III.17.  
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Figure III.17. Fulfillment of expectations by legislatures in Latin America  
 
 While in any of the 18 countries the mean value of fulfillment of expectations 
reaches the midpoint of the scale, in some of them it is close: Dominican Republic, 
Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile show scores of above 45 points (Figure III.18). At the other 
extreme, Paraguay, Brazil, and Ecuador are the countries with the least satisfied citizens 
in terms of congress’ accomplishment of what they expected it to do.  
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Figure III.18. Fulfillment of expectations by the legislature, by country 
 
 
 
 The relationship between fulfillment of expectations and trust also runs in the 
predicted direction: confidence in the institution is higher among those who see their 
expectations fulfilled to a greater extent (Figure III.19). 
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Figure III.19. Trust in legislature by levels of fulfillment of expectations, Latin America 
 
  
 The gap in levels of trust between those who think the legislature does not fulfill 
their expectations at all and those who think it does it a great deal is 44.2 points.  Again, 
there is a clear trend of rising levels of trust with greater levels of fulfillment of 
expectations. 
 All three measures of performance evaluation converge to the same pattern in its 
relationship with trust: perceptions of good performance enhance levels of confidence in 
assemblies.  What previous research has shown  true for the government  (Citrin 1974; 
Hetherington 1998; Miller 1974)  proves also right for legislatures: performance 
evaluation matters for trust. 
 When looking at the performance measures by country, a rather consistent pattern 
emerges: there are countries in which legislative performance is positively evaluated, and 
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there are others in which it is not, and that is a trend that remains across the three 
different indicators. Thus, for instance, if we look at the highest values for each of the 
three performance indicators, there are four countries that repeatedly appear among the 
top five in all three measures: Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay. 
Similarly, if we look at the bottom five countries in each of the indicators, two countries 
are always in the group: Ecuador and Brazil, and four other countries are found there for 
two of out the three variables: Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. 
 Does this mean the three measures are different expressions of a unique 
construct? What the three variables have in common is that they capture evaluative 
attitudes toward legislatures. Those evaluations are of different nature, though. The 
importance of the laws, as it has been stated, reflects a more general assessment of the 
relevance of assemblies’ job. The job approval variable aims at tapping attitudes toward 
legislators and their performance. Finally, the fulfilled expectations variable digs into the 
more personal evaluation of legislative accomplishment in light of the hopes individuals 
had for it.  
 If each indicator is conceived as one evaluative dimension, then the three of them 
could be combined into a general performance measure. The empirical tests of the 
suitability of such combination, however, are not conclusive. The coefficient of reliability 
for the three variables is slightly below the acceptable standard in social science: the 
Cronbach’s is Alpha 0.64,16 and the correlation among the variables is not very high (see 
Table AIII.3 in Annex VI). On the other hand, the three variables do load into a same 
                                                 
16 The convention is that reliability coefficient needs to be 0.70 or higher to be considered acceptable 
(UCLA Academic Technology Services 2006).   
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factor, but the loadings are not strong, and most of the variance of each variable is not 
explained by the factor (see Table AIII.4 in Annex F).  
 Given this borderline evidence of the existence of a single evaluative factor, what 
seems most appropriate to do is playing in both sides of the border: multivariate models 
will assess the impact of each individual performance evaluation variable upon trust, but 
mirror models with only the combined index will also be assessed. The Performance 
Evaluation Index is the simple mean of the three individual performance variables: 
importance of the laws passed by congress, job approval, and fulfilled expectations. The 
index is calculated for all those cases with valid values in at least two out of the three 
variables. If for one case there is missing information for two variables, then that case is 
considered missing and therefore left out of the index. This Performance Evaluation 
Index has a mean value of 45.613 with a standard deviation of 20.558, for 27,979 valid 
values). 
  
The Contagion from the Parties 
 
Legislatures are formed on a partisan basis, and parties have a predominant role in 
legislative politics. In Latin America that role is enhanced by their relevance for 
legislative elections, given the main features of the electoral systems, which generates 
incentives for parties to have greater visibility and power (Nohlen 2004). 
 The key function of representative institutions is that of responsiveness; as Pitkin 
states it, “representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner 
responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, 209). In democratic polities, the link between 
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represented and representatives is provided by political parties (Sartori 1976; 
Schattschneider 1942). In this context, whether individuals see parties as responsive to 
them  should affect how they evaluate legislatures, the institution where representation 
takes place. Lack of responsiveness sets the ground for lack of confidence; how can 
citizens trust an institution that is non responsive to them? Thus, if political parties are 
negatively evaluated, then those views should contaminate the views of the parliament as 
well.  
A measure of political party responsiveness was devised to tap citizens’ views of 
it: the belief that political parties represent their voters well. In addition, a supplementary 
indicator of a more general attitude toward parties –partisan identification- is assessed.   
According to the contagion from the parties hypothesis, then, more positive 
evaluations of party responsiveness would contribute to higher levels of confidence in 
parliaments. Similarly, those individuals with a partisan identification should be more 
leaning to support assemblies than their fellow citizens who do not hold such 
identification. 
The survey question used to measure evaluation of party responsiveness was the 
following: 
Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do [country] political parties 
represent their voters well? 
 
 
Like for questions previously discussed, respondents provided their answers on a 
1-7 scale, with the aid of a card (shown in Figure III.3). The original responses were also 
recoded in this case, so the data to be presented range from 0 –“not at all,” to 100- “a lot.” 
For the partisanship variable, the question used was: 
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At this moment, do you identify with a political party? 
 
The possible responses for this question were only two: “yes” or “no.” The data 
has been coded as a dummy variable, with 0 indicating no partisanship and 1 indicating a 
partisan affiliation.  
 
Political Party Responsiveness 
 
 Political parties have been designed to be the “central intermediate and 
intermediary structure between society and government” (Sartori 1976: iv); they perform 
that role by means of representing citizens’ interests.  The quasi omnipresent institutional 
frame of proportional representation, closed and blocked ballots, and relative high district 
magnitude found in Latin America (see Table AII.1, in Annex F) generates conditions for 
individuals to see themselves represented by political parties much more than by 
individuals. The link between represented and representative is not dyadic but collective 
(Weissberg 1978), and such collective nature is embodied in the political parties. 
 Perceptions about political party performance are not very encouraging in terms 
of support for political parties. Discontent with parties is so widespread that many 
citizens in the Americas agree with the statement that “There can be democracy without 
political parties,”17 therefore challenging the idea that “modern democracy is unthinkable 
save in terms of the parties” (Schattschneider 1942:1). 
                                                 
17 Individuals were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statement, in a 1-7 scale that 
ranged from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 7 “Strongly agree.” Original responses were recoded into a 0-100 
scale. The average response, expressed in the new scale, is 46.05 (with a standard deviation of 34.82, for 
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 Citizens are not satisfied with the representational function performed by 
political parties: one out of five Latin Americans (20.2%) said political parties do not 
represent their voters well at all (Figure III.20). The average response for the question 
was 38.57 (with a standard deviation of 28.24, for 28,110 cases).  
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Figure III.20 Evaluation of political party representation, Latin America 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
27,272 observations). The average support for the statement is slightly below the midpoint of the scale, 
which suggests that the mainstream rejects the idea of a democracy without political parties, but not for 
much. Complete results by country can be found in Annex E.  
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Figure III.21 Evaluation of political party representation, by country 
 
  
Cross-country differences are, once again, important. Evaluation of 
political parties is twice as high in Uruguay and the Dominican Republic as it is in 
Paraguay or Brazil. In any of the countries, however, evaluation of political party 
representation surpasses the midpoint of the scale, which points to a deficit in 
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partisan representation in Latin America, already detected by previous research 
(Achard and González 2004; Córdova Macías 2004; Mainwaring 2006; Marenghi 
and García Montero 2006). In addition, the significant differences among 
countries are also supported by the evidence from the fieldwork: while in Uruguay 
political parties are seen in relatively high regard –despite their less than expected 
performance, in Ecuador some people think there is not even room to make a case 
for the parties: 
 
I do feel represented, but it has not fulfilled my expectations yet… I know there is 
still time to come.  
 Participant Focus Group 1, Uruguay 
 
Political parties are against the wall, and anyone who attempts to talk favorably about 
them would not find a space [to do so]. 
Interviewee E1, Ecuador 
 
The relationship between perceptions about how well parties are representing 
their voters and trust in legislatures lends support for the contagion from the parties 
hypothesis: the better parties are perceived to represent their voters, the higher the trust in 
the legislature in which such representation takes place (Figure III.22). The gap in the 
confidence levels between those who perceive parties not representing their voters at all 
(23.7) and those who see them representing them a lot (62.1) is significant (38.4 points).  
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Figure III.22 Trust in legislatures by levels of political party representation, Latin America 
 
Thus, the evidence discussed so far suggests that whether political parties are seen 
responsive to citizens or not does matter for trust in the institution that holds them. Views 
of legislatures, however, might also be tinted by how favorable to parties individuals are 
in a more general vein –regardless of how they evaluate their performance in terms of 
responsiveness. Thus, partisanship should also be explored as a factor affecting trust in 
legislatures.  
 
Partisanship 
 
Partisanship “is a psychological identification [with a political party], which can 
persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a 
 88
consistent record of party support”; it is an affective orientation that lasts in time 
(Campbell et al. 1960, 121). The existence of this type of bonding feeling toward a party 
should predict a more favorable view toward the institution they staff. However, when 
the mean levels of support for legislatures among those who hold a partisan affiliation are 
compared with the support among those who do not have such and affective orientation, 
the differences are only modest (Figure  III.23), although statistically significant (see 
Table AIII.5 in Annex F). 
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Figure III.23 Trust in legislatures by levels partisanship, Latin America 
 
 The affective orientation partisanship refers to is oriented to a specific political 
party; it is social group identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, 21) directed 
not to political parties in general, but only to one of them. Therefore, partisanship should 
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matter in shaping attitudes toward legislatures only to the extent in which the parties 
toward which there exists an affective orientation play an important role in the 
legislature. Thus, it is identification with a political party in relation to its role in congress 
–and not partisanship in general- what should affect confidence in the institution more 
positively. Actually, there is strong evidence in the United States pointing that partisans 
of the political party in control of Congress have more positive views toward the 
institution (Cook and Gronke 2005; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; Kimball and 
Patterson 1997; Patterson and Magleby 1992). 
 Now, determining which party is in control of the legislature is a straight forward 
task in the context of the two-party United States system. In multi-party presidential 
systems, however, it becomes a more difficult enterprise (Elgie 2001; Shugart 1995). A 
party can hold more seats than its competitors and still not control the legislature, a “no -
majority situation” in Shugart’s terms (Shugart 1995, 327). Under these circumstances, a 
party with the highest percentage of seats might not have enough power to get laws 
passed with the party votes only.  
Therefore, in order to assess citizens’ partisan ties to the parties in the legislatures, 
a three-fold category seems the most accurate to describe the role the party object of such 
identification plays in the assembly. Parties will be classified as holding an absolute 
majority (50 percent or more of the seats in both chambers), holding a relative majority 
(less than 50 percent of seats, but still the highest share of seats in at least one of the 
chambers), or a minority position (any of the parties with less than the highest proportion 
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of seats). Individuals are classified according to whether they identify themselves with 
any of those parties, or if they do not have a partisan affiliation at all.18 
Therefore, for the hypothesis on the impact of party identification upon trust in 
legislatures to hold true, then trust should increase with the power of the party object of 
the identification. Those individuals identified with parties holding absolute majorities 
should trust legislatures more than their fellow citizens, in the sense than their partisan 
feelings should translate more clearly to the legislatures.   
The overwhelming majority of Latin Americans (68.8%) do not identify 
themselves with a political party (Table III.2). Those who do are distributed evenly 
among the three defined categories: identification with a party in the minority, 
identification with a party with a relative majority, and identification with a party holding 
the absolute majority of the legislative power. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Thus, individuals received a score of 3 if they declared to identify themselves with Partido 
Revolucionario Democrático of Panama, Alianza País and allies in Ecuador, Frente Amplio in Uruguay, 
Partido Justicialista or Frente para la Victoria in Argentina, Partido de la Liberación Dominicana  in 
Dominican Republic, or Movimiento V República and allies in Venezuela. These are the political parties 
that hold control of the legislature with more than 50% of the seats. Accordingly, individuals received a 
score of 2 if the identified with parties that hold only a relative majority in one or both chambers. 
Individuals who declared party sympathy for Partido Acción Nacional of Mexico, Unidad Nacional de la 
Esperanza of Guatemala, Alianza Republicana Nacionalista of El Salvador, Partido Liberal of Honduras, 
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional of Nicaragua, Partido Liberación Nacional of Costa Rica, Partido 
Liberal or Partido de la U of Colombia, Movimiento al Socialismo or PODEMOS of Bolivia, Unión por el 
Perú of Peru, Asociación Nacional Republicana of Paraguay, any of the parties members of Concertación 
Democrática of Chile, Partido dos Trabalhadores or Partido Frente Liberal of Brazil, received a score of 2. 
Such score indicates that the party they identify with controls only a relative majority of the legislature or 
one of its chambers. The individuals who identify with political parties other than the above mentioned, 
received a score of 1, indicating their attachment to a party with no legislative majority. Finally, those who 
do not identify with a political party received a score of 0. 
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Table III.2. Position in the legislature of political party object of identification, Latin 
America 
Position of party 
object of 
identification 
Frequency Percent 
No identification 19,927 68.8 
Minority 3,449 11.9 
Relative Majority 3,235 11.2 
Absolute  Majority 2,349 8.1 
  
Total 28,960 100.00 
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Figure III.24 Position in the legislature of political party object of identification, by country 
 
 
Figure III.24 depicts the distribution of partisan identities by country. The 
landscape is one of great variation, with countries in which only a small percentage of 
citizens identify with political parties –such as Mexico, Guatemala, or Chile- and other 
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countries with important proportions of partisans: Uruguay and Dominican Republic, 
most notably. 
The relationship between the role the party object of identification plays in the 
legislature and trust in the institution runs in the predicted direction, with confidence 
increasing as the role played for the party of identification is more important (Figure 
III.25). 
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Figure III.25. Trust in legislatures by role of party object of identification, Latin America 
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A Multivariate Model of Individual-Level Causes of Trust in Legislatures 
 
 The bivariate data analyzed in the previous sections of this chapter lend support 
for each of the three hypotheses about individual-level determinants of trust in 
legislatures. Figure III.26 summarizes such findings. The upper-left quadrant shows the 
quadratic fit between perceptions of congressional processes and trust in legislatures: 
when debate and counterbalance are seen as excessive, trust in legislatures decays.  
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Figure III.26. Summary of individual bivariate relationships between main independent 
variables and trust, fitted values, Latin America 
 
 
The upper-right quadrant shows the bivariate relationships between each of the 
three individual indicators of congressional performance – importance of the laws, job 
approval, and fulfilled expectations- as well as the Perfomance Evaluation Index.  
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Finally, the bottom-left quadrant shows the relationship involved in the contagion from 
the parties hypothesis: the link between assessments of party responsiveness and party 
identification with trust.  
 In order to determine the impact that each of these independent variables has upon 
trust in legislatures, a multivariate analysis is of order. Such analysis –the object of this 
section of the chapter- should include all the individual-level independent variables above 
discussed but also acknowledge for possible alternative explanations. 
 
The Alternative Explanations 
 
 Previous research has resorted to a myriad of variables to explain and control for 
the determinants of attitudes toward legislatures. Although it is not feasible to account for 
all of them, in this section I concentrate in those alternative explanations that are 
particularly interesting to look at, especially in the context of comparative research in 
trust in legislatures. Those comprise: presidential approval, views of the economy, 
political efficacy, political awareness, influence of mass media, personality traits, and 
sociomodemographic features. 
 
Presidential Approval 
 Views of other political institutions might tint how citizens view legislatures. 
Among political institutions, the president seems to be the most prominent, especially in 
the context of the Latin American presidential democracies. Some scholars argue that 
given the complexity of the legislative process and the absence of knowledge to evaluate 
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it, citizens might build their views of congress based on the views of the presidency 
(Parker 1977, 98).  It is said that congress is assessed in the “shadow” of the president.19  
In the United States, presidential approval leads to greater congressional approval 
(Kimball and Patterson 1997). The impact would remain under both, divided and unified 
types of government (Bernstein 2001). This link seems to be present in Latin America as 
well; some citizens have expressed this somehow blurry connection between president 
and congress: 
 
Congress is the law that rules the country. We have had politiquería [playing 
politics], but now the President has handled it well. [We have] new laws, new reforms, it 
seems everything is going to be all right. 
Interviewee A1, Ecuador 
 
 The impact of attitudes toward the president upon views of legislatures needs not 
be a direct one. If the president is held accountable for most of what happens in the 
country, then if he is seen in a negative view, all the other institutions might be, as well, 
or vice versa. In that sense, it would not be that the president is tailed to congress 
specifically, but that views of the presidency spread to the whole political system. In any 
case, it seems important to control for the impact that views of the presidency have upon 
attitudes toward parliaments. 
 The influence of the president can be assessed by means of feeling thermometers 
or approval questions. In this case, an indicator of presidential approval will be assessed. 
The question used to measure it was the following: 
Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job 
performance of President [NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT]: very good, good, neither 
good nor bad, bad, or very bad?  
  
                                                 
19 Davidson, Kovenock and  O’Leary 1966, as cited in Hibbing and Theiss Morse (2001b, 80). 
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 Following the standardization procedure, the original responses were coded into a 
0 to 100 scale, in which the value 0 represents the response “very bad” and the value 100 
“very good.”20 
 According to the previous findings, the expectation is a positive relationship 
between presidential approval and confidence in parliaments. The impact of approval 
upon trust, however, might be mediated by the institutional context, in particular, whether 
congress and the presidency are controlled by the same political party. Patterson and 
Caldeira (1990) and Bernstein (2001) found some evidence of that mediating effect. For 
purposes of parsimony, however, the impact of the context (in this case, whether there is 
a divided government or not) will be assessed in Chapter IV. 
 
Views of the Economy 
 Just as views of the president can impact the attitudes toward other political 
institutions, views about the economy are often present in explanatory models of political 
attitudes. Attitudes toward the economy are typically divided into those concerning the 
personal economic situation (or “pocketbook” economics) and those referring to the 
country’s economic conditions, or (“sociotropic”) measures (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). 
The hypotheses linking perception of the economy and support for political institutions 
point to a positive relationship between them. Weatherford found evidence of the positive 
link between perceptions of the economy and system support (Weatherford 1984; 
Weatherford 1987), and Kinder and Kiewiet encountered that sociotropic perceptions of 
the economy affected vote choice in congressional elections, but also found that 
                                                 
20 The by-country descriptives for this variable can be found in Annex E. 
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pocketbook views did not (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). 
However, Rudolph did find a positive link between pocketbook attitudes and 
congressional approval (Rudolph 2002). Similarly, Hibbing and Patterson (1994) and 
Mishler and Rose (1997) discovered a positive relationship between perceptions of the 
economy and favorable attitudes toward parliaments. 
 More than 45% of Latin Americans mentioned problems of economic nature as 
the most important problem the country faced. In eleven countries, economic aspects are 
the most frequently mentioned national problem; in the remaining seven, it is the second, 
after safety concerns. In this context of nearly omnipresent economic preoccupations, it is 
to foresee a high sensibility related to economic aspects, and therefore I expect to find 
sociotropic views of the economy having a positive impact upon confidence in 
legislatures.  
 Feelings toward the current national economic situation were asked through the 
following question: 
How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is 
very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  
 
  
 The original codes for these five possible valid responses ranged from 1 
“very good” to 5 “very bad.” To facilitate the analysis, the scale was inverted so 
higher values indicate more positive views. Likewise, the scale was recoded into a 
0-100 scale in which 0 corresponds to “very bad” and 100 means “very good.” 
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Political Awareness 
Ample evidence points to the fact that what individuals know about politics 
affects their political attitudes and behaviors (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 
1987; Zaller 1992). According to Zaller (1992, 21) political awareness “refers to the 
extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she 
has encountered;” the author suggests political knowledge as its operationalization.  
 The evidence of the impact of this political knowledge upon attitudes toward 
legislatures is mixed. Some scholars have found  that the most knowledgeable citizens 
support the institution less (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995; 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Others state that political knowledge affects the type of 
considerations individuals bring to mind at the time of evaluating assemblies, with less 
sophisticated individuals relying more on general judgments toward politics and more 
informed citizens having institution-specific considerations. This, in turn, implies 
different directions for relationships between knowledge and attitudes toward congress 
for sophisticated and unsophisticated individuals (Mondak et al. 2007). Yet other studies 
have found no impact at all of political sophistication upon attitudes toward legislatures 
(Kimball and Patterson 1997; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992), or even a positive 
relationship among the two variables (Davidson and Parker 1972). Given the 
contradictory findings of previous research, political knowledge will be tested with no 
previous expectation about the direction of its impact upon confidence in legislatures. 
The operazionalization of political knowledge has been done following the 
mainstream trend that measures it by testing factual information about politics (Barabas 
2002; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Delli Carpini 1993; Mondak 2001): the more an 
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individual knows about the facts of politics, the higher the level of political knowledge he 
has. In order to do so, five questions were devised to tap on general political factual 
knowledge among citizens of Latin America: 
Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is 
transmitted to the people...  
What is the name of the current president of the United States?  
What is the name of the President of Congress in country?   
How many provinces does the country have?  
How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country?  
What is the name of the current president of Brazil?  
 
 
 The design of the questions was not an easy task for them had to be applicable in 
every country and posit approximately the same degree of difficulty in all of them. The 
same five questions were asked in all the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer –
with the corresponding vocabulary adjustment- with two exceptions. The question about 
the name of the president of congress was not asked in Bolivia, and in Brazil, the 
question on the name of the president asked about the President of Chile, in order to keep 
the practice of asking for the name of a foreign president. 
 In order to obtain a summary measure, correct responses to the four questions 
asked in all the countries (all of them but the one about the president of congress, not 
asked in Bolivia) were combined into an index that ranges from 0 (none of the questions 
correctly answered) to 100 (the four questions correctly answered).21 Additionally, in 
order to have a measure of specific knowledge of Congress, the question about the name 
of the president of the congress has been left apart, to be tested independently. With the 
purpose of keeping the same metric, this variable on knowledge of congress ranges from 
0 (incorrect response) to 100 (correct response). 
                                                 
21 For every question, a correct response was assigned a value of 100, and incorrect, “don’t answer,” and 
“don’t know” responses were assigned a value of 0. To create the index, the values for the four responses 
were added and the simple average was calculated. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the four variables is 0.635. 
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Political efficacy 
 
 Political efficacy refers to the feeling that one’s political action might affect 
politics.22 Political efficacy has two dimensions: internal efficacy, pointing “to beliefs 
about one’s own competence to understand and to participate effectively in politics,” and 
external efficacy, which refers to “beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental 
authorities and institutions to citizens’ demands” (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990, 290).   
 It is hypothesized that those citizens who feel more efficacious will see political 
institutions in a more favorable light (Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992), and there is 
some evidence supporting the claim that political efficacy affects views of congress 
positively (Davidson and Parker 1972; Hibbing and Patterson 1994; Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 1995; Patterson, Ripley, and Quinlan 1992). Thus, confidence in legislatures 
would be bolstered by feelings of political efficacy. 
 Two questions were designed to tap feelings of political efficacy; one aims at 
measuring external political efficacy, whereas the other aims at measuring internal 
efficacy. The exact wording of the questions is as follows:  
 
Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think.  
How much do you agree or disagree? 
I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country. How much 
do you agree or disagree? 
 
 
 
 Individuals were asked to what extent they agreed with those statements, and 
were requested to provide an answer with a number within a 1 to 7 range, for which 1 
meant “strongly disagree” and 7 meant “strongly agree.” 23 The original responses were 
                                                 
22 Campbell, Gurin And Miller 1954, 187, as cited in Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990, 290).  
23 Respondents were given a card, showing all the numbers from one to seven and the labels for the extreme 
responses. A sample card (Tarjeta B) can be found in the attached sample questionnaire, in Annex C.  
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recoded into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 means “strongly disagree” and 100 means 
“strongly agree.”  
 
The Impact of Media 
The impact of the media on attitude formation, in particular upon feelings  toward 
the President is uncontestable (Brody 1991; Edwards III, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; 
Gronke and Newman 2000). The debate is not settled, though, about the magnitude of 
such an impact and the mechanisms through which it operates (Krosnick and Kinder 
1990; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Moy and Pfrau 2000). 
In the American context at least, a negative effect of news media upon attitudes 
toward political institutions in general and Congress in particular is often denounced 
(Moy and Pfrau 2000). The reason behind this pernicious effect would be that media 
coverage of politics is mostly negative (Patterson 1993). “The conventional wisdom is 
that the press has grown increasingly hostile toward Congress in recent years and that its 
coverage, reflecting that development, has become increasingly derogatory” (Coursen 
Parker 1994, 157).  Accordingly, Durr, Gilmour and Wolbrecht (1997) found that 
positive media coverage of congress leads to more positive attitudes toward the 
institution, whereas negative media coverage operates in the opposite way. 
However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse encountered that exposure to news had a 
significant negative impact only upon emotional reactions toward the institution (such as 
feelings of fear, anger, unease, or disgust), while it generated no impact upon cognitive 
evaluations of the institution, such as job approval ratings (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
1998, 480, 490). Similarly, studying the patterns of attitudes in the industrialized 
 102
democracies, Norris (2000) found that exposure to television decreases the level of 
support at a significant rate only in a few countries, and it has no statistical significant 
impact on confidence in political institutions. 
A pattern of negative media coverage which, in turn, has a negative impact on 
support for institutions has been suggested as also occurring in Latin America. Media 
portrayals of Congress would be “overwhelmingly negative” in the Andean region 
(Mainwaring 2006, 296). Likewise, media attacks were deemed the sixth cause in 
importance of poor images of political parties in a survey of Central American elites 
(Achard and González 2004, 87).  
Individuals learn about legislatures mainly through media. Every single person 
asked about how they learned about Congress in the groups and the interviews mentioned 
the media, especially the television as the main, if not only, source: 
 
Moderator: Through which channels do you learn about what is going on in 
Congress? 
 All: TV 
Participant 1: Radio, papers, and TV 
Participant 2: The Congress webpage, sometimes 
Group 1, Uruguay 
 
Thus, in light of the available evidence and claims about the role of media, it 
seems reasonable to control for the impact media exposure has upon confidence in 
assemblies. In light of the previous findings for the role of media in views of political 
institutions in Latin America, the expectation is to find a negative relationship between 
exposure to media news and trust in legislatures. Media exposure will be operationalized 
as frequency with which the individual declares watching TV news. The 
AmericasBarometer survey asked respondents: 
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How often do you listen to news on TV: everyday, once or twice a week, rarely, or 
never? 
 
The original codes ranged from 1 “every day” to 4 “never.” To facilitate the 
analysis, the scale was inverted for higher values to reflect higher frequency, and it was 
rescaled into a 0-100 scale in which 0 means “never” and 100 indicates “every day.” 
 
Personality Traits 
 
 Socio-psychological accounts of political attitudes highlight the impact that 
personality traits might have upon orientations toward the system; some individuals 
would naturally be more trusting, while others would be more cynical (Newton and 
Norris 2000, 59). Thus, some individuals would be more naturally predisposed to trust 
legislatures than others just because of this personality trait (Richardson, Houston, and 
Hadjiharalambous 2001).  
 A way of testing this assertion is by testing how levels of interpersonal trust affect 
confidence in legislatures. Trust in other individuals, has been argued, to “encourage faith 
in larger social entities” (Cook and Gronke 2005, 793).  The empirical evidence from 
previous research suggests a moderate to non significant impact (Cleary and Stokes 2006; 
Cook and Gronke 2005; Newton and Norris 2000; Richardson, Houston, and 
Hadjiharalambous 2001). However, for purposes of controlling for this trait among Latin 
Americans, a measure of interpersonal trust is in order. I expect to find that higher levels 
of interpersonal trust would lead to higher levels of confidence in Congress. 
 The proxy for interpersonal trust is the following question: 
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Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community 
are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or 
untrustworthy...?    
 
 The original responses were scored in a 1 -“very trustworthy”- to 4 -
“untrustworthy”- which was recoded into a 0-100 range where 0 indicates 
“untrustworthy” and 100 means “very trustworthy.” 
 
 
Sociodemographic variables 
 
Sociodemographic variables have not shown great explanatory power upon 
attitudes toward legislatures. As stated in Chapter II, only in a few instances they yield 
statistically significant results.  
Education is the only variable whose impact has been more controversial, being 
nonsignificant in most cases (Hibbing and Larimer 2003; Kimball and Patterson 1997; 
Patterson, Boynton, and Hedlund 1969), but found to increase support for the institution 
of congress in one study (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) and to decrease it in other two 
(Asher and Barr 1994; Cook and Gronke 2005).  Therefore, based on the previous 
experience, and with the aim of keeping the number of parameters within a manageable 
range, education is the only sociodemographic variable to be included in the multivariate 
analyses.   
In order to know the educational level of interviewees, they were asked: 
 
What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
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  The responses were there transformed into an ordinal scale with the following 
values: 0, no formal education; 1, elementary school; 2, high school; 3, College and 
more.  
 
The Model  
 
 The dependent variable this research aims at explaining, trust in legislatures, is an 
interval variable ranging from 0 to 100. The interval nature of the dependent variable 
makes OLS the most appropriate procedure to follow in pursuing the multivariate 
statistical analysis. The fact that individuals are nested in countries, however, adds a 
special characteristic to the analysis, inserting an additional level of analysis: the country-
level. There are several ways to model this multilevel nature of the data. A common 
approach used to account for the country-level differences is the fixed effects approach, 
that consists of including in the OLS regression dummy variables for each country so that 
the dummy variables “‘absorb’ the unique variation among groups” (Steenbergen and 
Jones 2002, 220). Another alternative to account for by-group difference is interactive 
modeling, which consists of including subgroup level predictors as main effects in 
regression models (Franzese 2005; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Yet a third way of 
modeling data of this nature is by means of multilevel models or random effects models 
(Beck 2005; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Typically, the multilevel nature of the 
data is modeled in multivariate linear regressions functions, as described in Equation 1: 
(Equation 1)       Y ij = βo + β1x1ij + β2x2 ij + ... + βpxp ij  + εij 
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where Y stands for the dependent variable to explain (i.e., trust in legislatures), βo is the 
intercept (the value Y assumes when the covariates have a value 0), β1x1ij  to  βpxp ij are the 
coefficients for each of the independent variables entered in the model, and εij  stands for 
the residual, or the variation in Y  not explained by the model. Following Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal (2008, 94), the equation specifies a model for individuals i within countries 
j. This specification better suits the nature of the cross-national survey data object of 
analysis, and allows for considering residuals due to individuals and residuals due to 
countries separately, therefore splitting the error between those two levels and allowing 
for a random-intercept that accounts for the country-specific error component. 
 Thus, a first step is to assess the suitability of the data for a multilevel model; that 
is, to find out whether considering that individuals are nested in countries adds analytical 
leverage. This is done by testing the null hypothesis that country-level variations are not 
significantly different from zero, in which case a simple OLS would be a better fit for the 
data. A likelihood-ratio test of variance components models (one with the country-level 
random intercept and one without it) indicates that the assumption that individuals are 
nested in countries is safe (the significance of the test -shown in Table AIII.6 in Annex F- 
indicates the null hypothesis that there is no random intercept in the model can be 
rejected). Therefore, a random intercept model is appropriate for the data.  
  Four slightly different multivariate models of trust in legislatures are to be 
analyzed. In all of them, the variables involved in the individual level determinants of 
trust hypotheses are assessed vis-à-vis one another and the alternative explanations. In 
Model 1, the impact of each of the three dimensions of congressional performance is 
individually assessed, whereas in Model 2 the variables are substituted by the index of 
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Congressional performance. Model 3 and Model 4 replicate the Models 1 and 2 with a 
slight change: in Models 3 and 4, political knowledge is measured as congress-specific 
knowledge. Since the congress-specific knowledge question was not asked in Bolivia, 
Models 3 and Models 4 are run over 17 countries. 
 A summary of the results for each of the four models are reported in Table III.3 
(individual full models are presented in Tables AIII.7 to AIII.10 in Annex F). The upper 
part of Table III.3 presents the results of the fixed part of the linear regression. For each 
variable, the β coefficients are reported together with their level of statistical significance 
(whether p < 0.001, p < 0.01, or p < 0.05). The magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients are interpreted as in the standard OLS regression.   
 The lower part of Table III.3 presents the random-effects parameters and the 
goodness of fit indicators. The first row sd(_cons) presents the between-country 
variability, whereas the second row sd(Residual) presents the within-country variability 
not explained by the model. The results suggest that there is country-level variability –
indicated by value of sd(_cons), but that there still is individual-level variation –indicated 
by sd(Residual)- not yet explained by the current model. The significance of the p-value 
for the likelihood-ratio test (LR) confirms that the mixed model with random-intercept is 
a better fit for the data than a simple OLS regression model.  
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Table III.3. Random-intercept linear regression on trust in legislatures 
 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
         
 β  β  β  β  
Excessive debate 0.124 *** 0.121 *** 0.118 *** 0.116 ***
Excessive debate Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
Excessive counterbalance 0.084 *** 0.085 *** 0.084 *** 0.086 ***
Excessive counterbalance Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
Importance of laws 0.092 ***   0.094 ***   
Job approval legislators 0.198 ***   0.201 ***   
Fulfilled expectations 0.213 ***   0.219 ***   
Congressional Performance    0.472 ***   0.483 ***
Party responsiveness 0.177 *** 0.183 *** 0.170 *** 0.175 ***
Partisan ID 0.522 ** 0.531 ** 0.523 ** 0.538 ** 
Presidential approval 0.042 ** 0.050 *** 0.046 *** 0.053 ***
Economic situation 0.021 ** 0.027 *** 0.026 ** 0.031 ***
Political Knowledge -0.020 ** -0.024 ***     
Congress-specific knowledge     -0.956 * -0.985 * 
Internal political efficacy 0.040 *** 0.037 *** 0.036 *** 0.033 ***
External political efficacy 0.057 *** 0.063 *** 0.059 *** 0.066 ***
TV news 0.004  0.003  0.003  0.001  
Interpersonal trust 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.027 *** 0.026 ***
Education -0.983 *** -1.076 *** -1.079 *** -1.224 ***
_cons 4.092 ** 4.739 *** 3.061 * 3.596 * 
         
Random-effects Parameters. Estimates reported (std error in parentheses) 
country: Identity         
sd(_cons) 4.551  4.673  4.590  4.722 
 (0.775)  (0.795)  (0.804)  (0.826) 
sd(Residual) 24.119  24.243  24.232  24.364 
 (0.117)  (0.115)  (0.124)  (0.122)  
         
LR vs OLS Chibar p 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
R2 (model) 0.428  0.418  0.421  0.411  
R2 (between-country) 0.507  0.494  0.503  0.489  
R2 (within-country) 0.158  0.154  0.154  0.150  
Observations 21,345  22,048  19,199  19,842  
Groups 18  18  17  17  
Wald chi2(17) 8196.5  8119.6  7684.2  7589.2  
Prob > chi2        =     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
         
p < 0.05 * || p < 0.01 ** || p < 0.001 *** 
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Each model explains more than 40% of the total variance, as indicated by the 
coefficients of determination R2. The covariates explain around half of the variance at the 
country level, while they explain 15% of the individual-level variance, as expressed by 
the between and within country coefficients of determination.24 
The results for all four models present little difference both in terms of magnitude 
of coefficients and in terms of their significance. Every variable included in the model, 
with the sole exception of TV news exposure, achieves statistical significance.  The 
impact of evaluations of congressional performance is well captured in any of its two 
forms: with all three variables separately (Model 1) and with the summary Index (Model 
2). Model 2, however, seems to be a better option than Model 1 for two reasons. First, 
relying on fewer parameters (and still achieving very similar substantive results) Model 2 
is more parsimonious than Model 1. Second, Model 2 takes advantage of more 
observations for the analysis than Model 1. The difference in the number of observations 
lies in the way missing values are treated in the regression analysis. Every case with a 
missing value in any of the variables involved in the analysis is dropped out of the model 
for the multivariate analysis. Thus, in Model 1, observations with missing cases in any of 
the three performance evaluation variables –importance of the laws passed by congress, 
job approval of legislators, and fulfilled expectations- were left out of the analysis. Recall 
that the composite index of congressional performance used in Model 2 is the simple 
average of the values of those three variables, computed for all cases with valid values for 
at least two of them. Thus, not every case with a missing value in any of the three 
                                                 
24 The coefficients of determination are not readily available from the statistical output. Following Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 102) they were calculated as the proportional reduction in the estimated total 
residual variance the model provides when compared with the unconditional model (in which only the 
dependent variable is entered in the random intercept model). 
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variables of performance was dropped out: only those cases with two or more missing 
values –out of the three variables- were left out, therefore yielding to a greater number of 
cases than under the first model. 
The second difference across the models was the operationalization of political 
knowledge. In Models 1 and 2, political knowledge is a summary index of factual 
political information about several features of the country, whereas in Models 3 and 4 
only congress-specific factual information comprises the measure. In all four models 
political knowledge yields statistically significant results, but its substantive impact is 
greater for the congress-specific variable. The congress-specific knowledge has a greater 
impact upon trust in legislatures than general political knowledge, consistently with 
findings from previous research. Ideally, this should be the variable to keep in future 
models. However, the fact that the survey question on congress-specific knowledge was 
not asked in Bolivia, relying on that measure of political knowledge would leave an 
entire country outside of the analysis.  Therefore, considering the previous discussion, 
Model 2, the most parsimonious model with data for all 18 countries is the one to keep. 
A difficulty often found in random effects models is endogeneity (Neuhaus and 
McCulloch 2006). Endogeneity is a problem when the random component and at least 
one of the regressors are correlated, making the random effects estimators biased 
(Gujarati 2003, 650-651). To find out whether there is endogeneity, a Hausman test needs 
to be performed (Gujarati 2003 651; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 123). Table 
AIII.10 in Annex F shows the results for the random effects Model 2.  The significance of 
 111
the test indicates presence of endogeneity, although these results should be taken with a 
grain of salt.25  
First, endogeneity most likely occurs due to misspecification of the models, by 
absence of cluster-level omitted-variable bias (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 114). 
Given that at this stage of the analysis only individual-level explanatory variables have 
been included in the model, there are, indeed, country-level omitted variables -those to be 
discussed and analyzed in Chapter IV. Thus, keeping in mind that the results presented in 
Table III.3 are partial and the full model is developed in the next chapter, should put 
concerns about endogeneity on hold.  
Second, when the usual recommendation when facing endogeneity is followed –
i.e.: turn to a fixed effects model (Gujarati 2003, 651; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 
122), the achieved results are almost identical (see Table III.4, and Table AIII.11 for the 
full results), and they remain the same also when robust standard errors are calculated 
(see Table AIII.12 in Annex F).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 A Hausman test consists of testing the consistency of covariates under fixed and random effects models. 
A significant test indicates that the random effects estimator is inconsistent, more likely due to a violation 
of the assumption of independence between the random intercept and the covariates. 
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Table III. 4. Random vs fixed effects models 
Model 2 Model 2 
 Random effects Fixed effects 
     
 β  β  
Excessive debate 0.121 *** 0.122 *** 
Excessive debate Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Excessive counterbalance 0.085 *** 0.085 *** 
Excessive counterbalance Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Congressional Performance  0.472 *** 0.471 *** 
Party responsiveness 0.183 *** 0.182 *** 
Partisan ID 0.531 ** 0.535 ** 
Presidential approval 0.050 *** 0.050 *** 
Economic situation 0.027 *** 0.026 *** 
Political Knowledge -0.024 *** -0.024 *** 
Internal political efficacy 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 
External political efficacy 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 
TV news 0.003  0.003  
Interpersonal trust 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 
Education -1.076 *** -1.070 *** 
Guatemala   -9.975 *** 
El Salvador   -11.298 *** 
Honduras   -9.467 *** 
Nicaragua   -12.616 *** 
Costa Rica   -7.299 *** 
Panama   -11.169 *** 
Colombia   -7.250 *** 
Ecuador   -22.801 *** 
Bolivia   -7.412 *** 
Peru   -13.124 *** 
Paraguay   -16.348 *** 
Chile   -4.917 *** 
Uruguay   -7.114 *** 
Brazil   -10.434 *** 
Venezuela   -7.364 *** 
Argentina   -11.950 *** 
Dominican Republic   -6.966 *** 
_cons 4.739 *** 14.657 *** 
     
R2 (model) 0.418  0.3492  
Adj R2 (model)   0.3483  
Observations 22,048  22,048  
     
Country of reference: Mexico    
p < 0.05 * || p < 0.01 ** || p < 0.001 ***    
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In the second column of Table III.4 the by-country effect is incorporated by 
means of individual dummy variables (with exception of Mexico, taken as the reference 
category). Thus, the β coefficients for the independent variables should be assessed as in 
any linear regression; the β coefficients for each of the countries should be evaluated in 
contrast with the reference category. For instance, the -9.975 coefficient for Guatemala 
indicates that Guatemalans have, on average, 9.975 points less of confidence in 
legislatures than Mexicans. 
 
Discussion  
 
 
Figure III.27 shows the impact of each of the variables involved in the three 
hypotheses about individual-level determinants of trust. For each variable, its influence 
on trust in legislature –after controlling for all the other variables included in the model- 
is depicted by the green lines, which is the regression line for each individual covariate, 
that is, how much trust in legislatures varies given the variations in the covariate (holding 
all the others constant). 
All the variables discussed in the hypotheses have a statistical significant impact 
upon confidence in assemblies in the predicted direction. They eyeball scrutiny of the 
data indicates that performance evaluation of congress and perceived responsiveness of 
political parties are the two main determinants of trust in legislatures; in other words, 
politicians and parties doing a good job in the citizens’ eyes would grant the institution 
the qualification of trustworthy.  
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Figure III.27. Individual regressors of trust  in legislatures and residuals (from fixed effects 
model) 
 
There is support for the argument that citizens’ views of legislatures are more 
complex than the paradox of representation argument implies. In order to model the 
curvilinear relationship between perceptions of excessive debate and counterbalance and 
trust (presented in Figure III.7 and Figure III.10), for each of the independent variables 
both, a linear and a quadratic term were included in the model. Both terms yield 
significant results in the expected direction. The linear terms show a positive relationship 
with trust: the more individual perceive congress engaged in debate and in 
counterbalancing the president, the more they confer the institution the status of 
trustworthy. However, the significance of the quadratic term indicates that the linear 
relationship is only partially accurate: at a point, the positive association reverses, and 
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from that point, the more debate and counterbalance to the executive are perceived as 
excessive, the less individuals trust the legislatures.  
These results confirm the hypothesis about the impact of attitudes toward 
legislatures being more complex than a simple rejection of the democratic processes that 
take place in congress translated into disregard for the institution. As citizens perceive 
assemblies doing what their constitutional mandate is, that is, as they see legislators 
devoting time to discuss and debate and congress controlling the president, their levels of 
trust in the institution grow. It is only when discussion and debate become excessive, and 
when the separation of power becomes a big obstacle for the president’s job that citizens’ 
levels of trust in the institution decay.  
Also as predicted, positive evaluations of congressional performance lead to 
higher levels of trust in the institution.  Actually, congressional performance is the single 
most important predictor of trust: holding everything else constant, the average level of 
trust in legislatures can vary up to 47 points due to congressional performance 
evaluation.26 Similarly, political party responsiveness – operationalized as the belief that 
political parties represent their voters well- can increase trust in legislatures up to 18 
points.27 The role that the political party object of identification plays in congress does 
not exert much influence upon trust in parliaments, although it yields significant results in 
the predicted direction: the more important the role the party object of identification plays 
in the legislature, the higher the trust conferred to the institution. 
                                                 
26 The maximum possible impact of a single regressor is calculated by multiplying its β coefficient by the 
difference between the maximum (100 in this case) and minimum (0) value the variable can assume. For 
the case of congressional performance, the index varies from 0 to 100, and the β coefficient is 0. 47; 
therefore, the maximum possible impact of the variable upon trust is 47 (100 * 0.47). 
27 Figure obtained following the same procedure describe in note 26. 
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With the exception only of the exposure to TV news, the variables included as 
controls for alternative explanations also achieve statistical significance, although their 
impact is moderate to low in substantive terms. Remarkably, spillover from presidential 
popularity can only affect trust in up to 5 points. If we bear in mind that performance 
evaluation of congress and parties have the greatest impact on trust, then it is clear that in 
Latin America citizens evaluate the legislature in its own terms, with little contamination 
from their views of the executive. Along the same lines, trust in congress is barely 
affected by perceptions about the economic situation, for which citizens appear to blame 
the executive power much more than the legislative: 
 
Participant A: You always first think the government is responsible [for economic 
problems]  
Participant B: Yes and [you blame] the Secretary of Economy 
Participant A: one tends to complain [about the economy] first blaming the government 
rather than the Parliament  
Group 1, Uruguay 
 
Trust in Legislature increases at a statistically significant rate with feelings of 
political efficacy, with external political efficacy having almost twice the impact internal 
political efficacy has. In agreement with the findings previously discussed, those who see 
the government –at least potentially responsive- to individuals tend to trust its institutions 
more. When individuals believe those who govern care about what they think, they hold 
political institutions in higher regard, and the feeling of political efficacy in general 
seems to spill over trust in parliament. 
Those citizens who trust other citizens more are also more trusting of legislatures 
in statistically significant terms, but the substantive impact interpersonal trust has upon 
trust in legislatures is very small: its maximum impact can be 3 points within a 100-point 
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scale. In this sense, trust in other individuals does not translate into trust in political 
institutions. This is also consistent with the ongoing discussion pointing at institutional 
performance and responsiveness as the main determinants of those institutions being 
deemed trustworthy. 
Finally, political knowledge and education are both negatively related to trust in 
parliaments at statistically significant rates, although in both cases the substantive impact 
is small. More educated and more knowledgeable individuals trust the institution less 
than their less sophisticated fellow citizens; they are probably stricter in terms of what 
they believe legislatures need to provide in order to become depositaries of trust. 
The assessment of the individual level determinants of trust in legislatures leads to 
a first conclusion that represents good news for those concerned about public images of 
the institution: congress does not sabotage itself by doing what it is supposed to do by 
constitutional mandate. On the contrary, as legislatures engage in debate and 
counterbalance of the practices of the president, citizens’ confidence in the institution 
grows. It is only when such practices are seen taken to an extreme that individuals reject 
them. Thus, there is nothing inherent to the nature of congressional activities that push 
citizens apart from them; it is the negative evaluation of specific ways in which those 
practices are carried out –i.e. excessive debate and counterbalance- that affects 
confidence in the institution negatively.  
In this sense, there is no such thing as the unavoidable faith of congress to be held 
in low public esteem. Conversely, the results suggest that the responsibility for low levels 
of confidence in the institution does not lie in citizens’ misunderstanding of the 
conflictive nature of congressional politics, but on congress itself. The greater impact 
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upon trust comes from performance evaluation of the institution and from political 
parties’ responsiveness.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 DOES CONTEXT MATTER? 
 
Institutional context has increasingly come to occupy a center stage in explaining 
citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors, and cross-national studies constitute the ideal 
setting to test many institutional theories (Helmke and Levistky 2006; Norris 1999b; 
Norris 2004; Pharr and Putnam 2000). By bringing institutions into the analysis there is 
the explicit acknowledgment that context matters and that -as North puts it- formal and 
informal institutions provide the framework in which citizens relate to each other and to 
political institutions (North 1990, 3-6); in this sense, institutions mediate attitudes 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997, 66).   
In which ways can political institutions shape citizens’ attitudes toward 
legislatures?  It is reasonable to expect that institutional frameworks that contain 
incentives that bring institutions of representation and citizens closer together lead to 
more positive attitudes toward those institutions.  I believe that certain characteristics of 
the party system are more favorable to the development of trusting attitudes toward 
legislatures than others. More precisely, I expect to find that as the number of political 
parties and political party polarization are held within moderate levels, trust in 
legislatures should increase. Similarly, in polities where parties have strong roots in 
societies, trust in legislatures should be greater than in those with weak part systems. 
Prior research has shown that the type of system–whether parliamentary of 
presidential- affects they ways in which system support and confidence in legislatures are 
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configured (Criado and Herrero 2007).  Similarly, Norris argues that “parliamentary 
systems, where all parties continue to have a stake in the policymaking process, should 
generate greater system support than winner-take all presidential systems” (Norris 1999, 
223). There is no empirical evidence, however, to sustain this claim. Likewise, Anderson 
and Guillory (1997) studied several European democracies and found that the type of 
system –whether consensual or majoritarian- affects the levels of citizens’ satisfaction 
with democracy, and Norris (1999) found that institutional confidence is higher in 
majoritarian systems. 
 In Latin America all regimes are presidential and the most typical electoral system 
is proportional representation (Payne, Zovatto, and Díaz 2006; Roberts and Wibbels 
1999), which prevents  us from testing the impact that variations along these dimensions 
can have upon citizens’ levels of trust in legislatures. There are other institutional 
arrangements, however, that should explain in part the country-level variance in trust in 
legislatures. Thus, in the pages that follow I assess the impact each of them has upon trust 
in legislative bodies. The chapter begins by analyzing the bivariate relationships between 
the features of the party system considered key to the development of trust and trust in 
legislatures among citizens of the Americas. Next, alternative explanations are explored, 
including some institutional features such as unified government and federalism, as well 
as measures of institutional performance. Finally, the impact of the contextual-level 
variables is assessed vis-à-vis each other and the individual-level determinants explored 
in the previous chapter.  
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The Influence of the Party System 
 
 
 Political parties serve as the link between the represented and their 
representatives. The importance of citizens’ views of political parties upon their feelings 
toward legislatures was established in the previous chapter: those individuals who see 
parties being responsive to their needs tend to trust legislatures more. At the country 
level, there are certain features of the party system that indicate parties being responsive 
to their voters and to citizens in general. Therefore, it can be expected that citizens living 
in polities with such characteristics will tend to trust legislatures more than those living in 
countries with less responsive parties. In this section, I analyze the impact upon trust in 
legislatures of the effective number of political parties with representation in the 
assembly, the degree of polarization of the party system, and the extent to which political 
parties have stable roots in society. 
 
 
The Number of Political Parties 
 
The number of  parties there are in a political system can affect the dynamics of 
the political system (Sartori 1976), and such dynamics, in turn, can affect citizens’ views 
of the system. According to the number of relevant political parties a system can range 
from being highly fragmented to having very little fragmentation (Sartori 1976, 122-23); 
previous research has suggested that both extremes have similar –negative- consequences 
for citizens’ support for legislatures. Party systems with only one party and political 
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systems with too many parties share a common characteristic: they do not provide 
individuals clear options (Norris 1999, 225). In one-party systems, citizens do not get to 
choose between different alternatives, which would lead to growing dissatisfaction with 
the body that holds them, and, in turn, it would lead to lower levels of trust in 
legislatures.  In a somewhat paradoxical sense, highly fragmented party systems have the 
same effects: the more parties there are, the closer to each other the options would be, 
therefore diminishing the clarity of the options (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, 424). 
Additionally, highly fragmented party systems posit other threats to the system, mainly in 
terms of undermined accountability and diminishing governability (Freidenberg 2006, 16; 
Kuenzi and Lambright 2005, 424) which might as well erode citizens’ support for 
legislatures. 
The more parties there are in a parliament, the more legislative bargaining and 
negotiation will take place due to the many positions to reconcile. Therefore, as the 
number of political parties with seats in the assembly increases, so would the disaffection 
with the institution that hosts them, probably seen as unproductive or, at least, inefficient. 
In this sense, and in contradiction with Norris’ hypothesis, if citizens value effectiveness 
more than the ability of representing a wide array of interests, then the relationship 
between the number of political parties in the assembly and trust in legislatures should be 
a direct, negative one (rather than curvilinear). 
A widespread used measure of the number of political parties is the Effective 
Number of Political Parties (ENPP), developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The 
ENPP is an indicator of the number of political parties weighted by their relative strength 
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either in votes received in the election (Effective Number of Electoral Parties or ENEP) 
or in seats obtained in the Parliament (Effective Number of Legislative Parties or ENLP).1 
1.0
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.9
3.0
3.2
3.2
3.3
3.5
3.6
3.8
4.9
5.6
5.8
6.9
9.3
0 2 4 6 8 10
Effective Number of Legislative Parties
Venezuela
Honduras
Dominican Republic
Bolivia
Uruguay
Panama
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Costa Rica
Mexico
Argentina
Peru
Guatemala
Chile
Ecuador
Colombia
Brazil
Source: Freidenberg 2006
 and electoral data N = 18
 
Figure IV.1. Effective Number of Legislative Parties, by country 
 
                                                 
1 The formula to calculate the ENPP is N=1/∑pi2, where N indicates the ENPP, and p stands for the 
individual parties share of votes or seats. 
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The average ENLP for the 18 countries studied in this research is 3.87 (with a 
standard deviation of 1.98).2 Venezuela is an exceptional case, with only one party in the 
legislature. This is due to the fact that all opposition parties withdrew from the 
competition in the 2006 legislative elections, leaving only pro-Chavez groups to be 
elected. At the other extreme we find Brazil, with more than nine effective parties 
according to the Laakso and Taagepera Index. 3 Most countries, however, have between 
two and four legislative parties. 
According to the hypothesis above stated, as the number of parties increases, trust 
in legislatures would decrease. The relationship depicted in Figure IV.2 lends support to 
it. Figure IV.2 presents the fitted relationship between the existing ENLP and the levels 
of trust in legislatures expressed by the citizens. The data fits quite nicely in a linear 
regression line with a negative slope, which indicates that those citizens living in 
countries with a higher number of political parties tend to trust legislatures less than those 
who live in a more reduced partisan space.  
 
                                                 
2 I use the ENLP instead of the ENEP because I am mainly interested in how the dynamics of parties in the 
Legislature might affect citizens’ views of the institution. In any case, given that most Latin American 
electoral systems for selection of legislative authorities are either pure proportional representation or some 
variant of proportional representation the ENLP does not differ much from the ENEP. 
3 The source for the ENLP for all countries except Argentina and Venezuela is Freidenberg 2006, page 18. 
Argentina had legislative elections after Freidenberg’s work was published, so I calculated the ENLP based 
on data from Rodríguez 2007. For Venezuela, Freidenberg reported a ENLP greater than 1, but in fact, the 
Venezuelan Congress is operating as a one-party system. Finally, for Ecuador, Freidenberg reports an 
ENLP of 5.6. This figure corresponds to the configuration of Congress previous to the destitution and 
substitution of 57 of the original congressmembers (see Escobar 2007). Since the Ecuadorian Congress is 
suspended in its functions anyways and several reconfigurations of power have occurred since the election, 
I chose to keep the original figure. 
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Figure IV.2. Trust in legislatures by effective number of legislative parties, Latin America 
(Fitted Values) 
 
 If, as often conveyed, fragmentation of the party system is associated with 
diminished governability and gridlock, then the negative relationship between the ENLP 
and trust lends additional support for the hypothesis discussed in the previous chapter: 
when there is too much debate (and few outcomes) in the legislature, then individuals 
tend to trust the institution less, because they no longer see it as a responsive, worth of 
their confidence.  
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Party System Polarization 
 
The above discussed ENLP accounts for a very important part of the legislative 
and political dynamics. There is, however, another key component to look at when 
considering the impact the party system might have: the degree of polarization. 
Polarization refers to the ideological distance (measured in a left-right continuum) of the 
parties operating in the assembly (Sartori 1976).  High levels of partisan polarization are 
thought to affect political system stability negatively (Evans 2002, Sartori 1976, but see 
González and Queirolo 2008). I argue that the degree to which the political parties are 
close to, or far away from, each other in their ideological positions also affects legislative 
debates and ultimately legislative outcomes. As the political positions in the assembly are 
polarized, gridlock will be the most probable outcome and therefore support for the 
institution will decay. The evidence from the United States supports this assertion; King 
found that as the political parties moved away from their political center, trust in 
government decayed (King 1997, 156).  
 The measurement of political party ideology has been approached in several 
different ways, including content analysis of party manifestos, analysis of public opinion 
data, and experts’ judgments (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 75-76).  The data obtained from 
these different sources, however, is not always convergent. For instance, in Latin 
America, experts’ judgments tend to present a more polarized landscape than that 
depicted by citizens’ ideological self-placements (González and Queirolo 2008). Thus, it 
seams reasonable to test, alternatively, both operationalizations. Up- to- date polarization 
data measured through citizens’ ideological self-placement and through experts’ 
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judgments is readily available in Queirolo and González (2008).4 For the measure based 
on citizens’ self-placement, the authors resort to Sani and Sartori’s (1983) formula for 
calculating party system polarization. For the experts’ judgments measures, González and 
Queirolo rely on an updated version of Coppedge’s clasification of political parties 
(Coppedge 1997).5 
 Figure IV.3 presents the polarization ratings according to each of the two 
measurements, for the 15 countries for which there are data available. As the graph 
shows, there is only partial agreement between citizens’ self-placements and experts’ 
judgments. If the five most polarized countries according to each indicator are 
considered, only two countries appear among the top five in both indicators: El Salvador 
and Uruguay. Nicaragua, the most polarized country according to experts’ judgment, 
occupies the eighth position in the scale based on citizens’ ideology. When the five least 
polarized countries are considered, matches among the two indicators rise to three: 
Honduras, Panama, and Peru.  
 
  
                                                 
4 The data are available for 15 of the 18 countries here analyzed. Therefore, any analysis containing 
polarization as independent variable would exclude Argentina, Paraguay, and Dominican Republic. 
5 The authors describe the procedures followed to create the indicators of polarization as “(a) estimating 
Sani and Sartori’s (1983) definition of polarization (ideological distance between the two most extreme 
relevant parties, where the position of the parties result from their voters’ self placement in the left right 
scale), and (b) estimating Coppedge’s (1998) indicator of polarization, which differs from Sani and 
Sartori’s in two basic ways: it is based on the experts’ classification, and it takes into account the position 
of all the parties (not merely the two most extreme ones) except those of the center. Polarization according 
to Sani and Sartori’s definition (the difference between the positions of the two most extreme relevant 
parties divided by nine, the maximum possible difference) varies between 0 (an extremely unlikely case: all 
relevant parties should be in the same place in the ten-point scale) and 1 (when the most extreme relevant 
parties are found at both ends of the scale, 1 and 10). Coppedge’s indicator measures the dispersion of the 
vote away from the relative center of the party system; polarization ranges from zero to 100.” (González 
and Queirolo 2008, 15). 
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Figure IV.3. Party system polarization in Latin America 
 
 Despite these differences, the impact of party system polarization upon citizens’ 
levels of trust in legislatures runs in the same direction, whatever the measurement 
(Figure IV.4). The relationship observed, however, is contrary to that expected. Figure 
IV.4 depicts a positive relationship between the level of party system polarization and 
trust in legislatures. 
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 The observed bivariate relationship between party system polarization and trust in 
legislatures contradicts the hypothesis above stated. The positive impact of polarization 
upon trust in legislatures, however, is mild.  Changes in party system polarization can 
make trust vary only within a range of 4 points (in a 100-point scale); if confidence 
intervals are taken into account, the maximum possible variation in trust due to party 
system polarization is less than 2 points. 
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Figure IV.4. Trust in legislatures by levels of party system polarization, Latin America 
(Fitted values) 
 
 
The impact of party system polarization upon trust in legislatures does not operate 
in the expected direction. A potential explanation for the falsification of the hypothesis is 
that the degree of party system polarization might not have impact at all upon trust in 
legislatures (already suggested by the little substantive impact shown by the regression 
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lines in Figure IV.4). Alternative explanations, however, should be put on hold until the 
results from the multivariate analyses are explored. 
 
Parties with Stable Roots in Society 
  
 Political parties with stable roots in society are a key indicator of party system 
institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). If parties have stable roots in society, 
it means they are meaningful to citizens and that they are accomplishing (at least 
partially) their expected functions (otherwise citizens would not continue voting for them, 
or identifying with them). 
 A polity with parties with stable roots is a polity in which the function of political 
representation is channeled mainly through political parties. If, as seen in the previous 
chapter, citizens’ evaluations of parties and legislatures’ responsiveness are key to the 
development of confidence in legislatures, a political system where most citizens confer 
(again, at least partially) such attribute to political parties should be a system where 
conditions are given for individuals to trust legislatures more. Thus, I expect to find 
greater levels of trust in legislatures among those individuals living in polities where 
political parties have stable roots in society.  
 The degree to which political parties have stable roots in society can be 
established by the percentage of self- described partisans living in such a society (Dalton 
and Weldon 2007); a polity with elevated proportions of party identifiers is deemed as a 
polity in which parties have stable roots. The AmericasBarometer 2008 asked citizens 
whether they identified themselves with a political party; by computing the total number 
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of affirmative answers to that question in each country, an indicator of parties’ stable 
roots is obtained. 
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Figure IV.5. Percent of partisans as indicator of parties’ stable roots, Latin America 
 
 Figure IV.5 shows the percentage of self-described partisans in each of the 
countries. Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Honduras have clearly 
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established parties according to the indicator of percentage of partisans. In the four 
countries, at least half of the citizens identify themselves with a political party. At the 
other extreme, only 15.9% of Guatemalans self-identify with a political party. The 
landscape of partisan identification as indicator of parties’ roots is, thus, one with a lot of 
variations across countries in Latin America. 
  
35
40
45
50
20 30 40 50 60 70
Percentage of partisans
95% CI Trust (Fitted values)
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 N = 28,267
 
Figure IV.6. Trust in legislatures by parties’ stable roots measured as percentage of 
partisans, Latin America (Fitted Values) 
 
 
 
Do parties’ stable roots in society foster citizens’ levels of trust in legislatures? 
The preliminary evidence from the bivariate relationship among the two variables 
suggests so (Figure IV.6). As the percentage of partisans in the polity they inhabit 
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increases, so does the confidence citizens confer to legislatures. Thus, countries with 
more stable party systems (again, measured as the percentage of partisans) seem to 
provide a frame more favorable for trusting legislatures than those countries with weak 
partisan roots. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
 
 Previous research might have ignored the impact that some characteristics of the 
party system can have in shaping citizens’ attitudes toward institutions of representation, 
but other institutional characteristics have been explored. These alternative explanations 
converge in two broad categories:  political institutions and institutional performance. 
The first category comprises the type of government (whether divided or unified), and the 
distribution of power within the polity (whether federal or unitary). The second category, 
institutional performance, includes regimes’ economic performance as well as other 
indicators of the effectiveness of governments such as crime and corruption rates. Each of 
them is here briefly described and later included in the multivariate analyses. 
 
Unified Government 
  
As discussed in the previous chapter, as citizens perceive congress wasting too 
much time discussing and debating and as they perceive the assembly obstructing the 
executive in excess, their levels of trust in the institutions decay. Whether a divided or 
unified government is in place, it conditions the stage for those situations of excessive 
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debate and gridlock to exist. Thus, it could be reasonable to expect that under unified 
government congressional activities would run smoother, and so will the legislative- 
executive relations, therefore leading to lower levels of perceived conflicts and hence 
higher levels of trust. Conversely, it could be expected that under divided government 
inter branches conflicts arise, leading to lower levels of trust in legislatures among 
citizens.  Evidence from the United States lends support for the hypothesis: views of 
Congress improve under periods of unified government (Patterson and Caldeira 1990), 
which is probably linked to more perceived effectiveness.  
The idea of divided government is easily grasped and operationalized in the 
context of the stable American two-party system. In multiparty systems the classification 
is not that straightforward (Elgie 2001; Shugart 1995). In multiparty systems – especially 
those configured under proportional representation rules- there is the possibility for a 
party to obtain only a relative majority, a situation that must be distinguished from that in 
which a party holds the absolute majority (Shugart 1995, 327).  Following such guideline, 
in this research, countries in which the executive and more than 50% of the legislature 
(and each of the chambers in bicameral systems) are controlled by the same political 
party will be counted as cases of unified government; all the other situations (whether the 
party controlling the executive is in minority or holding only a relative majority in one or 
both chambers) will be considered cases of non unified government.  
The countries holding unified governments at the time the public opinion data 
were collected were: Argentina (Executive and both chambers controlled by the coalition 
Alianza Frente para la Victoria), Dominican Republic (Executive and both chambers 
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controlled by the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana), Uruguay (Executive and both 
chambers controlled by the Encuentro Progresista – Frente Amplio), and Ecuador. 6   
Contrary to previous findings, citizens living in countries with unified 
governments have, on average, lower levels of trust in legislatures than those living under 
non unified governments (Figure IV.7). The mean trust in legislatures among those living 
under non unified government is almost four points higher than among those living under 
unified government. This mean value for those living under unified government, 
however, is highly influenced by the presence of Ecuadorians, who stand up for their low 
levels of trust in assemblies.  
                                                 
6 Ecuador is a special case. The original configuration of a non unified government product of the vote 
share resulting from the 2006 legislative election (Freidenberg 2006, 63-68) was clearly modified by the 
electoral authority ruling enacting the destitution of 57 out of the 100 originally elected congressmembers 
in March 2007, and their replacement by new legislators identified as supporters of the President (Escobar 
2007) . Thus, since March 2007 Ecuador held a unified government. Since November 2007, however, the 
Ecuadorian Congress has been suspended on its functions, following the mandate of the Assembly 
conformed to create the new Constitution – the Asamblea Constituyente. At the Asamblea Constituyente, 
supporters of President Correa hold the majority (ADNMUNDO 2007). Thus, since the last operating 
Congress did so in a unified government configuration and the functioning institution that more closely 
resembles a legislative body, the Asamblea Constituyente, is also conformed by a majority of individuals 
loyal to the President, it is reasonable to assume Ecuador is also a case of unified government. 
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Figure IV.7. Trust in legislatures by type of government, Latin America 
 
When Ecuadorians are removed from the analysis, the mean level of trust in 
legislatures for those citizens living under unified governments rises to 45.1, surpassing 
the average confidence among citizens living under non unified governments (which is 
not altered).  When this outlier is removed, then, the predicted trend emerges: those living 
under unified governments, on average, trust legislatures more than their fellow citizens 
living under non unified governments.  
 The case of Ecuador comprises a clear refusal of the positive link between unified 
government and trust in legislatures. This does not mean, however, that the hypothesis 
proposing such a link is altogether inaccurate. A unified government, as the other 
institutional features, is thought to promote –not determine- a more positive environment 
for the development of trust in legislatures. Additional variables might exert effects in the 
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opposite direction, therefore neutralizing the impact a unified government can have upon 
trust in legislatures. Thus, the effect unified government has upon trust in legislatures, if 
any at all, can only be clearly assessed in a multivariate analysis, conducted in the final 
section of this chapter. 
 
Federalism 
 
  “Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are 
divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each 
kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Riker 1975, 
101 cited by Lijphart 1999, 186). This is a widely-used definition of federalism that 
stresses the constitutional division of powers across the space. 
 Norris hypothesized that confidence in institutions of representation should be 
higher among citizens living in federal states because “federalism manages to 
accommodate simultaneously the needs of different regions” (Norris 1999, 225). The 
empirical evidence she found when she analyzed data for 25 democracies, however, 
pointed in the opposite direction: individuals living under unitary states trusted 
institutions of representation –on average- more than their fellow citizens living under 
federal systems. A possible explanation Norris found is that unitary states are better than 
federal ones at producing accountability and responsible party government (Norris 1999, 
233), therefore constituting a framework for citizens to be more satisfied with the 
government outcomes which would ultimately lead to higher levels of trust.  
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In Latin America there are four formally federal countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Venezuela (Gibson 2004, 3). If Norris’ hypothesis is accurate for the Latin 
American context, then individuals living in those four countries should express higher 
levels of trust in legislatures than their fellow citizens from the rest of the continent. If, on 
the other hand, the explanation developed for the 25 democracies analyzed in her piece 
holds – that is, if individuals value unitary government outputs more- then higher levels 
of trust should be found among those living in unitary systems.  
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Figure IV.8. Trust in legislatures by Federalism, Latin America 
 
  The bivariate relationship between federalism and trust in legislatures lends mild 
support for Norris’ hypothesis: trust in legislatures is higher among those living in federal 
systems; the difference is substantively small, but statistically significant (see Table 
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AIV.3 in Annex F). The extent to which a federal environment provides a frame more 
favorable for citizens to trust legislatures can only be assessed by means of the 
multivariate analysis, where other covariates are introduced and controlled for.  
 
 
 
Institutional Performance  
 
 Some scholars argue that citizens’ support for the system is driven by how well 
the government is doing its job, and they explore measurements of institutional 
performance at the aggregate level.7 Thus, Miller and Listhaug argue that “countries with 
governments that turn in a better performance should also exhibit relatively higher levels 
of diffuse public support than countries with poorly performing governments” (Miller 
and Listhaug 1999, 206).  
 Assessments of governmental performance upon institutional trust have mainly 
focused on economic performance. In most cases, Miller and Listhaug’s hypothesis has 
been supported; Lipset and Schneider (1983 62-65) found that unemployment and 
inflation were associated with weak support for the incumbent U.S. government. 
Similarly, poor economic performance has been identified as one of the reasons for 
declining trust in institutions in Sweden (Holmberg 1999, 121). Finally, per capita 
income and per capita income growth are both positively associated with trust in 
legislatures in the Andean countries (Mainwaring 2006, 300). Lawrence, on the other 
hand, observed that governmental economic performance has a negative impact upon 
                                                 
7 Specific, individual-level performance evaluations of legislatures and legislators do affect individual 
levels of trust, as discussed in Chapter 3. In this section the focus shifts to country-level objective 
indicators. 
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political trust, but that it does not account for the dramatic changes in trust suffered by 
the US. Government (Lawrence 1997). Moreover, some studies have found a negative 
association between GDP and institutional trust at the country level; the outlined 
explanations for this counter-intuitive finding is that individuals living in the most 
affluent countries have higher expectations for their institutions, which would lead them 
to be less satisfied with the performance –and therefore to trust them less (Mcallister 
1999, 197).  
 Among Latin American countries, a great deal of variation on GDP per capita is 
found. In 2007, the GDP per capita ranged from 863 USD for Nicaragua to 8,744.4 for 
Argentina (ECLAC 2007, 88).8 If what has been seen for the Andean countries holds true 
for the rest of Latin America, then we should observe higher levels of trust among those 
individuals living in richer countries. Figure VI.9 shows that it is, indeed, the case. For 
Latin America, the country’s per capita GDP is positively associated with trust in 
legislatures: those individuals who live in countries with a higher GDP per capita trust 
parliaments more than their fellow citizens who live in more modest environments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The complete list of GDP per capita values for all countries included in the analysis is found in Annex E. 
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Figure IV.9. Trust in legislatures by level of GDP, Latin America 
 
 Economic institutional performance is a powerful indicator of government 
effectiveness, but it might not be the only one. Mainwaring argues that the low levels of 
confidence in institutions of representation in the Andes have been caused by state 
deficiencies; together with a poor economic performance; the author identifies crime and 
corruption as key indicators of poor governmental performance (Mainwaring 2006, 296-
302).  The impact of these state deficiencies is worth exploring, given that they might 
constitute a structural hinder for the development of trusting bonds between individuals 
and institutions of representation. 
In order to control for the impact the level of corruption existing in the country 
might affect trust in legislatures, I rely on the Corruption Victimization Index developed 
by LAPOP (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999) and available from the AmericasBarometer 
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round 2008. The Corruption Victimization Index indicates the proportion of individuals in 
a given country that have been victims of corruption during the past year, according to 
their responses in the survey. The index is obtained by computing the total number of 
individuals who answered they were victims of at least one of the following forms of 
corruption: bribe solicited by a police officer, bribe solicited by a public official, 
corruption at the city hall, corruption in the courts, bribe solicited in the job, at the 
children’s school, or in state-run hospitals. 
Also regarding corruption victimization there is important variation across 
countries. The countries with the highest corruption victimization rates  -Mexico and 
Bolivia, with over 30% of their population being victims of corruption in the past year- 
have almost four times the level of corruption found in the countries with the lowest 
values of corruption victimization, such as Uruguay, Panama, and Colombia.9  
The bivariate relationship between degree of corruption in the country –measured 
by the percentage of victims of corruption during the past year- and the levels of trust 
individuals have on legislatures is negative, rendering further confirmation to what was 
found for the Andean countries. Figure IV.10 depicts such a relationship.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 For a complete list of the corruption victimization see Annex E. 
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Figure IV.10. Trust in legislatures by level of corruption, Latin America 
 
 The regression line revealed in Figure IV.10 shows that as the level of corruption 
in the country increases, individuals tend to trust legislatures less. The substantive impact 
of the degree of corruption, however, is only modest; given the different levels of 
corruption victimization trust in legislatures varies within 44 and 38 points (if confidence 
intervals are taken into account, the range of variation is even narrower).  
 Finally, the impact of the overall level of crime and its impact upon trust in 
legislatures are to be assessed. Crime is a serious problem that many Latin American 
countries face, and it constitutes an area in which the state has proven deficient in many 
circumstances. Crime is also a phenomenon rather difficult to measure, a problem that 
becomes worse when cross-national comparisons are intended due to differential criteria 
for defining and reporting what constitutes a crime. A way in which this difficulty is 
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overcome is by means of crime victimization surveys, which consist of asking citizens 
directly whether or not they have been victims of crime (UNODC 2008). The 
AmericasBarometer 2008 asked such a question, therefore national-level crime 
victimization rates can be obtained by computing the percentage of individuals 
expressing they were victims of a crime during the past year. 
 Again, cross-country variation is found, with crime victimization rates that range 
from 13% in Honduras to 27% in Argentina.10 The bivariate correlation between crime 
and trust in legislatures run in the direction predicted by Mainwaring: those individuals 
living in countries with higher crime rates tend to trust legislatures less than their fellow 
citizens living in safer environments (Figure IV.11) 
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Figure IV.11. Trust in legislatures by level of crime, Latin America 
                                                 
10 See complete results in Annex E. 
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The range in the predicted values of trust for given levels of crime is wider than the 
observed for the relationship between trust and corruption, which suggest crime would 
have a more significant impact upon trust in legislatures than corruption does. The 
relative impact of each independent variable, however, can only be assessed vis-à-vis the 
impact of the other, the task that occupies the next section of the panel. 
 
 
A Multivariate Multi-level Model of Trust in Legislatures 
 
In order to single out the impact that each of the contextual variables has upon 
trust in legislatures in Latin America, those variables have to be tested in a model that 
controls for the other contextual variables as well as for the individual-level variables 
explored in Chapter III. Therefore, the way of assessing whether context matters in 
shaping citizens’ confidence in legislatures is by adding the eight contextual variables –
effective number of legislative parties, degree of polarization of the party system, parties’ 
roots in society, unified government, federalism, GDP, corruption, and crime- to the 
model presented in Table III.4 in the previous chapter. 
Table IV.1 presents the results from three random effects models upon trust in 
legislatures. All three models are identical except for the polarization variable. Model 5 
includes citizens’ ideological identification as a proxy for party system polarization; it is 
substituted in Model 6 by polarization according to experts’ judgments. Given that the 
available data on polarization only covers 15 countries (therefore leaving out of the 
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analysis all cases from Argentina, Dominican Republic, and Paraguay), Model 7 
replicates the model without a proxy for party system polarization which allows for the 
inclusion of cases from all 18 countries. 
An important advantage of running multi-level models with the xtmixed command 
of Stata 10 –as I did- is that unlike other statistical software, Stata does not impose severe 
constrains in the number of country-level variables to include in the model. Therefore, 
including seven or eight country-level variables as I do in Models 5 to 7 does not violate 
any modeling assumption.11 
The random effects models analyzed in Chapter 3 explained around 40% of the 
total variance of trust in legislatures. By adding the country-level variables the model 
reaches higher explanatory power: according to the R Squared values the explanatory 
power of the new models is around 53% for the models including the polarization 
variables (models 5 and 6) and 49% for Model 7, which excludes it (Table IV.1). 
Accordingly, the country-level unexplained variance -sd(_cons)- is significantly reduced 
in reference to the model with individual-level variables only, especially in models 5 and 
6. 
Although the significance of the p-value for the likelihood-ratio test (LR) 
confirms that the mixed model with random-intercept is a better fit for the data than a 
simple OLS regression model for all three models, a Hausman test reveals that despite the 
fact these are better specified models than those analyzed in the previous chapter, they 
still suffer from endogeneity (Tables AIV.7 to AIV.9, Annex F).  
 
                                                 
11 This is so because Stata treats country-level variables in the same way it does individual-level variables, 
in a unique data matrix (Gutierrez 2008). 
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Table IV. 1. Individual and contextual determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin 
America, random effects models 
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
  β  β  β  
Excessive debate 0.115 *** 0.115 *** 0.121 *** 
Excessive debate Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Excessive counterbalance 0.089 *** 0.089 *** 0.085 *** 
Excessive counterbalance Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Congressional Performance  0.474 *** 0.473 *** 0.472 *** 
Party responsiveness 0.183 *** 0.183 *** 0.183 *** 
Partisan ID 0.459 * 0.456 * 0.534 ** 
Presidential approval 0.051 *** 0.052 *** 0.051 *** 
Economic situation 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 0.027 *** 
Political Knowledge -0.022 *** -0.022 *** -0.025 *** 
Internal political efficacy 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.037 *** 
External political efficacy 0.059 *** 0.059 *** 0.063 *** 
TV news 0.000  0.000  0.002  
Interpersonal trust 0.033 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 
Education -1.076 *** -1.083 *** -1.062 *** 
Effective N of parties -0.973 ** -1.044 ** -0.786  
Polarization (Citizens) 4.717      
Polarization (Experts)   0.032    
Parties' roots in society -0.044  -0.042  0.016  
Unified government -8.357 *** -7.933 *** -6.597 *** 
Federalism 1.876  1.565  0.782  
GDP 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
Corruption -0.042  -0.006  -0.036  
Crime -0.306  -0.296 * -0.361  
_cons 11.583  9.610 10.227  
       
 Random-effects Parameters. Estimates reported (std error in parentheses)  
country: Identity      
sd(_cons) 1.776  1.719  2.744  
  (0.373)  (0.368)  (0.494)  
sd(Residual) 24.239  24.239  24.243  
  (0.123)  (0.123)  (0.115) 
LR vs OLS Chibar p 0.000  0.000  0.000 
R2 (model) 0.529  0.531  0.493 
R2 (between-country) 0.808  0.814  0.703 
R2 (within-country) 0.154  0.154  0.154 
Observations 19,381  19,381  22,048 
Groups 15  15  18 
Wald chi2(23) 7199.67  7217.25  8242.63  
Prob > chi2        =     0.000  0.000  0.000  
p < 0.05 * || p < 0.01 ** || p < 0.001 ***      
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The usually recommended palliative for this situation, the reliance on fixed effects 
models yields similar substantive results (Table IV.2). The fixed effects models have a 
diminished explanatory power (around 33% of the total variance), but thanks to the 
inclusion of country-level dummy variables, they do provide additional hints on country-
level specific features. 
Although the results shown in tables IV.1 and IV.2 do not provide strong 
confirmation for all the hypotheses stated in this chapter, they do suggest very interesting 
patterns. First, the impact of the individual-level variables remains strong and practically 
unchanged when the contextual variables are included in (any of) the models. Second, 
none of the characteristics of the party system has a statistically significant impact 
consistent across models, but the ENLP reaches such an impact in five out of the six data 
analysis. Among the contextual-level control variables, unified government and GDP per 
capita are the only ones with consistent effects across models. 
Party system polarization, either measured through the proxy of citizens’ self-
identification or by experts’ judgments does not have a statistically significant impact 
upon trust in legislatures. Given this, models 5 and 6 can be abandoned and replaced by 
Model 7, which mirrors models 5 and 6 in all other variables, with the advantage of 
having cases from all 18 countries.  To facilitate comparisons, Table IV.III presents the 
results from both random and fixed effects analyses for Model 7 next to the results 
obtained for the final model analyzed in Chapter 3 (that is, results from Model 2, 
originally presented in Table III.4) 
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Table IV. 2. Individual and contextual determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin 
America, fixed effects model 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 β  Β  β  
Excessive debate 0.114 *** 0.114 *** 0.122 *** 
Excessive debate Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Excessive counterbalance 0.089 *** 0.089 *** 0.085 *** 
Excessive counterbalance Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Congressional Performance  0.472 *** 0.472 *** 0.471 *** 
Party responsiveness 0.183 *** 0.183 *** 0.182 *** 
Partisan ID 0.456 * 0.456 * 0.535 ** 
Presidential approval 0.051 *** 0.051 *** 0.050 *** 
Economic situation 0.023 ** 0.023 ** 0.026 *** 
Political Knowledge -0.023 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 *** 
Internal political efficacy 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.037 *** 
External political efficacy 0.059 *** 0.059 *** 0.063 *** 
TV news 0.001  0.001  0.003  
Interpersonal trust 0.033 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 
Education -1.084 *** -1.084 *** -1.070 *** 
Effective N of parties -1.041 *** -0.983 *** -1.599 *** 
Polarization (Citizens) (dropped)      
Polarization (Experts)   -0.009    
Parties' roots in society 0.028  0.033  0.150 *** 
Unified government -8.323 *** -8.197 *** -12.292 *** 
Federalism 1.588 * 1.603 * 1.067  
GDP 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
Corruption -0.035  -0.040  -0.097 ** 
Crime -0.088  -0.069  -0.065  
Guatemala 2.935 * 3.169 ** -1.325  
El Salvador -2.200 * -1.665  -10.143 *** 
Honduras (dropped)  (dropped)  -10.304 *** 
Nicaragua -0.699  (dropped)  -10.053 *** 
Costa Rica -3.139 *** -3.251 *** -6.255 *** 
Panama (dropped)  (dropped)  (dropped)  
Colombia 4.797 *** 4.999 *** 0.685  
Ecuador (dropped)  (dropped)  (dropped)  
Bolivia 4.279 *** 4.817 *** -2.795  
Peru -2.346 * -2.384 * -6.230 *** 
Paraguay     -16.843 *** 
Chile (dropped)  (dropped)  (dropped)  
Uruguay (dropped)  (dropped)  -0.403  
Brazil (dropped)  (dropped)  (dropped)  
Venezuela (dropped)  (dropped)  (dropped)  
Argentina     (dropped)  
Dominican Republic     (dropped)  
_cons 5.297 * 4.791  13.037 *** 
R2 (model) 0.340  0.340  0.349  
Adj R2 (model) 0.339  0.339  3.348  
Observations 19,381  19,381  22,048  
Country of reference: Mexico p < 0.05 * || p < 0.01 ** || p < 0.001 *** 
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 Model 7 lends almost identical results for the individual-level variables under 
random and fixed effects analyses.12 Moreover, for the individual-level variables, the 
coefficients and their statistical significance are almost identical to those of Model 2 
(originally presented in Table III.4 and copied in the first two columns of Table IV.3). 
This not only means that individual attitudes and behaviors remain strong predictors of 
attitudes toward legislatures even after controlling for contextual variables, but also that 
the introduction of contextual-level variables does not alter the direction, magnitude, or 
significance of such an impact, either. 
 Among the contextual predictors of trust in legislatures, the ENLP reaches 
statistical significance under the fixed effects model and it does so in the predicted 
direction:  as the number of political parties with representation in the assembly 
increases, the confidence in the Legislature expressed by individuals living in a the polity 
decreases, for each additional political party with parliamentary representation, trust in 
legislatures decreases 1.5 points. Similarly, the positive and significant coefficient for 
parties’ roots in society indicates that as parties are better established in a polity, the 
individuals who live in such a polity tend to trust legislatures more. 
 Among the institutional variables, only unified government achieves statistical 
significance, but it does so in a direction opposite to that predicted by the theory: 
individuals living in countries with unified governments trust legislatures less than their 
citizens living under non unified arrangements. In the previous section it was shown how 
the results changed when Ecuador was removed from the group of cases defined as 
unified government.  
  
                                                 
12 The results remain strong under a robust standard error analysis (see Table AIV.13, in Annex F). 
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Table IV. 3. Individual and contextual determinants of trust in legislatures in Latin 
America, Model 7, random and fixed effects models 
 Model 2 Model 7 
 Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
 β  β   β  β  
Excessive debate 0.121 *** 0.122 *** 0.121 *** 0.122 *** 
Excessive debate Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Excessive counterbalance 0.085 *** 0.085 *** 0.085 *** 0.085 *** 
Excessive counterbalance Sq -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Congressional Performance  0.472 *** 0.471 *** 0.472 *** 0.471 *** 
Party responsiveness 0.183 *** 0.182 *** 0.183 *** 0.182 *** 
Partisan ID 0.531 ** 0.535 ** 0.534 ** 0.535 ** 
Presidential approval 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.051 *** 0.05 *** 
Economic situation 0.027 *** 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.026 *** 
Political Knowledge -0.024 *** -0.024 *** -0.025 *** -0.024 *** 
Internal political efficacy 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 0.037 *** 
External political efficacy 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 
TV news 0.003  0.003   0.002  0.003  
Interpersonal trust 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 0.032 *** 
Education -1.076 *** -1.07 *** -1.062 *** -1.07 *** 
Effective N of parties      -0.786  -1.599 *** 
Parties' roots in society      0.016  0.15 *** 
Unified government      -6.597 *** -12.292 *** 
Federalism      0.782  1.067  
GDP      0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
Corruption      -0.036  -0.097 ** 
Crime      -0.361  -0.065  
Guatemala    -9.975 ***   -1.325  
El Salvador    -11.298 ***   -10.143 *** 
Honduras    -9.467 ***   -10.304 *** 
Nicaragua    -12.616 ***   -10.053 *** 
Costa Rica    -7.299 ***   -6.255 *** 
Panama    -11.169 ***   (dropped)  
Colombia    -7.25 ***   0.685  
Ecuador    -22.801 ***   (dropped)  
Bolivia    -7.412 ***   -2.795  
Peru    -13.124 ***   -6.23 *** 
Paraguay    -16.348 ***   -16.843 *** 
Chile    -4.917 ***   (dropped)  
Uruguay    -7.114 ***   -0.403  
Brazil    -10.434 ***   (dropped)  
Venezuela    -7.364 ***   (dropped)  
Argentina    -11.95 ***   (dropped)  
Dominican Republic    -6.966 *** (dropped)  
_cons 4.739 *** 14.657 *** 10.227  13.037 *** 
R2 (model) 0.418  0.3492   0.493  0.349  
Adj R2 (model)   0.3483     3.348  
Observations 22,048  22,048   22,048  22,048  
Country of reference: Mexico 
p < 0.05 * || p < 0.01 ** || p < 0.001 ***        
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When such a thing is done, and Ecuador is therefore considered a case of non 
unified government, the variable is dropped out of the model under a fixed effects robust 
standard errors analysis (see Table AIV.14, in Annex F). I will return to the issue of 
dropped variables in the upcoming paragraphs. 
Finally, two of the institutional performance variables lend significant results 
under the fixed effect model: GDP and corruption. The substantive impact of GDP per 
capita is, however, almost zero, whereas the overall corruption level in the country –as 
expressed by the percentage of self-declared victims of corruption during the past year- 
affects trust in legislatures in the predicted direction: citizens living in countries with 
higher levels of corruption tend to trust legislatures less than their fellow citizens living in 
less corrupt environments. 
These results, however, should be carefully assessed in light of the by-country 
variation of each of the contextual independent variables. In this sense, the fixed effects 
model sheds light over how these country-level variables might actually overlap with the 
country-dummy variables. In the previous chapter, the significance of the tests showing 
that a random effects model controlling for country level random variation was a better fit 
for the data than a simple OLS regression, and the magnitude and statistical significance 
of the country dummy variables encouraged the exploration of the contextual variables as 
potential determinants of the trust in legislatures pursued in this chapter. What those 
results suggested was that there were factors at the country level that explained part of the 
variance observed in the dependent variable. Facing this scenario, some particularities of 
the party system considered key in shaping citizens’ attitudes toward legislature were 
explored, together with additional, control contextual-level variables such as the type of 
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government, and indicators of institutional performance. Some of these country-level 
variables, as it has just been discussed, prove to be statistically significant, which 
suggests contextual variables do have an impact upon citizens’ levels of trust in 
legislatures.  
Now, in the fixed effects final model (Model 7), in addition to the seven 
contextual variables, the country-level effects are included in the model as country 
dummies. The dummy variables for Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, 
Argentina, and Dominican Republic are automatically dropped out of the model by the 
software used to process the analysis. This is due to perfect collinearity between the 
dropped variable and some other variable included in the model. 
Why does this happen? Recall that in order to calculate the impact contextual 
variables have upon trust in legislatures at the individual level, each case (that is, each 
individual) was assigned the value corresponding to the country he resides in for each of 
the contextual level variables. Thus, for instance, all Brazilians received a score of 9.3 for 
the ENLP parties, because that is the number of parties with representatives in the 
national Congress in the country they inhabit. Similarly, all Dominicans and Bolivians 
received a score of 2.4 in the same variable, because that is the ENLP for their respective 
countries. Brazil is the only case of the Americas with a ENLP of 9.3 therefore, when a 
country dummy for Brazil was included (for which all Brazilians were assigned the value 
1), then there is perfect collinearity between ENLP and the country dummy for Brazil, 
and that is why the model automatically drops one of the variables in order to avoid 
multicollinearity and the violation of a basic assumption of the OLS regression. The same 
situation of perfect collinearity happens with some other of the contextual variables and 
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the country dummies for Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, and Dominican 
Republic. 
Several alternative avenues can be pursued to overcome this problem, although 
none of them is optimal. For instance, the values of the independent variables of interval 
nature (ENLP, parties’ roots in society, GDP, corruption, and crime) could be collapsed 
into fewer categories, therefore transforming them into ordinal scales. This procedure, 
however, would eliminate most of the by-country existing variation for most of these 
variables, which renders their inclusion in the analysis almost pointless. Besides, it does 
not solve the multicollinearity problem posited by the dummy variables (federalism and 
unified government), which cannot be recoded in such a way. 
Another alternative would be to collapse the different contextual independent and 
control variables into fewer variables by means of creating indexes of party systems 
features, institutional features, and institutional performance, for instance. This 
procedure, however, does not seem advisable due to theoretical as well as methodological 
reasons. The aim of including each of the above listed contextual independent variables is 
to test their impact upon trust in legislatures with the ultimate goal of identifying the 
institutional features that promote trusting bonds between citizens and legislatures. If two 
or more of those variables are collapsed into a unique indicator, then the individual effect 
of each institutional feature fades and it will no longer be possible to identify the features 
that better promote –or hinder- confidence in legislatures. Therefore, collapsing several 
different independent variables into summary measures yields the same results as 
recoding each independent variable into fewer categories: it renders the analysis pointless 
from the perspective of the theory driving the exploration. Additionally, even if this issue 
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was ignored, there is a methodological obstacle to do it: the variables do not conform 
reliable scales.13 
Finally, a third strategy consists of removing the country dummies from the 
model, which would wipe out the collinearity problem between the country dummies and 
the institutional context variables. Following such strategy, however, implies that the 
only contextual differences the model accounts for are those captured by the seven 
contextual variables included in the model. The problem of pursuing this strategy is, 
though, that for El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru, and Paraguay the 
country dummies not only do not suffer from collinearity with the contextual variables 
but they also achieve statistically significant results. This means that in these countries 
there is something beyond the contextual variables included in the model that accounts 
for variation in the levels of trust in legislatures expressed by the citizens in the survey. 
The random and fixed effects analyses of Model 7 presented in Table IV.3 are not 
free of problems, as it has been discussed. The ways to overcome those problems 
however, are not free of caveats, either. The main issue probably resides in the limited 
number of countries, something that cannot be solved with any of the data manipulation 
processes just discussed. With 18 countries, the collinearity problem between the country 
dummy variables and some of the contextual variables is something not to be surprised 
about. The focus of this research, however, is trust in legislatures among Latin 
Americans, and therefore the limitation is inherent to the object of research. Variation in 
                                                 
13 The Alpha coefficient of reliability for the party system variables (ENLP and parties’ roots in society) is 
0.23. The Alpha coefficient for the institutional control variables: federalism and unified government is 
0.26. Finally, the Alpha coefficient for the institutional performance variables is 0.4 for crime and 
corruption considered together. The results are not reported when a coefficient of reliability for crime, 
corruption, and GDP is requested (probably because the coefficient is too small to be reported). Thus, any 
of the groups of variables achieves values of the coefficient of reliability high enough to justify their 
combination in an index. 
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the institutional features –especially those concerning the party systems- does exist 
among the studied countries; the range of that variation, however, is not wide enough to 
allow for additional data analysis (collapsing categories, for instance). This does not 
mean, however, that the analysis of the impact of the contextual variables pursued in this 
chapter is valueless. It suggests, rather, that contextual factors matter, but they do so in 
more complex ways than originally expected. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Two major lessons are drawn from the preceding analyses. The first one is that 
individual-level attitudes are the stronger predictors of trust in legislatures; their impact is 
not altered in any significant way when the contextual variables are included in the 
multivariate models. The second lesson is that assessing the impact of the contextual 
features is a complex enterprise. The consequences of institutional arrangements and 
institutional performance upon trust might not be something that can be assessed 
straightforward. 
 In spite of the methodological challenges that the introduction of contextual-level 
variables posited, the results from all the multivariate analyses show the strong influence 
individual attitudes toward legislatures have upon confidence in the institution. The 
finding that views about parties and legislatures responsiveness is the main determinant 
of the confidence individuals deposit in the legislatures remains unchallenged. These 
results reassure the assertion that for citizens to trust legislatures more, the key step is for 
them to become –and be perceived as- responsive to citizens’ representational needs.  
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 Beyond this keystone factor, however, I expected the institutional context to play 
a role in the trusting linkages between citizens and legislatures. This chapter began with 
the discussion on how specific features of the party systems were expected to affect how 
citizens’ view their legislatures. Specifically, it was argued that the number of political 
parties with legislative representation –the ENLP- and their degree of polarization could 
negatively affect trust in legislatures by constituting obstacles to efficient legislative 
outcomes. If citizens reject excessive legislative bargain, then as the number of parties 
represented in congress and the ideological distance among them increase, the conditions 
are given for individuals to trust legislatures less, because citizens would see legislatures 
often engaging in the processes they abhor. Along the same lines, I expected to find 
greater levels of trust in legislatures among those citizens living in polities in which 
political parties have strong roots in society, given that the strength of parties would 
speak of the effectiveness of the representation. Similarly, under non-unified government 
there should be expected higher congressional gridlock to the presidential agenda –a 
practice also rejected when perceived as carried out in excess- that would also make trust 
in legislatures decay. 
  The available evidence suggests that the number of parties with legislative 
representation existing in a country affects the confidence deposited in legislatures by the 
citizens, and it does so in the expected direction. As the ENLP increases, trust in 
legislatures decreases at a statistically significant –although substantively moderate- rate. 
This moderate effect, however, remains constant across the different multivariate models 
analyzed in this chapter. 
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 Conversely, the degree of party system polarization does not attain statistical 
significance in any of its versions. It might be possible that polarization does not affect 
levels of trust in any significant way, therefore disconfirming the hypotheses about its 
impact upon confidence in legislatures. It could also be, however, that its effect upon 
trust is contingent to other characteristics of the party systems –such as the ENLP, for 
instance. Unfortunately, matching the ENLP and the degree of polarization into a single 
scale that accounts for both (as suggested by Sartori 1976) is unfeasible given that with 
only 18 countries, it is highly likely that there would be a unique value for each country, 
therefore leading to collinearity between this variable and the country-level dummies. 
 On the alternative explanations, only one of the institutional variables –unified 
government- attains statistical significance. Federalism, on the other hand, does not affect 
levels of trust in legislatures in any significant way. For the case of unified government, 
the impact operates in a direction contrary to that expected: individuals living under 
unified governments trust their legislatures less than those living in non unified polities. 
Among the institutional performance variables, GDP and corruption achieve statistical 
significance in the predicted direction, but their substantive impact is very small. 
 For the above exposed methodological reasons, these results on the impact of 
contextual variables cannot be taken as definitive. The significance of both, the 
contextual variables and the country dummy variables reassures the claim that context 
matters in shaping trust in legislatures. The limited number of countries, however, posits 
some limitations to the confidence with which the results from the statistical analyses are 
read. The consistent impact of the ENLP across different models, for instance, suggests 
that this particular feature of the party system might affect citizens views of legislatures 
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in the predicted direction; in those polities with more political parties with legislative 
representation citizens trust legislatures less, probably because the more the parties at 
play, the more chaos and ineffectiveness of the whole legislative body individuals 
perceive. In sum, context matters for citizens attitudes toward legislatures but it does so 
in a complex manner, not easily grasped by multivariate statistical analyses.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
TRUST IN LEGISLATURES AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 Legislatures have been operating as political institutions since its rudimentary 
origins in medieval Europe (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979), long before democracies 
were established and consolidated in the modern world. In today’s polities, parliaments 
play essentially the same old role: to allow for different views, groups, and interests to 
have a voice; it is in the legislatures where political representation takes place. In 
performing such a role, parliaments constitute a centerpiece of democratic institutional 
arrangements. However, as it has been argued throughout this dissertation, citizens hold 
legislatures in very low esteem; this attitude can represent a threat not only for the 
institution itself but also for democracy. 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the ways in which low levels of trust in 
legislatures can hurt democracy in contemporary Latin America. A second section 
discusses a series of actions aimed at improving trust in legislatures given the findings in 
the previous chapters. The third and final section digs into the questions that remain 
unanswered, setting the road for new avenues of research. 
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Trust in Legislatures and Democratic Values 
 
 
Previous research has shown that across the world, low levels of trust in 
institutions of representation represent a challenge for democracy in more than one way. 
Individuals that see institutions of representation not worthy of trust are more prone to get 
involved in non conventional, even illegal forms of political action (Blakelock 2006; 
Dalton and Weldon 2005; Dalton 2006). Previous research has also established that it is 
in difficult times when political institutions require the most support in order to properly 
carry out their role (Dalton 1999; Hetherington 2005; Mcallister 1999). Therefore, under 
the current globally spread turbulent economic and also (at least for some countries) 
political conditions, the issue of trust in legislatures requires even more special 
consideration. 
In Latin America, as it will be discussed in the upcoming paragraphs, low levels 
of trust in legislatures posit a threat to democracy in at least two different ways: 
mistrusting individuals are less likely to believe the law should always be obeyed, and 
they support democracy less than their more trusting fellow citizens. 
 
Trust in Legislatures and Respect for the Law  
 
Tyler’s classic book on the motives that lead people to obey the law makes an 
argument in favor of trust as a key value to develop in order to ensure compliance with 
the law, because “[c]itizens who view legal authority as legitimate are generally more 
likely to comply with the law” (Tyler 1990, 62). In Chapter III, it was shown that 
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individuals who see their national congress passing important laws tend to trust 
legislatures more; but what about observance of such laws? Can trust in the institution 
affect whether a person thinks there should be compliance with the law? The available 
evidence suggests so.  
Measuring individual compliance with the law comes with an important 
methodological caveat: it can hardly be expected that those who do not follow the law 
will report it to a third party (an interviewer, for instance), therefore rising concerns for 
reliability due mostly to under reporting of violations of the law. A less problematic 
measure to tap individuals’ views on law compliance consists of asking them whether the 
law should be respected. A proxy indicator for this attitude is available in the 
AmericasBarometer 2008: a question that asks individuals whether they think authorities 
should always respect the law in their attempt to apprehend criminals was included in 
every country survey. Although not specifically aimed at digging into law compliance 
attitudes but rather attitudes related to crime and crime victimization, the question does 
serve the purpose of testing Tyler’s argument in the Latin American context.  
 Figure V.1 presents the mean levels of trust in legislatures split by attitudes 
toward compliance with the law. Trust in legislatures is higher among those who believe 
the law should always be respected (42.8) than among those who believe authorities can 
sometimes act on the margins of the law (39.6). This difference is statistically significant 
at the .001 level.1  
Some could argue that the substantive difference between the average levels of 
trust in legislatures is far from striking. We should keep in mind, however, that despite 
                                                 
1 See Table AV.1 in Annex V. 
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the fact that this is a very specific, crime-related question, trust in legislatures 
significantly differs from one group to the other.  
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Figure V.1 Mean levels of trust in Congress by support for compliance with the law 
 
 
 Moreover, trust in legislatures positively and significantly affects the probability 
that an individual will prefer authorities to always respect the law when entered in a 
multivariate random effects logistic model on support for compliance with the law. Trust 
in the legislature increases the probability of preferring compliance with the law even 
after controlling for crime victimization, interpersonal trust, and control attitudinal -
political knowledge, political efficacy- and sociodemographic –education, age, and 
gender- variables (see Table AV.2 in Annex VI). 
Ideally, a question on compliance with the laws passed by the parliament would 
be, of course, a better test for the hypothesis stating that trust in the institution leads to 
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greater compliance with the laws. In absence of it, however, the alternative indicator 
tends to confirm it.   
 
Trust in Legislatures and Support for Democracy 
 
 
 If legislatures are perceived by the public as the centerpiece institution they are 
for democracy, then disregard for parliaments can certainly translate into less support for 
the democratic regime itself. This section explores precisely that: how trust in legislatures 
can affect support for democracy. 
 The extent to which citizens are sympathetic to their democratic government has 
been object of prolific research (see Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001 for a brief 
review of the literature). Since Mishler and Rose’s benchmark work on post-communities 
societies (Mishler and Rose 1996), public support for democracy has been measured in 
terms of survey questions about “Churchillian democracy:” that is, support for democracy 
as a regime in spite of the problems the democratic regime might have.  
 Although trust in political institutions is not a key explanatory variable of support 
for democracy within this body of research, it has been examined, nonetheless, as a 
potential determinant of support for the democratic regime. In the pioneer AfroBarometer 
studies it was found that trust in government does not significantly increase support for 
democracy among Africans (Bratton and Mattes 2000, 37). On the other hand, trust in 
parliaments was found to decrease support for authoritarian regimes in postcommunities 
societies (Mishler and Rose 1996, 46).  
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 Support for democracy is relatively widespread among Latin Americans. 2  
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Figure V.2 Support for democracy, by country 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 For an extensive treatment of the factors that might affect support for democracy in Latin America see the 
complete series of 2008 AmericasBarometer country reports on “Political Culture, Governability, and 
Democracy” by the LAPOP team. Available from www.lapopsurveys.org 
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When asked to what extent they agree with the statement “Democracy may have 
problems, but it is better than any other form of government,” the average response for 
the continent is 70.2 in a scale that ranges from 0 “Strongly disagree” to 100 “Strongly 
agree.”3  
The country with the lower level of support for democracy is Honduras, with an 
average of 59.9, a figure way beyond the midpoint of the scale (Figure V.2). At the other 
extreme, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Argentina present the highest levels of public support 
for the democratic regime. 
Figure V.3 presents the relationship between trust in legislatures and support for 
democracy in Latin America. The line depicted in the figure is the regression line of trust 
in legislatures on support for democracy for the whole continent. The inclination of the 
regression lines indicates a positive relationship between the two variables, lending 
preliminary support for the hypothesis that trust in legislatures contributed to increase 
support for democracy. 
 
                                                 
3 The original scale employed in the survey question ranges from 1 “Stronly disagree” to 7 “Strongly 
agree.” The original values were rescaled to fit the standard 0-100 scale.  
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Figure V.3 Support for democracy by level of trust in legislatures (Fitted values) 
 
 
The positive impact of trust in legislatures upon support for democracy is 
confirmed in a multivariate analysis. A multilevel linear regression on support for 
democracy validates the statistically significant impact of trust, even after controlling for 
other variables such as presidential approval, political knowledge, political efficacy, 
interpersonal trust, age, gender, and education (see Table AV.3 in Annex VI).  
  
 
Improving Trust in Legislatures 
 
 
 
The evidence analyzed in the previous chapters pointed to a series of factors that 
shape trust in legislatures among Latin Americans. Some of those factors lie in the 
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broader environments in which legislatures operate, and therefore there is little room to 
manipulate them in order to promote trusting feelings among citizens. Other factors, 
however, are more precisely circumscribed to the legislative and partisan arenas, thus 
action upon them seems more feasible. 
 
Where Not to Direct Efforts 
  
Some of the explanatory variables of trust in parliaments are related to factors 
clearly distinct from the legislative bodies themselves: presidential approval and the 
national economy (both the actual GDP and the evaluation of the economic situation) are 
clear examples of such type of factors. It does not seem reasonable, however, to discuss 
actions (if any possible at all) for improving citizens’ perceptions on those variables in 
order to bolster trust in legislatures. If the president in office is popular and the economic 
times are good, then it would be good for legislatures because general feelings will 
translate into greater levels of support for parliaments. If, as foreseeable will be the case 
in the coming times, economic conditions worsen and presidential approval decays, then 
it is to expect a decrease in the overall levels of trust in legislature. 
Similarly, characteristics of the individuals’ personality such as feelings of 
political efficacy, partisan identification, and interpersonal trust along with the 
sociodemographic characteristics could hardly be modified in order to bolster favorable 
feelings toward legislatures. This group of variables also lies beyond the reach of feasible 
action: some individuals will be more prone than others to trust legislatures given these 
characteristics, and that is about it. 
 169
Finally, the contextual variables are not an easier target for change, either. Of 
course that improving state deficiencies in Mainwaring’s terms (Mainwaring 2006) 
would be a nice achievement and it could translate into higher levels of trust in 
legislatures in the region together with a myriad of other good things. However, aiming at 
improving crime and corruption rates does not seem to be the way to promote trust in 
legislatures, either. 
 
What Could Be Done 
 
 Performance evaluation is the single most relevant determinant of trust in 
legislatures in Latin America. The explanatory factor that seconds it in magnitude is 
political party responsiveness. This is good news, because it is feasible to think of actions 
aimed at improving citizens’ perceptions in these two dimensions.  
The first thought would be, of course, to encourage legislators and parties to do a 
better job so citizens’ views of their performance will improve. This is certainly a 
possibility. As a matter of fact, international donors have devoted numerous resources in 
programs aimed at improving legislative performance.  
Besides actually improving performance, however, there is a series of measures –
probably easier to achieve in the short term- than can also contribute to improve the 
images of legislative performance and ultimately heighten the levels of trust in the 
institution. The centerpiece of such a strategy should be moderating expectations among 
citizens. By this I do not mean citizens should be instructed to lower their expectations 
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about congressional performance but rather focusing those expectations in the tasks that 
can actually be performed by the assembly and its members. 
The indicator of congressional performance developed in Chapter III is 
constituted by three dimensions: job approval of legislators, belief in the importance of 
the laws passed by the legislatures, and the extent to which expectations are satisfied. It 
has been argued that one of the problems with expectations is that they are too high, and 
therefore they are often unfulfilled, which, in turn, leads to lower levels of trust in the 
assembly. Legislators themselves hold great part of the responsibility for these magnified 
expectations for they often promise to their constituents more than can possibly be done. 
Encouraged many times by candidates’ promises, citizens expect from legislatures 
actions and goods that are way beyond the parliaments’ constitutional attributions, and it 
is in that sense that expectations about legislative assemblies should be moderated.  
How to moderate those expectations, then? Controlling campaign promises is 
probably not a feasible strategy; the temptation of gaining votes in exchange for the 
promise of public works or goods for the constituency is too high for candidates to resign 
to. What can be done, then, it is to attack the other end: to inform individuals about what 
they should and should not expect from the national congress.   
The available evidence suggest that citizens of Latin America do not need to be 
instructed as much in congressional processes as in congressional outcomes. As discussed 
in earlier chapters, citizens’ perceptions of congressional processes of debate and 
counterbalance to the executive do not affect trust negatively; rather, when individuals 
see legislators devoting time to discuss and debate and when they perceive congress 
controlling the president, their levels of trust in the institution grow. Only at extreme 
 171
levels of perceived debate and counterbalance the relationship with trust turns negative 
Therefore, the negative impact on trust does not come from perceptions about the 
activities a parliament must perform by constitutional design, but rather from perceptions 
of those activities being miscarried by legislators. This takes us back to the performance 
and congressional outcomes. 
I envision a two-fold strategy for initiating citizens on what they should expect 
from their legislatures. The long-term strategy consists of imparting knowledge on these 
matters as a part of a broader program of civic education through the school system.  The 
short-term strategy consists of a massive multimedia campaign aimed at letting citizens 
of all ages and conditions know what they should expect from their parliaments, as well 
as the available channels for trying to affect congressional outcomes.  
Finally, a word on political parties. We have seen that perceptions of parties not 
being responsive to citizens lead to lower levels of trust in legislatures. Thus, improving 
political parties’ performance in the public eye should also contribute to increasing the 
levels of trust in legislatures among Latin Americans. Parties are held in very low esteem 
and citizens’ views of political parties are far from encouraging (Córdova Macías 2004; 
Mainwaring 2006; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongómez 2006).   
The generalized disregard for political parties, however, does not entail a plain 
rejection for their role in a democratic polity: support for the idea that democracies can 
exist without parties is far from receiving unanimous support in the region: when Latin 
Americans were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that “democracy can 
exist without political parties,” the average response given was 46 points in a 100-point 
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scale ranging from 0 “Strongly disagree” to 100 “Strongly agree.”4 This support for the 
normative role of political parties in spite of their poor performance indicates that there 
still exists a reservoir of support for them, and that dissatisfaction is directed at their 
actual performance, not at the role they are supposed to fulfill in a democratic polity 
(Boidi 2008).  
 Parties are not believed to represent their voters well, and in that sense they fail to 
deliver the representational linkage they are supposed to. For parties to be seen as more 
responsive, they need to reach out. A first step toward the recovery of this 
representational linkage is for parties to open up diverse channels for their voters to 
express their concerns, so that their demands can be eventually picked up by the parties. 
Two other aspects that those concerned with improving partisan performance usually 
point out are the recruitment of high-quality political personnel for their cadres and the 
development and communication of clear policies and programs (Caton 2007).   
 
 
 
Where to Go Now: Future Avenues for Research 
 
 
 This dissertation has shed light upon several factors driving the current low levels 
of trust in legislatures in Latin America. By digging into topics never explored before for 
the Latin American context, it has contributed to a better understanding of the dynamics 
of the relationships between citizens and institutions. Several questions, however, remain 
unanswered, and they pave the road for future avenues for research.  
                                                 
4 See the average country support for a democracy without parties in Figure AV.1 in Annex VI. 
 173
One significant finding is that the relationship between citizens’ perceptions of 
legislative constitutional processes and support for parliaments is more complex than 
conceived by previous research. Contrary to previous research on the topic focused in the 
United States Congress, support for legislatures in Latin America is actually enhanced by 
views of assemblies engaging in debates and counterbalance to the president. Only when 
these duties are perceived as taken to their extreme is that the relationship between such 
perceptions and trust in legislatures becomes negative.  
A second major contribution of this research has been bringing political parties in 
for explaining the low levels of confidence in legislatures. Prior research on the topic had 
not explicitly conceived attitudes toward political parties and characteristics of the party 
system as key explanatory factors of attitudes toward legislatures. As demonstrated by 
the analyses, these variables account for an important part of the explanation of the 
current levels of trust. 
Finally, it has been demonstrated that contextual factors also play a role in 
shaping public support for the legislatures across Latin America. Some limitations 
inherent to the number of countries studied prevented us from a deeper exploration of the 
contextual determinants of trust in parliaments. Future research should attempt to 
ascertain more specifically in which way context matters. In order to do so, research 
projects should go deeper and broader. By deeper I mean intensifying qualitative 
research in order to better grasp the institutional history of each country. Going broader 
implies augmenting the range of countries covered by the quantitative analyses so 
collinearity problems are avoided. 
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Future research can go deeper and broader in a different sense, too. Citizens’ 
attitudes toward legislatures can be more fully assessed throughout additional focus 
groups and experiments aimed at testing and measuring the influence media portrayals of 
parliaments have upon their attitudes toward them. Also, it would be interesting to test 
whether the observed influence of views about processes and the role of political parties 
also affect support for other political institutions such as courts and the presidency.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
IRB APPROVAL  
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APPENDIX B 
 
TECHNICAL REPORTS 
 
 
This appendix contains the by country technical reports of the surveys as 
published in the LAPOP web site (http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop).60 The country-
specific questionnaires and reports here mentioned are downloadable from the web site as 
well. 
Argentina  
This survey was carried out between January and February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by 
the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt 
University and Central American Population Center of the University of Argentina with field work being 
carried out by CIO Research. Funding came from the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,486 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Metropolitan 
area and province of Buenos Aires, Central, Northeastern, Northwestern, Cuyo, and Patagonia) and by 
urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 74 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 61 final sampling units, which 
represent 21 of 24 provinces (including Buenos Aires). The total number of respondents surveyed in urban 
areas is 1327 and 159 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.54. The 
questionnaire can be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org.  
Bolivia 
This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 1998, 2000, 2002, 
2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was 
conducted by Vanderbilt University, Ciudadania, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública and 
Universidad Católica Boliviana, with field work being carried out by Encuestas y Estudios (the Bolivian 
Gallup International organization specialized in surveys) Funding came from the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 3,003 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish, with some interviews in Quechua, and Aymara for 
                                                 
60 Technical reports for the surveys carried in Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay 
and Peru are not yet publicly available. They were kindly facilitated to me by Rubi Arana, from the LAPOP 
Central staff.  
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monolingual speakers of those languages. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design 
taking into account stratification, clustering, and weighting.  
The sample is composed of nine strata representing the departments of the country: La Paz, Santa Cruz, 
Cochabamba, Oruro, Chuquisaca, Potosí, Pando, Tarija and Beni. Each department was divided into urban 
and rural strata, and respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas). 
The sample is weighted by department population size.  
The sample consists of 183 primary sampling units and 437 final sampling units which represent the 9 
departments. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1,889 and 1,114 in rural areas. 
The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 1.79.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia, 2008: 
the Impact of Governance, written by Mitchell Seligson, Daniel Moreno, Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Vivian 
Schwarz-Blum, Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko.  
 
 
Brazil 
This survey was carried out between April and May 2008, as part of the LAPOP AMericasBarometer 2008 
round of surveys. It is a follow up on the national survey 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Universidade de 
Brasilia with the fieldwork being carried out by CEDATOS. Funding came from the Interamerican 
Development Bank (IDB). 
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,497 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Portuguese. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (north, 
northeastern, mid-west, southeastern, and south) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected 
in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas. 
The sample consists of 60 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 178 final sampling units, which 
represent 21 of the 27 states (including Brasilia). The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas 
is 1216 and 281 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53. The questionnaire can 
be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org.  
 
 
Chile 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Instituto de Ciencia 
Política of the Pontifica Unviersidad Católica de Chile. Funding came from the Interamerican Development 
Bank (IDB).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,527 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Central, 
North, and South regions) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in 
urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 91 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 259 final sampling units, which 
represent 7 provinces and 53. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1311 and 216 in 
rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.51. The questionnaire can be found at 
www.AmericasBarometer.org.  
 
 
Colombia 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 carried out by the Latin 
America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University, 
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Universidad de los Andes, and the Observatorio de la Democracia with field work being carried out by 
Centro Nacional de Consultoría. Funding came from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). 
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,503 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Bogota, 
Atlantic, Pacific, Central, and Oriental regions and the Antiguos Territorios Nacionales) and by urban and 
rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6- 8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas. 
The sample consists of 53 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 193 final sampling units, which 
represent 26 de los 32 departments of Colombia. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas 
is 1106 and 397 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53. 
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga and Mitchell A. Seligson. 
Readers can access the publication through a link on the LAPOP website: www.AmericasBarometer.org. 
 
 
Costa Rica 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Central American 
Population Center of the University of Costa Rica with field work being carried out by Borges y Asociados. 
Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (metropolitan 
area, San José, the rest of central valley and areas beyond the central valley) and by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 29 primary sampling units (cantons) and 194 final sampling units, which represent 7 
provinces in Costa Rica. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 949 and 551 in rural 
areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53. 
 
 
Dominican Republic 
This survey was carried out in March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 
2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried 
out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was 
conducted by Vanderbilt University with field work being carried out by Gallup 
República Dominicana. Funding came from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). 
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N 
of 1,500 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best 
described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and clustering. 
The sample was stratified by regions (Santo Domingo Metropolitan Area, North, East, 
and South) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in 
urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas. 
The sample consists of 57 primary sampling units and 238 final sampling units, which 
represent 31 provinces. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1107 
and 400 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.52. 
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of 
Democracy in Dominican Republic, 2008: the Impact of Governance, written Jana 
Morgan Kelly, and Rosario Espinal. Readers can access the publication through a link on 
the LAPOP website: www.AmericasBarometer.org. 
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Ecuador 
This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2001, 2004, and 
2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted 
by Vanderbilt University, with field work being carried out by CEDATOS under the direction of Dr. Angel 
Polibio Córdova. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 3,000 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish, with some interviews in Quichua for monolingual speakers of 
that language. The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account 
stratification, clustering, and weighting.  
The sample is composed of six strata representing the three main regions in the country: coast, highlands 
and the Amazon. Each region was divided into urban and rural strata, and respondents were selected in 
clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas). Given the small size of the population in the 
Amazon region, a larger number of respondents were drawn as to provide sufficient cases for the analysis. 
The data set includes weights to compensate for this design.  
The sample consists of 135 primary sampling units and 437 final sampling units which represent 23 
provinces. The insular province of Galapagos is not included in the survey. The total number of 
respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1,832 and 1,168 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the 
survey is ± 1.79.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Ecuador, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Mitchell Seligson, Abby Córdova, Margarita Corral, Juan 
Carlos Donoso, Brian Faughnan, Daniel Montalvo and Diana Orcés.  
 
  
El Salvador 
This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys since 1991 carried out 
by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt 
University and IUDOP-UCA. Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,549 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering.  
The sample is stratified by municipalities and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in 
clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 66 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 213 final sampling units, which 
represent the 14 departments in El Salvador. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 
965 and 584 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.49.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Ricardo Córdova and Miguel Cruz.  
 
 
Guatemala  
This survey was carried out between February and March of 2008, as part of the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys since 1992 carried out 
by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt 
University and Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES). Funding came from the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,538 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish with some interviews in Mam, K’iche’, Kaqchikel, Q’echi, 
Achi, and Ixil for monolingual speakers of these languages. The data set can be best described as a complex 
sample design taking into account stratification and clustering.  
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The sample is composed of five strata representing the five main regions in the country: metropolitan area, 
northeastern, southeastern, southwestern, and northwestern, and by urban and rural areas. Respondents 
were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 95 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 194 final sampling units, which 
represent the 22 departamentos - in Guatemala. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 
716 and 822 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Dinorah Azpuru.  
 
 
Honduras 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with field work being 
carried out by Borges y Asociados. Funding came from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,522 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions and by urban 
and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 93 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 163 final sampling units, which 
represent the 22 departments in Honduras. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 662 
and 860 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.51.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Kenneth M. Coleman, José René Argueta.  
 
 
Mexico 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and ITAM, with field 
work being carried out by DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados under the direction of Pablo Parás García. 
Funding came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,560 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. 
The sample is composed of four strata representing the four main regions in the country: north, midwest, 
central region and south and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 12 in urban 
and rural areas. The sample consists of 105 primary sampling units and 130 final sampling units, which 
represent 29 of the 32 Federal States of Mexico. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 
1,080 and 480 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.48. 
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Pablo Parás García and Alejandro Moreno. 
 
Nicaragua 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP Americas Barometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 1999, 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with field 
work being carried out by Borges y Asociados. Funding came from the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,540 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
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design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Metropolitan, 
Central, North, North-Pacific, South-Pacific and Caribbean) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents 
were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 43 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 164 final sampling units, which 
represent 17 departments in Nicaragua. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 856 and 
684 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Orlando Pérez.  
 
 
Panama  
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2004, and 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Alianza 
Ciudadana Pro Justicia with field work being carried out by Borges y Asociados. Funding came from the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,536 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (metropolitan 
area, oriental, central, and occidental region) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in 
clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 76 primary sampling units (districts) and 112 final sampling units, which represent 
10 provinces in Panama. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 960 and 576 in rural 
areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Panama, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Orlando Perez.  
 
Paraguay 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Centro de Información y 
Recursos para el Desarrollo (CIRD) and the field work was carried out under the direction of Alejandro 
Vial and Manuel Orrego. Funding came from the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). 
The project was carried out in the oriental region and used a national probability sample design of voting-
age adults, with a total N of 1,166 people involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. 
The data set can be best described as a complex sample design taking into account stratification and 
clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Capital, Central Department, North, Central, South, and 
East regions) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 
10-12 in rural areas. 
The sample consists of 116 primary sampling units (municipalities) and 233 final sampling units, which 
represent 15 of the 18 departments of Paraguay. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 
712 and 454 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.87. The complete 
questionnaire can be found at www.AmericasBarometer.org. 
 
Peru 
This survey was carried out in February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of 
surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by the Latin America Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University and Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos with field work APOYO Opinión y Mercadeo. Funding came from the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 
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The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (North and 
South Coast, Metropolitan Lima, the Amazon, Central, North and South Highlands) and by urban and rural 
areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas. The sample 
consists of 96 primary sampling units and 289 final sampling units, which represent 
the 24 departments and 1 constitutional province of Peru. The total number of respondents surveyed in 
urban areas is 1125 and 375 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53. 
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Peru, 2008: 
the Impact of Governance, written by Julio Carrión, and Patricia Zárate Ardela. 
 
Uruguay 
This survey was carried out between April and May of 2008, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 
2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national survey of 2006 carried out by the Latin America 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University, CIFRA, 
González Raga & Associates and La Universidad de Montevideo with field work being carried out by 
CIFRA, González Raga & Associates. Funding came from Vanderbilt University and University of Notre 
Dame.  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (Montevideo 
and Interior) and by urban and rural areas Respondents were selected in clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 
10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 37 primary sampling units and 292 final sampling units, which represent the19 
departments of Uruguay. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1375 and 125 in rural 
areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.  
 
 
Venezuela 
This survey was carried out between January and February of 2008, as part of the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer 2008 wave of surveys. It is a follow up of the national surveys of 2006 carried out by 
the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2008 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt 
University and Centro de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales (CISOR) with field work being carried out 
by CEDATOS. Funding came from Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).  
The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,500 people 
involving face-to-face interviews in Spanish. The data set can be best described as a complex sample 
design taking into account stratification and clustering. The sample was stratified by regions (capital, 
zuliana, west, mid-west, east and Los Llanos) and by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in 
clusters of 6-8 in urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas.  
The sample consists of 55 primary sampling units and 178 final sampling units, which represent 21 of 23 
states. The total number of respondents surveyed in urban areas is 1221 and 279 in rural areas. The 
estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.53.  
The complete report and the questionnaire can be found at Political Culture of Democracy in Venezuela, 
2008: the Impact of Governance, written by Maria Fernanda Boidi. 
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ANNEX C 
 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Uruguay Versión # 18Q9  IRB Approval:  #071086 
 
 
LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA  DEMOCRACIA: Uruguay, 2008 
© Vanderbilt University 2008. Derechos reservados.  All rights reserved. 
  
País: 1. México  2. Guatemala  3. El Salvador  4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua   6. Costa Rica  7. Panamá  8. 
Colombia 9.  Ecuador  10. Bolivia 11. Perú  12. Paraguay  13. Chile  14. Uruguay  15. Brasil.  16.  
Venezuela 17. Argentina  21. República Dominicana  22. Haití  23. Jamaica  24.Guyana  25. Trinidad 40. 
Estados Unidos 41. Canadá 
PAIS  
IDNUM.  Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]__________________ IDNUM  
ESTRATOPRI:  
1. Montevideo 
      2. Interior 
ESTRATOPRI  
UPM. [Localidad] (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo): ______________________________ UPM  
Departamento:_________________________________________ URUPROV  
[SECCION] SEGMENTO CENSAL__________________________________________ URUSEGMENTO  
[SEGMENTO] Sector____________________________________________________ URUSEC  
[ZONA] CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo) (Punto muestral) 
                  [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales] CLUSTER  
UR     (1) Urbano        (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] UR  
Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana)     (2) Ciudad grande 
(3) Ciudad mediana        (4) Ciudad pequeña                 (5) Área rural TAMANO  
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español  IDIOMAQ  
Hora de inicio: _____:_____  [no digitar]   
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____    mes:_______    año: 2008 FECHA  
 
 
Q1.  Género (anotar, no pregunte):            (1) Hombre                          (2) Mujer Q1 __ 34 
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A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO 
LEER ALTERNATIVAS;  SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN] 
A4 
 
__  
__
35  
36
Agua, falta de 19 Inflación, altos precios 
  
02 
Caminos/vías en mal estado  18 Los políticos  59 
Conflicto armado    30 Mal gobierno  
  
15 
Corrupción    13 Medio ambiente   10 
Crédito, falta de    09 Migración    16 
Delincuencia, crimen  05 Narcotráfico  
  
12 
Derechos humanos, violaciones de 56 Pandillas    14 
Desempleo/falta de empleo  03 Pobreza   
  
04 
Desigualdad 58 Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre  
de carreteras, paros, etc.) 
06 
Desnutrición    23 Salud, falta de servicio 
  
22 
Desplazamiento forzado   32 Secuestro   31 
Deuda Externa    26 Seguridad (falta de)   27 
Discriminación    25 Terrorismo  
  
33 
Drogadicción    11 Tierra para cultivar, falta de 07 
Economía, problemas con, crisis de  01 Transporte, problemas con el 60 
Educación, falta de, mala calidad  21 Violencia 57 
Electricidad, falta de   24 Vivienda    55 
Explosión demográfica   20 Otro 70 
Guerra contra terrorismo  17 Conflicto con Argentina, bloqueo de 
puentes 
71 
   NS/NR 88 
 
Ahora, cambiando de tema… [Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o 
“nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado] 
Con qué frecuencia … Todos los días 
[Acepte también 
casi todos los 
días] 
Una o dos veces por 
semana 
Rara vez Nunca NS 
   
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio 1 2 3 4 8 A1  _3
A2. Mira noticias en la TV 1 2 3 4 8 
A2 
 
_
3
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos 1 2 3 4 8 A3 __3
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet 1 2 3 4 8 
A4i __ 4
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URUCP. De todas las fuentes que brindan información sobre el problema de la pobreza ¿a cuál le cree más? [Leer opciones] 
1. Al gobierno 
2. A los políticos de la oposición 
3. A los medios de comunicación 
4. A especialistas y expertos 
5. A la familia, amigos y conocidos 
6. A organizaciones no gubernamentales 
7. A la Iglesia 
8. A su experiencia personal 
9. [No leer] Ninguna (no confía en ninguna opinión) 
77. [No leer] Otro  
      88. NS/NR 
URUCP 
 
 
 
 
 
__  __
41   4
URUCP. De todas las fuentes que brindan información sobre el problema de la delincuencia ¿a cuál le cree más? [Leer 
opciones] 
1. Al gobierno 
2. A los políticos de la oposición 
3. A los medios de comunicación 
4. A especialistas y expertos 
5. A la familia, amigos y conocidos 
6. A organizaciones no gubernamentales 
7. A la Iglesia 
8. A su experiencia personal 
9. [No leer] Ninguna (no confía en ninguna opinión) 
77. [No leer] Otro  
      88. NS/NR 
URUCP 
 
 
 
 
__  __
43   4
SOCT1.  Ahora, hablando de la economía…. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país?  ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, 
buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?  
(1) Muy buena   (2)  Buena   (3)  Ni buena, ni mala (regular)   (4)  Mala    (5)  Muy mala (pésima)   (8) NS/NR  
SOCT1 
 
 
__ 
45 
  
SOCT2.  ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?  
(1) Mejor                       (2) Igual                        (3)  Peor                  (8) NS/NR  
SOCT2 
 
 
__ 
46  
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica?  ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o 
muy mala? 
(1)  Muy buena    (2)  Buena     (3)  Ni buena, ni mala (regular)    (4)  Mala    (5)  Muy mala (pésima)   
(8)  NS/NR  
IDIO1 
 
 
  
 
__ 
47 
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? 
(1)  Mejor                        (2) Igual                       (3)  Peor                          (8)  NS/NR  
IDIO2 
 
 
  
__ 
48 
 
Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos 
piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. 
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...  Sí No NS/NR   
CP2. A algún diputado del Parlamento? 1 2 8 CP2  __
4
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (intendente, presidente de la junta local, centro comunal)? 1 2 8 CP4A  __
5
CP4. A algún ministerio, secretaría, institución pública, u oficina del  estado? 1 2 8 CP4  __
5
 
Ahora vamos a hablar de su intendencia... 
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una reunión de la Junta Departamental, Junta Local o Centro Comunal Zonal durante los últimos 12 meses?            
(1) Sí                        (2) No                    (8) NS/NR  
NP1 
_
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios municipales hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones?  Le 
hacen caso (1) Mucho        (2) Algo        (3) Poco        (4) Nada      (8) NS/NR 
NP1B _
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina o funcionario de la intendencia durante los últimos 12 
meses?            
(1) Sí                          (2) No                             (8) NS/NR 
NP2 
_
5
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la intendencia está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas]   
(1) Muy buenos  (2) Buenos  (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares)     (4) Malos        (5) Muy malos (pésimos)  
(8) NS/NR 
SGL1 
_
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LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades? [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Mucho más al gobierno central 
(2) Algo más al gobierno central 
(3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad 
(4) Algo más a la municipalidad 
(5) Mucho más a la municipalidad 
(8) NS/NR     
LGL2A 
_
LGL2B.  Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero? [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Mucho más el gobierno central 
(2) Algo más el gobierno central 
(3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad 
(4) Algo más la municipalidad 
(5) Mucho más la municipalidad  
(8) NS/NR 
LGL2B  
 
--
5
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la intendencia para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree 
que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la intendencia?                                                                                                                          
(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos              (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos  (8) NS/NR  
LGL3  
--
5
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? [Leer alternativas]           
(3) Mucha confianza  (2) Algo de confianza   (1) Poca confianza  (0) Nada de confianza   
(8) NS/NR 
MUNI6  
 
--
5
 
 Una vez a 
la 
semana 
Una o dos 
veces al 
mes 
Una o 
dos 
veces 
al año 
Nunca NS/NR  
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos 
doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de 
algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de 
su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos 
una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o 
dos veces al año, o nunca. 
1 2 3 4 8 CP5 
 
Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones.  Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente  asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la 
semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al 
año,” o “nunca”  para ayudar al entrevistado] 
 Una vez a 
la 
semana 
Una o dos 
veces al 
mes 
Una o 
dos 
veces 
al año 
Nunca NS/NR   
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? 
Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP6 _
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de 
familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…. 
1 2 3 4 8 CP7 
_
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras 
para la comunidad? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP8 
_
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, 
comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones 
rurales? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP9 
_
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste… 1 2 3 4 8 CP10 
_
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento 
político? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP13 
_
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o 
grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 9 
(HOMBRE) 
CP20 
_
 
LS3. Hablando  de otras cosas. En general, ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Muy satisfecho    (2) Algo satisfecho     (3) Algo insatisfecho    (4) Muy insatisfecho  (8) NS/NR  
LS3 
_
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IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es:   [Leer alternativas]                                                         
(1) Muy confiable    (2) Algo confiable    (3) Poco confiable     (4) Nada confiable       (8) NS/NR 
IT1 
_
 
IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez?  ¿Diría usted que:   [Leer alternativas]                                               
(1) Confía plenamente    (2) Confía algo    (3) Confía poco     (4) No confía nada   (8) NS/NR 
IT1A  _
IT1B.  Hablando en general, ¿diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso 
cuando trata con los demás? 
(1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas 
(2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás 
(8) NS/NR 
IT1B 
_
 
[ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1] 
 
L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha)  En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derec
Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más co
derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha"  cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se coloca
usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.  
 
      
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 L1 
Izquierda Derecha (NS/NR=88) 
___ ___
72   73
 
[RECOGER TARJETA  # 1] 
 
IMMIG1.  ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno uruguayo ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia 
de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted… [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Muy de acuerdo 
(2) Algo de acuerdo      
(3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo    
(4) Algo en desacuerdo       
(5) Muy en desacuerdo        
(8) NS/NR 
IMMIG1 
 __
7
IMMIG2.  En general, ¿usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los uruguayos no quieren, 
o que les quitan el trabajo a los uruguayos? [Asegurarse de enfatizar en general] 
(1) Hacen los trabajos que los uruguayos no quieren 
(2) Le quitan el trabajo a los uruguayos 
(8) NS/NR 
IMMIG2 
 __
7
 
PROT2. ¿En los  últimos doce meses, ha participado en una 
manifestación o protesta pública?  ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi 
nunca o nunca? 
(1) algunas 
veces 
(2) 
casi nunca 
(3) 
nunca 
(8) 
NS/NR 
 
PROT2 
Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado.
su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? [Leer alternativas después de cada
pregunta]: 
JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto. (1) Se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(2) No se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(8) NS/NR JC1 
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales. (1) Se justificaría  que 
los militares tomen el 
poder 
(2) No se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(8) NS/NR JC4 
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia. (1) Se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(2) No se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(8) NS/NR JC10 
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo 
de precios. 
(1) Se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(2) No se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(8) NS/NR JC12 
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción. (1) Se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(2) No se justificaría que los 
militares tomen el poder 
(8) NS/NR JC13 
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JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el 
presidente cierre el Parlamento, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para 
eso? 
SI puede haber 
razón 
(1) 
NO puede 
haber razón 
(2) 
NS/NR 
 
(8) 
JC15 
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el 
presidente disuelva la Suprema Corte de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón 
suficiente para eso? 
SI puede haber 
razón 
(1) 
NO puede 
haber razón 
(2) 
NS/NR 
 
(8) 
JC16 
 
VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?   
(1) Sí [siga]   
(2) No [pasar a VIC20]     
(8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]  
VIC1 
 _
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?  
(1) Sí [pasar a VIC20]                    
(2) No lo denunció [Seguir]   
(8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]                     
(9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar  a VIC20] 
AOJ1 
 _
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] 
 (1) No sirve de nada    
 (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias    
 (3) No tenía pruebas     
 (4) No fue grave 
 (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar  
 (6) Otro         
 (8) NS/NR           
 (9) INAP   
AOJ1B 
 _
 
[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder 
las siguientes preguntas [Si contesta “Sí,” preguntar ¿Cuántas veces?  y anotar el número de veces; si 
contesta “No” anotar “0” cero] 
¿Cuántas 
veces? 
NO = 0, 
NS/NR=88 
 
VIC20. Sin tomar en cuenta robo de vehículo, ¿alguien le robó a mano armada en los últimos doce meses? 
¿Cuántas veces? 
 VIC20  ___
87
VIC21. ¿Se metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?  VIC21 
 ___
89
VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, lo golpeó o lo maltrató físicamente? 
¿Cuántas veces? 
 VIC27 
 ___
9
 
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden 
actuar al margen de la ley?                                                                                                                                                                    
(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre        (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen       (8)NS/NR 
AOJ8 
_
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente 
usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?                                                                       
(1) Muy seguro    (2) Algo seguro    (3) Algo inseguro    (4) Muy inseguro       (8) NS/NR  
AOJ11 
 
 
AOJ11A.  Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una 
amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro?  [Leer alternativas] 
 (1) Mucho                    (2) Algo                   (3) Poco                      (4) Nada               (8) NS/NR   
AOJ11A 
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer 
alternativas] Confiaría…(1) Mucho          (2) Algo           (3) Poco        (4) Nada    (8) NS/NR 
AOJ12 
AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer 
alternativas] Confiaría…(1) Mucho        (2) Algo       (3) Poco       (4) Nada  (8) NS/NR 
AOJ12a 
AOJ16A.  En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? 
(1) Sí               (2) No                (8) NS/NR 
AOJ16A 
URUPB  ¿Conoce usted a alguien que sufra de adicción a la pasta base? 
(1) Sí                   (2) No                         (8) NS/NR 
URUPB 
AOJ18.  Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras AOJ18 
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otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia.  ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] 
 (1) La policía protege, o     
 (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia 
 (3) [No leer] No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia o protege e involucrada  
 (8) NS/NR 
 
 
 
 [ENTREGAR TARJETA A] 
 
Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta
qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el núme
7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. 
[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 
Nada Mucho NS/NR 
 
 Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/N
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Uruguay garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que 
los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja 
el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio ) 
 
B1 
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas del Uruguay? 
 
B2 
_
1
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político uruguayo? 
 
B3 
_
1
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político uruguayo? 
 
B4 
_
1
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político de Uruguay? 
 
B6 
_
1
B10A.  ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia? 
 
B10A 
_
1
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Corte Electoral? 
 
B11 
_
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?  
 
B12 
_
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Parlamento? 
 
B13 
_
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno? 
 
B14 
_
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía? 
 
B18 
_
1
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica? 
 
B20 
_
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos? 
 
B21 
_
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente? 
 
B21A 
_
1
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia? 
 
B31 
_
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su Intendencia?   B32 
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 Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/N
_
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser uruguayo? 
 
B43 
_
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?  
 
B37 
_
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Dirección General Impositiva (DGI)?_ 
 
B42 
_
B47.  ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones? 
 
B47 
_
1
B48.  ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía? 
 
B48 
_
 
Usando la misma escala… 
Anota
8 = NS
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?  N1 
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?  N3 
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?  N9 
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?  N10 
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?  N11 
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?  N12 
 
Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre los partidos políticos de Uruguay y voy a pedirle sus opiniones. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 
a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho. 
 
 Anotar 1-7,
8 = NS/NR 
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos uruguayos representan bien a sus 
votantes?  
 EPP1 
EPP2.  ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos uruguayos?   EPP2 
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?   EPP3 
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Parlamento. ¿Hasta qué punto el Parlamento  estorba la labor del presidente?   EC1 
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los diputados y senadores del Parlamento discutiendo y debatiendo?   EC2 
EC3.  ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Parlamento ?  EC3 
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Parlamento cumple con lo que usted espera de él?  EC4 
[RECOGER TARJETA A] 
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M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Tabaré Vázquez es...?: [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Muy bueno  (2) Bueno  (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)  (4) Malo  (5) Muy malo (pésimo)   (8) NS/NR  
M1 
M2. Hablando del Parlamento y pensando en todos los diputados y senadores en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que 
pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados y senadores del Parlamento uruguayo están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, 
mal, o muy mal? 
(1) Muy  bien       (2) Bien             (3) Ni bien ni mal               (4) Mal            (5) Muy Mal             (8) NSNR 
 
M2 
 
[ENTREGAR TARJETA B] 
Ahora, vamos a usar una  tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 
el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo co
esas afirmaciones. 
Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 
Muy en desacuerdo                                                                                 Muy de acuerdo                          NS/NR 
  Anotar Número 1-7, y 8
los que N
 
 
Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta  hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.. 
 
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y  el voto de los partidos de la 
oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
  
 
 
POP101 
POP102. Cuando el Parlamento estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Parlamento. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 POP102 
POP103. Cuando la Suprema Corte estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué 
punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 POP103 
POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 POP106 
POP107.  El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
(8) NS/NR 
 POP107 
POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta 
qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal? 
 (8) NS/NR 
 POP109 
POP110.  Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto 
está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8) NS/NR 
 POP110 
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 POP112 
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
(8) NS/NR 
 POP113 
 
 
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
 EFF1 
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
 EFF2 
 
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto 
está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?  
  ING4  
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PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los uruguayos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país.  ¿Hasta 
qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
  PN2 
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo 
con esta frase? 
 DEM23 
 
Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando
misma escala de 1 a 7.          
NS/NR = 8 
ROS1. El Estado uruguayo, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del 
país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 ROS1 
ROS2. El Estado uruguayo, más que los individuos, debería ser  el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 ROS2 
ROS3. El Estado uruguayo, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué 
punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 ROS3 
ROS4. El Estado uruguayo debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 ROS4 
[RECOGER TARJETA B] 
 
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la  forma en que la democracia 
funciona en Uruguay? 
(1) Muy satisfecho        (2) Satisfecho                 (3) Insatisfecho       (4) Muy insatisfecho  (8) NS/NR 
PN4 
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Uruguay es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? 
(1) Muy democrático   (2)  Algo democrático      (3) Poco democrático      (4) Nada democrático     (8) NS/NR PN5 
 
[ENTREGAR TARJETA C] 
Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10
indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus meta
objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Desaprueba  firmemente                         Aprueba firmemente         NS/NR 
  1-10, 88 
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?   
E5 
___ _
157 
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta 
qué punto aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E8 
___ _
159 
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o 
desaprueba? 
  
E11 
___ _
161 
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué 
punto aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E15 
___ _
163 
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?   
E14 
___ _
165 
E2. Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?   
E2 
___ _
167 
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto 
aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E3 
___ _
169 
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E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto 
aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E16 
___ _
171 
 
 
 
Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Uruguay. Siempre 
usaremos  la escala de 10 puntos. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Desaprueba  firmemente Aprueba firmemente                   NS/NR 
 
 1-10, 
88  
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Uruguay, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la 
forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el 
número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?] 
  D1 
___ _
173 
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con 
el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número. 
  D2 
___ _
175 
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Uruguay ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba 
usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos? 
  D3 
___ _
177 
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso?   D4 
___ _
179 
D5.  Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas 
personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos? 
 D5 
___ _
181 
[RECOGER TARJETA C] 
 
 
Ahora cambiando de tema… 
DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: 
(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o 
(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o 
(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático 
(8) NS/NR 
DEM2 
_
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden 
resolverse con la participación de todos?  
(1) Mano dura             (2) Participación de todos           (8) NS/NR 
DEM11 
_
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que 
aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o 
(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor              
(8) NS/NR   
AUT1 
_
AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes, o  
(2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes 
(8)  NS/NR 
AUT2 
_
 
Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones (1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; (2) corruptas pero justificada
bajo las circunstancias; o (3) no corruptas.     
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos.  Para no perder tiempo 
esperando, ella paga 100 pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora…? [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 
 
DC10 
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(2) Es corrupto pero se justifica 
(3) No es  corrupto 
(8) NS/NR 
 
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. 
Cree usted que lo que hizo el político…?  [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Es corrupto y él debe ser castigado 
(2)  Es corrupto pero justificado  
(3)  No es corrupto         
(8)  NS/NR 
 
DC13 
 
 
 INAP 
No trató o 
tuvo 
contacto 
No Sí NS/
NR 
  
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...      
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno) en el último año?  0 1 8 EXC2 
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima (o soborno) en el último año?  0 1 8 EXC6 
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la junta o intendencia en el último año? 
No Æ Marcar 9 
Sí  Æ Preguntar: 
Para tramitar algo en la intendencia (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, 
¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?  
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC11 
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja?  
No Æ Marcar 9 
Sí  Æ Preguntar: 
En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima en el último año? 
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC13 
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?  
No Æ Marcar 9 
Sí  Æ Preguntar: 
¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en el último año? 
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC14 
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año?  
No Æ Marcar 9 
Sí  Æ Preguntar: 
 Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido 
que pagar alguna coima (o soborno)? 
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC15 
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? 
No Æ Marcar 9 
Sí  Æ Preguntar: 
En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima (o soborno)?  
9 0 1 8 EXC16 
EXC17.¿Alguien le pidió una coima (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?   0 1 8 EXC17 
EXC17a ¿Y alguien le pidió una coima (o soborno) para colgarlo de la TV cable, del teléfono 
o de la luz? 
 0 1 8 EXC17a 
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima (o soborno)?   0 1 8 EXC18 
 
Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente… 
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] 
(1) Correcto            (2) Incorrecto                 (8) No sabe              (9) No Responde 
GI1 _
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea General de Uruguay? [NO LEER: Rodolfo Nin Novoa] 
 (1) Correcto                  (2) Incorrecto                (8) No sabe                  (9) No Responde GI2 _
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: 
[LEER] (1) Muy generalizada   (2) Algo generalizada    (3) Poco generalizada    (4) Nada generalizada                     (8) 
NS/NR 
  EXC7  
___ 
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GI3. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Uruguay? [NO LEER: 19] 
(1) Correcto                 (2) Incorrecto                (8) No sabe                (9) No Responde 
 
GI3 
_
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Uruguay? [NO LEER: 5 años] 
(1) Correcto                  (2) Incorrecto               (8) No sabe                     (9) No Responde 
GI4 
_
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también “Lula”] 
 (1) Correcto                   (2) Incorrecto                    (8) No sabe                  (9) No Responde 
GI5 
_
 
 
VB50. [Preguntar a todos] En general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de 
acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? 
(1) Muy  de acuerdo       (2)  De acuerdo        (3) En desacuerdo              (4) Muy en desacuerdo           (8) NSNR 
  VB50 
__
21
 
 
 
 
 
VB1. ¿Tiene usted credencial cívica?  
(1) Sí                         (2) No                            (3) En trámite                     (8) NS/NR  
VB1  
___ 
207 
 
VB2.  ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? 
  (1)  Sí votó [Siga]  
  (2) No votó [Pasar a VB50]   
  (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB50] 
VB2  
 
___ 
208 
 
VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? [NO LEER LISTA] 
(00)  Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 
(1401) Tabaré Vázquez, Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista 
(1402) Jorge Larrañaga, Partido Nacional 
(1403) Guillermo Stirling, Partido Colorado  
(1404) Pablo Mieres, Partido Independiente 
(77) Otro  
(88) NS/NR  
(99) Inap (No votó) 
VB3  
 
 
___ ___ ___ ___ 
209 210 211 212 
 
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?  
(1) Sí  [Siga]    
(2) No [Pase a POL1]    
(8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1] 
VB10  
___ 
214 
 
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA].  
(1401) Frente Amplio – Encuentro Progresista 
(1402) Partido Nacional  
(1403) Partido Colorado 
(1404) Partido Independiente 
(77) Otro 
(88) NS/NR [Pase A POL1] 
(99) INAP [Pase A POL1] 
VB11  
 
___ ___ ___ ___ 
215 216 217 218 
VB12. ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy 
 débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? 
(1) Muy débil          (2) Débil              (3) Ni débil ni fuerte       (4) Fuerte    (5) Muy fuerte  (8)NS/NR 
(9) INAP 
VB12  
___ 
219 
POL1.  ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?  
(1) Mucho        (2) Algo               (3) Poco                   (4) Nada              (8) NS/NR 
POL1  
___ 
220 
POL2.  ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) A diario    (2) Algunas veces por semana    (3) Algunas veces por mes       (4) Rara vez     (5) Nunca                    (8) NS/NR 
POL2  
___ 
221 
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VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? 
[No leer] 
(1) No votaría 
(2) Votaría por el  candidato o partido del  actual presidente (Frente Amplio) 
(3) Votaria por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno (P. Colorado, P Nacional, P Independiente, otros partidos) 
(4) Iría a votar pero dejaría en blanco o anularía 
(8) NS/NR      
 
VB20 
__
22
VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer alternativas] 
 (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición 
 (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente 
 (3) Influir de otras maneras 
 (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga 
 (8) NS/NR 
VB21 
__
22
 
[ENTREGAR TARJETA D] 
LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que 
yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted. 
...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  88 
___ __
224 22
Peor  vida posible                         Mejor vida posible         NS/NR 
[RECOGER TARJETA D] 
 
En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con… [Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta 
para ayudar al entrevistado]  
 Satisfecho(a) Insatisfecho(a) NS/NR 
o No 
Utiliza 
  
SD1. El sistema de transporte público 
1 2 8 SD1  _
SD2. Las calles, carreteras y autopistas 1 2 8 SD2  
_
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas 1 2 8 SD3  
_
SD4. La calidad del aire  1 2 8 SD4  
_
SD5. La calidad del agua 1 2 8 SD5  
_
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad 1 2 8 SD6  
_
SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles 1 2 8 SD7  
_
SD8. La belleza física del lugar 1 2 8 SD8  
_
SD9. El flujo del tránsito 1 2 8 SD9  
_
SD10. Las veredas o vías peatonales  1 2 8 SD10  
_
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes  1 2 8 SD11  
_
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente 
pueda practicar deportes  
1 2 8 SD12  
_
 198
 
LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o  insatisfecho con el 
lugar donde vive? 
 (1) Satisfecho                              (2) insatisfecho                      (8) NS/NR  
LS4 
_
 
 
A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de la
reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería. 
  Aprobaría No aprobaría pero entendería  
No aprobaría ni 
entendería NS/NR 
 
VOL201. Suponga que una persona agrede a 
alguien que le quitó el esposo o la esposa. Usted… (3) (2)  (1) (8) VOL201 
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien 
que le ha violado a un hijo o hija. Usted… (3)  (2) (1) (8) VOL202 
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene 
asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata, usted… (3)  (2) (1) (8) VOL203 
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a 
hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente 
indeseable. Usted… 
(3)  (2) (1) (8) VOL204 
 
Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos... 
ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó? 
_____ Año de ___________________ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = ________ años total [Usar tabla abajo para 
código] 
 
 10 20 30 40 50 60   
Ninguno 0           
Primaria 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Secundaria  7 8 9 10 11 12 
Superior no universitaria (Técnica) 13 14 15 16   
Universitaria 13 14 15 16 17 18+ 
NS/NR 88           
ED   
 
___ ___ 
243 244 
 
Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años  (0= NS/NR) Q2   
___ ___ 
245 246 
 
Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas] 
(1) Católica 
(2)  Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, 
Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano). 
(3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas) 
(5)  Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo). 
(6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día 
(7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas). 
(4) Ninguna 
 (8) NS/NR  
Q3  
 
___
247
Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Más de una vez por semana  
(2) Una vez por semana  
(3) Una vez al mes  
(4) Una o dos veces al año  
(5) Nunca o casi nunca                              
(8) [No leer] NS/NR  
Q5A 
___
248
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA E] 
Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar,  incluyendo las remesas 
del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?  
[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?] 
(00)  Ningún ingreso  
(01)  Menos de $4.500 
(02)  Entre $4.501 y 6.000 
(03)  Entre $6.001 y 8.000 
(04)  Entre $8.001 y 10.000 
(05)  Entre $10.001 y 12.000 
(06)  Entre $12.001 y 14.000 
(07) Entre $14.001 y 18.000 
(08) Entre $18.001 y 23.000 
(09) Entre $ 23.001 y 33.000  
(10)  $33.001 y más 
(88) NS/NR  
[RECOGER TARJETA E] 
Q10 
___ ___
249 250
 
Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? 
(1) Sí                   (2) No [Pase a Q10C]              (8) NS [Pase a Q10C] 
Q10A __
25
Q10A2 [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Y por qué medio le son enviadas principalmente las remesas (el dinero)? [No leer] 
(1) A través del banco, giro bancario 
(2) Empresa de transferencias internacionales (Western Union, Money Gram, etc)  
(3) Con gente que viaja o el emigrante mismo la entrega  
(4) Ordenes de compra en supermercados o comercios enviadas por Internet 
(5) Otro 
(8) NS/NR 
(9) INAP  
Q10a2  
 
 
__
25
Q10A3 [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Y con qué frecuencia recibe dinero del exterior? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Una o más veces por mes 
(2) Una vez cada tres meses 
(3) Una vez cada seis meses 
(4) Una vez al año 
(8) NS/NR 
(9) INAP 
Q10a3  
 
 
__
25
Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer] 
(1) Consumo (alimento, vestido) 
(2) Vivienda (construcción, reparación) 
(3) Gastos en educación 
(4) Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias)  
(5) Gastos médicos 
(6) Ahorro/Inversión 
(7) Otro 
(8) NS/NR 
(9) Inap 
Q10a1  
 
 
__
25
Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Mucho                   (2) Algo                (3) Poco                 (4) Nada            (8) NS/NR         (9) Inap 
Q10B  
__
25
Q10C. [Preguntar a todos]  ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el 
exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿dónde?] 
[No leer alternativas]  
(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga] 
(2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga] 
(5) Sí, en España [Siga] 
(3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos o España) [Siga] 
(4) No [Pase a Q14] 
(8) NS/NR [Pase a Q14] 
Q10C  
 
 
__
25
Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia  se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Todos los días  
(2) Una o dos veces por semana  
(3) Una o dos veces por mes  
(4) Rara vez  
(5) Nunca   
(8) NS/NR  
(9) INAP 
Q16  
 
 
__
25
Q14.  [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?  
(1) Sí                 (2)  No                     (8) NS/NR 
Q14  
__
25
 200
   
Q10D.  [Preguntar a todos] ¿El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar                               
(2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades                
(3) No les alcanza, tienen dificultades                            
(4) No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades              
(8) [No leer] NS/NR                                                                
Q10D  
 
 
__
25
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]    
(1) Soltero                    (2) Casado                     (3) Unión libre (acompañado)                      (4) Divorciado  (5) Separado                (6) 
Viudo  (8) NS/NR 
Q11  
__
26
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos? ¿Cuántos?  _________ (00= ninguno Æ Pase a ETID)    NS/NR (88)   Q12 ___ 
261 
Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento?  ___________ 
 00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos) 
Q12A ___ 
263 
 
ETID.  ¿Usted se  considera una persona  blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra (afrouruguaya), mulata, u otra? 
(1) Blanca   (2) Mestiza   (3) Indígena    (4) Negra (afrouruguaya)  (5) Mulata     (7) Otra        (8) NS/NR 
ETID 
__
26
 
WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Todos los días o casi todos los días  
(2) Por lo menos una vez por semana  
(3) Por lo menos una vez al mes   
(4) Rara vez   
(5) Nunca    
(8) [No leer] NS/NR  
WWW1 
__
26
 
Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [Leer todos] 
R1. Televisor  (0) No (1) Sí R1  
___ 
267 
R3. Heladera  (0) No (1) Sí R3  
___ 
268 
R4. Teléfono de línea(no celular) (0) No (1) Sí R4  
___ 
269 
R4A. Teléfono celular (0) No (1) Sí R4A  
___ 
270 
R5.  Vehículo (auto o camioneta) 
 Cuántos? 
(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más R5  
___ 
271 
R6. Lavadora de ropa (0) No (1) Sí R6  
___ 
272 
R7. Microondas (0) No (1) Sí R7  
___ 
273 
R8. Moto (0) No (1) Sí R8  
___ 
274 
R12. Agua potable dentro de la 
casa 
(0) No (1) Sí R12  
___ 
275 
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la 
casa 
(0) No (1) Sí R14  
___ 
276 
R15. Computadora (0) No (1) Sí R15  
___ 
277 
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OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Trabajando? [Siga]  
(2) No  está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] 
(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(4) Es estudiante? [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a MIG2] 
(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a MIG2] 
(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(8) NS/NR  
OCUP4 
__
27
 
OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (Sondee: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?)  [No leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) 
(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)  
(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, 
deportista, etc.)  
(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) 
(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la 
administración pública) 
(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) 
(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) 
(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados 
(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.)  
(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) 
(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 
(12) Artesano  
(13) Servicio doméstico 
(14) Obrero 
(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, 
etc.)  
(88) NS/NR 
(99) INAP 
OCUP1 
___ __
279 28
 
 
OCUP1A.  En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas] 
  (1) Asalariado del gobierno? 
  (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? 
  (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? 
  (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? 
  (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? 
  (8) NS/NR 
   (9) INAP 
OCUP1A 
 
 
OCUP 12A ¿Cuántas horas trabaja habitualmente por semana en su ocupación principal? 
___________________________ [Anotar número de horas]  (88)  NS/NR                 (99) INAP 
OCUP 12A  
___ 
282 
OCUP12. ¿Quisiera trabajar más, menos o igual número de horas? 
    (1) Menos                   (2) Igual                    (3) Más                  (8) NS/NR (9) INAP 
OCUP12 
 
 
  
OCUP1C. ¿Está Usted registrado en el BPS (está en caja) a través de su empresa o su empleador? 
 (1) Sí                  (2) No             (8) NS/NR              (9) INAP 
OCUP1C 
_
 
Ahora nos gustaria hacerle algunas preguntas sobre su situacion laboral en octubre 2004   
OCUP27. –En esa fecha, tenía usted el mismo trabajo que tiene ahora?  
(1) Sí [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(2) No [Siga] 
(8) NS/NR  [Siga] 
(9) INAP 
OCUP27 
___
286
OCUP28.   En esa fecha estaba usted: [Leer alternativas]  
(1) Desempleado?  [Siga]  
(2) Trabajando? [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(3) Estudiando? [Pase a MIG2 ] 
OCUP28 
___
287
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(4) Dedicándose a los quehaceres del hogar?  [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(5)   Otros (jubilado, pensionista, rentista) [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(8)  NS/NR [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(9)  INAP  
OCUP29. ¿Cuál  era la razón por la cual se encontraba desempleado en esa fecha? [No leer alternativas] 
(1) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [Pase a OCUP31] 
(2) Fin de empleo temporal  [Pase a OCUP31]                                                        
(3) Buscaba empleo por primera vez [Pase a OCUP31] 
(4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [Siga] 
(5) Despido o cese [Siga]                                                                         
(8) NS/NR  [Pase a OCUP31] 
(9) INAP    
OCUP29 
___
288
OCUP30.  ¿Recibió algun pago en concepto de cesantía o despido por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba?  
(1) Sí   [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(2) No [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(8) NS/NR   [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(9)INAP  
OCUP30 
___
289
OCUP31. ¿En esa fecha, estaba buscando empleo? 
(1) Sí [Siga]                         
(2) No [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(8) NS/NR [Pase a MIG2 ] 
(9) INAP   
OCUP31 
___
290
OCUP31A ¿En esa fecha,  cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando empleo? 
(1) Menos de un mes 
(2) Entre un mes y tres meses 
(3) Entre tres meses y seis meses 
(4) Más de seis meses 
(8) NS/NR    
(9) INAP                                                                                   
OCUP31A 
___
291
 
 
 
MIG2.  Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 
(1)  En este mismo barrio [Pase a TI]                      
(2) En otro barrio en el país [Siga] 
(3)  En otro país [Pase a TI]                                           
(8) NS/NR [Pase a TI] 
MIG2 
_
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este 
(2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este 
(3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este 
(8) NS/NR 
(9) INAP 
MIG3 
_
 
Hora terminada la entrevista _______ : ______  
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1]  _____________ 
TI  
___ ___ ___ 
294 295 296 
 
 
Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.   
Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. 
Firma del entrevistador__________________ Fecha  ____ /_____ /_____  
 Firma del supervisor de campo _________________ 
Comentarios: ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Firma de la persona que digitó los datos __________________________________ 
Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _______________________________ 
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Tarjeta  #1 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Izquierda Derecha
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Tarjeta A 
 
 
 
 
Mucho  7
 
6
 
5
 
4
 
3
 
2
Nada
 
1
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Tarjeta B 
 
 
 
 
 
Muy de 
Acuerdo
 
7
 
6
 
5
 
4
 
3
 
2
Muy en 
Desacuerdo
 
1
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Tarjeta C 
 
 
Aprueba firmemente  
10
 
9
 
8
 
7
 
6
 
5
 
4
 
3
 
2
Desaprueba firmemente
 
1
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Tarjeta D 
 
 
 
 
Mejor vida posible  
10
 
9
 
8
 
7
 
6
 
5
 
4
 
3
 
2
 
1
Peor vida posible 
 
0
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Tarjeta E 
 
 
 
(00)  Ningún ingreso 
(01)  Menos de $4.500 
(02)  Entre $4.501 y 6.000 
(03)  Entre $6.001 y 8.000 
(04)  Entre $8.001 y 10.000 
(05)  Entre $10.001 y 12.000 
(06)  Entre $12.001 y 14.000 
(07) Entre $14.001 y 18.000 
(08) Entre $18.001 y 23.000 
(09) Entre $ 23.001 y 33.000  
(10)  $33.001 y más 
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ANNEX D 
 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
 
 
Unless specification in the contrary, the source for the variables listed here is the 2008 
round of the AmericasBarometer survey. 
 
 
Trust in congress (World Values Survey) 
Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the national parliament in a scale ranging 
from 1 “A great deal of confidence” to 4 “None at all.” The original scale has been inverted for greater 
values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the 
inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates “none at all” and 100 “a great 
deal of confidence.”  
 
Trust in government (World Values Survey) 
Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the national government in a scale ranging 
from 1 “A great deal of confidence” to 4 “None at all.” The original scale has been inverted for greater 
values to indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the 
inverted values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates “none at all” and 100 “a great 
deal of confidence.”  
 
Trust in justice system (World Values Survey) 
Individuals were asked to express their degree of confidence in the justice system in a scale ranging from 1 
“A great deal of confidence” to 4 “None at all.” The original scale has been inverted for greater values to 
indicate higher levels of confidence. Also, in order to allow comparison of means values, the inverted 
values were converted into a 0 to 100 scale, in which 0 indicates “none at all” and 100 “a great deal of 
confidence.”  
 
Trust in legislatures  
Response to survey question “To what extent do you trust legislatures?” 
Ranges from 0 “Not at all” to 100 “A lot” 
 
Excessive debate 
Survey question: “To what extent do members of congress waste time discussing and debating?” 
Ranges from 0 “Not at all” to 100 “A lot” 
  
Excessive counterbalance  
Survey question: “To what extent does the Congress hinder the President’s job?” 
Ranges from 0 “Not at all” to 100 “A lot” 
 
Importance of the laws passed by the legislature 
Survey question: “How important are for the country the laws passed by the legislature?” 
Ranges from 0 “Not at all” to 100 “A lot” 
 
 
 
 
 210
 
Unfulfilled expectations 
Survey question: “To what extent does the Congress do what you expect from it?”  
Ranges from 0 “Not at all” to 100 “A lot” 
 
Job approval 
Survey question: “Now speaking of Congress. Thinking of members of congress as a whole, 
without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the 
congressmembers are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very 
poorly?” 
Ranges from 0 “Very poorly” to 100 “Very well” 
 
Performance evaluation index  
The Performance Evaluation Index is the simple mean of the three individual performance variables: 
importance of the laws passed by Congress, job approval, and fulfilled expectations. The index is 
calculated for all those cases with valid values in at least two out of the three variables. If for one case there 
is missing information for two variables, then that case is considered missing and therefore left out of the 
index.  
Ranges from 0, the worst possible performance score to 100, the best possible score 
 
Political party responsiveness  
Response to survey question “Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do [national] political 
parties represent their voters well?” 
Ranges from 0 “Not at all” to 100 “A lot” 
 
Role in Congress of party object of identification  
Survey question “Do you currently identify with a political party?” Those who expressed a partisan 
identification were classified according to the role the party object of identification plays in the national 
Congress.  
0. No partisan ID 
1. ID with party holding minority 
2. ID with party holding relative majority 
3. ID with party holding absolute majority 
 
 
Presidential approval  
Survey question: “Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job 
performance of President [NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT]: very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, 
or very bad?” 
Ranges from 0 “Very bad” to 100 “Very good” 
 
Sociotropic view of economy  
Survey question: “How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is very 
good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?” 
Ranges from 0 “Very bad” to 100 “Very good” 
 
Political knowledge 
Average of responses to the following questions; 
“What is the name of the current president of the United States?  
How many provinces does the country have?  
How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country?  
What is the name of the current president of Brazil?”  
For every question, a correct response was assigned a value of 100, and incorrect, “don’t answer,” and 
“don’t know” responses were assigned a value of 0. To create the index, the values for the four responses 
were added and the simple average was calculated.  
Ranges from 0 (zero responses correct) to 100 (al responses correct) 
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Internal political efficacy 
Survey question: “I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do 
you agree or disagree?” 
Ranges from 0 “Strongly disagree” to 100 “Strongly agree” 
 
 
External political efficacy 
Survey question: “Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think.  How 
much do you agree or disagree?” 
Ranges from 0 “Strongly disagree” to 100 “Strongly agree” 
 
Exposure to TV news 
Survey question: “How often do you watch news on TV?”  
Ranges from 0 “Never” to 100 “Everyday” 
 
Interpersonal trust 
Survey question: “Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are 
generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?” 
Ranges from 0 “Untrustworthy” to 100”Very trustworthy” 
 
Education  
Highest educational level attained 
0 No formal education 
1 Elementary School 
2 High School 
3 College 
 
Effective Number of Legislative Parties 
Each case was assigned a figure corresponding to the ENLP of the country they reside.1 
 
Party System Polarization  
Each case was assigned a figure corresponding to the party system polarization of the country they reside.2 
                                                 
1 The source for the ENLP for all countries except Argentina and Venezuela is Freidenberg 2006, page 18. 
Argentina had legislative elections after Freidenberg’s work was published, so I calculated the ENLP based 
on data from Rodríguez 2007. For Venezuela, Freidenberg reported a ENLP greater than 1, but in fact, the 
Venezuelan Congress is operating as a one-party system. Finally, for Ecuador, Freidenberg reports an 
ENLP of 5.6. This figure corresponds to the configuration of Congress previous to the destitution and 
substitution of 57 of the original congressmembers (see Escobar 2007). Since the Ecuadorian Congress is 
suspended in its functions anyways and several reconfigurations of power have occurred since the election, 
I chose to keep the original figure.  
2 The source for the two indicators of polarization is González and Queirolo (2008). For the measure based 
on citizens’ self-placement, the authors resort to Sani and Sartori’s (1983) formula for calculating party 
system polarization. For the experts’ judgments measures, González and Queirolo rely on an updated 
version of Coppedge’s clasification of political parties. The authors describe the procedures followed to 
create the indicators of polarization as “ (a) estimating Sani and Sartori’s (1983) definition of polarization 
(ideological distance between the two most extreme relevant parties, where the position of the parties result 
from their voters’ self placement in the left right scale), and (b) estimating Coppedge’s (1997) indicator of 
polarization, which differs from Sani and Sartori’s in two basic ways: it is based on the experts’ 
classification, and it takes into account the position of all the parties (not merely the two most extreme 
ones) except those of the center. Polarization according to Sani and Sartori’s definition (the difference 
between the positions of the two most extreme relevant parties divided by nine, the maximum possible 
difference) varies between 0 (an extremely unlikely case: all relevant parties should be in the same place in 
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Parties’ roots in society  
Each case was assigned the percentage of self-declared partisans in each country 
 
Unified government  
Individuals living in countries where the executive and more than 50% of the legislature (and each of the 
chambers in bicameral systems) are controlled by the same political party are counted as living under 
unified government; all other situations (whether the party controlling the Executive is in minority or 
holding only a relative majority in one or both chambers) are considered cases of non unified government.  
0. Non unified 
1. Unified 
 
Federalism  
Individuals living in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela were coded as living under federal 
government. Cases from all the other countries are coded as unitary 
0. Unitary 
1. Federal 
 
GDP  
Each case was asigned the GDP per capita in value (in US Dollars) corresponding to the country he lives in 
(CEPAL 2008)  
 
Corruption  
Each case was assigned the national corruption victimization rate. (As calculated by the LAPOP corruption 
victimization measures that computes the percentage of self-declared victims of corruption in a country in a 
given year)  
 
Crime  
Each case was assigned the national crime victimization rate. (As calculated by the LAPOP crime 
victimization measure that computes the percentage of self-declared victims of crime in a country in a 
given year)  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the ten-point scale) and 1 (when the most extreme relevant parties are found at both ends of the scale, 1 and 
10). Coppedge’s indicator measures the dispersion of the vote away from the relative center of the party 
system; polarization ranges from zero to 100.” (González and Queirolo 2008, 15).  
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ANNEX E 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
 
 
Table E1. Trust in legislatures, by country 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 55.570807 29.196809 1457 
Guatemala 40.231946 31.041614 1394 
El Salvador 40.26045 32.236408 1523 
Honduras 41.063321 24.314784 1395 
Nicaragua 36.453999 32.553464 1442 
Costa Rica 47.612392 31.399723 1431 
Panama 38.032454 26.743195 1479 
Colombia 51.578327 28.536623 1415 
Ecuador 23.138388 26.144544 2941 
Bolivia 47.992987 25.873742 2757 
Peru 33.164528 26.198194 1481 
Paraguay 24.508941 26.972566 1137 
Chile 50.496166 27.105847 1478 
Uruguay 53.625772 29.003353 1402 
Brazil 35.797523 29.21257 1373 
Venezuela 43.562231 31.547914 1398 
Argentina 37.367915 26.546015 1388 
Dominican Rep. 53.742732 33.753742 1376 
    
Total 41.342083 30.264529 28267 
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Table E2. Trust in president, by country 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 58.101402 32.2301 1545 
Guatemala 50.838574 32.929894 1431 
El Salvador 45.201037 36.021189 1542 
Honduras 41.051681 24.857464 1477 
Nicaragua 33.277405 36.165199 1490 
Costa Rica 60.319077 33.781353 1473 
Panama 43.209054 30.777656 1502 
Colombia 70.320556 30.762608 1487 
Ecuador 56.604834 31.68637 2965 
Bolivia 53.762532 33.394127 2959 
Peru 33.923796 27.462763 1496 
Paraguay 17.602187 26.428965 1158 
Chile 61.348941 29.12658 1495 
Uruguay 59.101174 34.732953 1476 
Brazil 56.734926 32.241851 1465 
Venezuela 51.789549 36.255329 1397 
Argentina 45.815801 30.049094 1426 
Dominican 62.846748 38.346045 1466 
    
Total 50.963532 34.338338 29250 
 
 
Table E3. Trust in supreme courts, by country 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 54.603926 29.662662 1477 
Guatemala 42.838067 30.299457 1373 
El Salvador 45.65845 29.574599 1501 
Honduras 38.040621 24.363079 1395 
Nicaragua 36.216402 31.730368 1451 
Costa Rica 55.18648 29.80681 1430 
Panama 40.407432 27.379822 1489 
Colombia 60.094899 28.2634 1405 
Ecuador 34.677512 26.066451 2889 
Bolivia 48.951896 24.655445 2751 
Peru 34.445208 24.897622 1454 
Paraguay 21.230502 25.821147 1154 
Chile 49.719037 27.458507 1483 
Uruguay 57.003295 29.00991 1416 
Brazil 48.276309 28.868431 1286 
Venezuela 41.512125 30.953531 1402 
Argentina 40.432551 27.539819 1364 
Dominican Rep. 55.539637 32.239449 1396 
    
Total 44.600346 29.584344 28116 
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Table E4. Excessive congressional debate, by country 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 73.656648 30.6151 1464 
Guatemala 65.665126 34.143687 1298 
El Salvador 79.89611 27.372534 1508 
Honduras 51.895375 30.448447 1319 
Nicaragua 75.859546 32.612117 1367 
Costa Rica 79.079254 28.558926 1430 
Panama 60.46755 30.554417 1433 
Colombia 70.186727 29.899081 1321 
Ecuador 64.142114 33.915976 2885 
Bolivia 67.298118 26.790551 2745 
Peru 74.380165 28.96679 1452 
Paraguay 68.42283 34.122841 987 
Chile 66.061452 28.689144 1432 
Uruguay 71.543526 30.467841 1367 
Brazil 64.893343 34.797194 1297 
Venezuela 39.989599 29.294475 1282 
Argentina 63.554687 33.529441 1280 
Dominican Rep. 68.640523 31.061785 1275 
    
Total 67.060889 32.065855 27142 
 
 
 
Table E5. Excessive congressional counterbalance, by country 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 52.037579 28.217221 1366 
Guatemala 50.859521 31.233237 1241 
El Salvador 49.077278 30.825474 1445 
Honduras 35.430021 24.737998 1248 
Nicaragua 43.45191 34.275119 1265 
Costa Rica 55.979073 32.422749 1338 
Panama 49.173352 30.107362 1371 
Colombia 49.48083 27.321534 1252 
Ecuador 55.509065 32.201823 2868 
Bolivia 51.711026 26.110195 2630 
Peru 44.348244 24.367739 1386 
Paraguay 44.834413 30.707614 926 
Chile 53.909464 24.7779 1377 
Uruguay 45.402298 29.467903 1247 
Brazil 54.60671 29.196998 1212 
Venezuela 32.114447 28.517155 1299 
Argentina 35.561342 27.551798 1152 
Dominican Rep. 49.263888 32.096382 1200 
    
Total 48.235423 30.019583 25823 
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Table E6. Importance of the laws passed by the legislatures, by country 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 64.314928 29.70151 1467 
Guatemala 56.897416 33.006636 1329 
El Salvador 57.419712 31.244762 1505 
Honduras 49.882297 29.349476 1416 
Nicaragua 63.127272 32.479325 1375 
Costa Rica 64.810849 28.054049 1401 
Panama 48.484848 27.363602 1463 
Colombia 65.856395 27.044787 1337 
Ecuador 43.049275 28.522207 2875 
Bolivia 65.009746 24.961802 2736 
Peru 51.918217 27.121762 1451 
Paraguay 51.969546 33.716066 1007 
Chile 61.782407 25.852505 1440 
Uruguay 69.825467 25.597779 1356 
Brazil 43.651399 29.137952 1310 
Venezuela 42.33436 30.192622 1298 
Argentina 59.406322 27.996341 1297 
Dominican 
Rep. 
69.448584 29.784388 1342 
    
Total 56.884996 30.162643 27405 
 
 
Table E7. Extent to which legislatures fulfills expectations, by country 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 43.607922 28.097047 1481 
Guatemala 34.456355 30.07041 1306 
El Salvador 36.478811 28.749423 1526 
Honduras 33.204406 24.683923 1422 
Nicaragua 33.769379 30.797672 1376 
Costa Rica 40.62795 30.590932 1412 
Panama 35.897435 25.739262 1469 
Colombia 44.208302 26.997574 1341 
Ecuador 29.391114 25.451167 2896 
Bolivia 46.621456 24.408623 2728 
Peru 30.460164 23.552927 1456 
Paraguay 21.444235 24.46015 1064 
Chile 45.423925 24.748157 1435 
Uruguay 46.985045 26.656918 1382 
Brazil 28.012121 25.754188 1375 
Venezuela 35.8605 29.523252 1319 
Argentina 33.699494 25.411958 1320 
Dominican Rep. 48.097014 31.415882 1340 
    
Total 37.349898 27.919931 27648 
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Table E8. Job approval of legislators, by country 
 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 45.677332 21.364411 1469 
Guatemala 40.87936 19.150808 1376 
El Salvador 42.559133 23.273482 1522 
Honduras 47.025129 22.466299 1353 
Nicaragua 40.561404 23.747426 1425 
Costa Rica 44.221369 23.44473 1432 
Panama 38.225256 23.220634 1465 
Colombia 51.341912 19.969182 1360 
Ecuador 31.438332 22.28862 2854 
Bolivia 46.072187 17.961624 2826 
Peru 39.181386 18.220244 1472 
Paraguay 33.975521 23.428703 1103 
Chile 45.313565 18.229172 1467 
Uruguay 54.382889 18.966396 1426 
Brazil 39.864395 23.041196 1438 
Venezuela 44.139194 24.658422 1365 
Argentina 42.112299 19.264664 1309 
Dominican Rep. 53.192279 25.130021 1347 
    
Total 42.920133 22.35534 28009 
 
 
 
Table E9. Index of performance evaluation 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 51.169198 20.170276 1492 
Guatemala 43.996982 20.396488 1344 
El Salvador 45.391868 21.813451 1529 
Honduras 43.09598 18.809774 1443 
Nicaragua 45.760441 20.800618 1410 
Costa Rica 49.718154 19.962039 1434 
Panama 40.803886 19.324979 1481 
Colombia 53.648775 18.498099 1357 
Ecuador 34.716498 19.330933 2912 
Bolivia 52.627573 16.086452 2774 
Peru 40.457906 17.307117 1465 
Paraguay 35.137979 20.266611 1069 
Chile 50.872851 17.578454 1448 
Uruguay 56.840648 19.094467 1405 
Brazil 36.875904 20.206495 1382 
Venezuela 40.620585 24.529213 1337 
Argentina 44.881725 18.702417 1334 
Dominican Rep. 56.851716 23.058449 1363 
    
Total 45.612532 20.85787 27979 
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Table E10. Political party responsiveness  
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 44.170004 29.084298 1498 
Guatemala 37.728524 29.590767 1331 
El Salvador 44.893006 28.928395 1511 
Honduras 32.984901 23.551204 1435 
Nicaragua 33.884976 31.958506 1420 
Costa Rica 42.961672 31.090536 1435 
Panama 37.704359 26.404461 1468 
Colombia 45.275035 27.472368 1418 
Ecuador 31.989059 27.008463 2864 
Bolivia 39.479863 24.073293 2839 
Peru 33.264272 23.973894 1448 
Paraguay 24.080882 25.42037 1088 
Chile 43.525596 26.171547 1439 
Uruguay 49.917022 26.443929 1406 
Brazil 28.652886 27.175346 1403 
Venezuela 41.33236 28.436546 1371 
Argentina 34.88372 25.734044 1376 
Dominican 
Rep. 
49.754902 33.036779 1360 
    
Total 38.572868 28.238985 28110 
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Table E11. Role in congress of party object of identification 
Country No 
identification 
Minority Relative 
majority 
Absolute 
Majority 
Total 
      
Mexico 1,298 3 205 0 1,506  
 86.19 0.20 13.61 0.00 100.00  
      
Guatemala 1,258 85 141 0 1,484  
 84.77 5.73 9.50 0.00 100.00  
      
El Salvador 909 394 195 0 1,498  
 60.68 26.30 13.02 0.00 100.00  
      
Honduras 750 347 340 0 1,437  
 52.19 24.15 23.66 0.00 100.00  
      
Nicaragua 908 294 293 0 1,495  
 60.74 19.67 19.60 0.00 100.00  
      
Costa Rica 1,025 128 307 0 1,460  
 70.21 8.77 21.03 0.00 100.00  
      
Panama 1,028 180 0 294 1,502  
 68.44 11.98 0.00 19.57 100.00  
      
Colombia 1,049 173 248 0 1,470  
 71.36 11.77 16.87 0.00 100.00  
      
Ecuador 2,401 136 0 417 2,954  
 81.28 4.60 0.00 14.12 100.00  
      
Bolivia 2,155 116 651 0 2,922  
 73.75 3.97 22.28 0.00 100.00  
      
Peru 1,206 248 27 0 1,481  
 81.43 16.75 1.82 0.00 100.00  
      
Paraguay 476 331 339 0 1,146  
 41.54 28.88 29.58 0.00 100.00  
      
Chile 1,152 25 259 0 1,436  
 80.22 1.74 18.04 0.00 100.00  
      
Uruguay 731 256 0 473 1,460  
 50.07 17.53 0.00 32.40 100.00  
      
Brazil 1,103 132 230 0 1,465  
 75.29 9.01 15.70 0.00 100.00  
      
Venezuela 979 163 0 290 1,432  
 68.37 11.38 0.00 20.25 100.00  
      
Argentina 1,061 114 0 187 1,362  
 77.90 8.37 0.00 13.73 100.00  
      
Dominican 
Republic 
438 324 0 688 1,450  
 30.21 22.34 0.00 47.45 100.00  
      
Total 19,927 3,449 3,235 2,349 28,960  
 68.81 11.91 11.17 8.11 100.00  
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Table E12. Presidential approval 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 58.523841 20.332431 1531 
Guatemala 56.141016 16.388858 1319 
El Salvador 51.311528 25.87383 1544 
Honduras 47.501666 20.21767 1501 
Nicaragua 43.227425 27.313352 1495 
Costa Rica 62.424038 21.827761 1481 
Panama 47.606383 22.172177 1504 
Colombia 69.261745 21.521818 1490 
Ecuador 62.187922 22.047844 2964 
Bolivia 54.576871 22.621186 2966 
Peru 44.487265 20.085878 1492 
Paraguay 30.62066 26.638019 1152 
Chile 55.026543 20.064619 1507 
Uruguay 62.702977 22.84558 1478 
Brazil 62.288709 23.280192 1479 
Venezuela 53.09903 29.008289 1444 
Argentina 54.109589 20.472489 1314 
Dominican Rep. 62.827401 27.785017 1489 
    
Total 54.989708 24.44309 29150 
 
 
 
Table E13. Sociotropic views of the economy 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 38.178295 21.740117 1548 
Guatemala 31.964761 19.857596 1504 
El Salvador 28.483474 21.78633 1543 
Honduras 38.343353 21.752151 1497 
Nicaragua 25.326371 21.608064 1532 
Costa Rica 43.132612 22.706899 1478 
Panama 37.312214 23.679709 1531 
Colombia 45.715726 20.121734 1488 
Ecuador 43.021113 21.627462 2984 
Bolivia 42.472213 20.37183 2969 
Peru 38.370147 20.168518 1494 
Paraguay 24.313305 22.020973 1165 
Chile 46.831911 19.984208 1523 
Uruguay 46.918955 21.400797 1493 
Brazil 46.452933 23.698983 1466 
Venezuela 44.908968 24.475782 1483 
Argentina 46.111869 21.510179 1466 
Dominican Rep. 36.239145 25.450833 1497 
    
Total 39.589865 22.866654 29661 
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Table E14. Political knowledge 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 51.458333 28.029208 1560 
Guatemala 51.202861 31.007531 1538 
El Salvador 64.880568 28.024455 1549 
Honduras 67.805519 27.074913 1522 
Nicaragua 39.334416 31.521858 1540 
Costa Rica 61.05 27.379687 1500 
Panama 64.208984 29.065398 1536 
Colombia 52.278776 28.23975 1503 
Ecuador 57.591667 32.914324 3000 
Bolivia 67.640693 31.505947 3003 
Peru 60.333333 30.599779 1500 
Paraguay 60.827616 32.610675 1166 
Chile 55.56647 32.946549 1527 
Uruguay 81.216667 24.40287 1500 
Brazil 49.532398 31.621959 1497 
Venezuela 57.8 31.514369 1500 
Argentina 74.579408 28.563971 1486 
Dominican Rep. 47.727273 27.502154 1507 
    
Total 59.453297 31.488495 29934 
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Table E15.  Congress –specific political knowledge 
Country Correct Incorrect Total 
    
Mexico    1,407 153 1,560  
 90.19 9.81 100.00  
    
Guatemala 1,352 186 1,538  
 87.91 12.09 100.00  
    
El Salvador 1,445 104 1,549  
 93.29 6.71 100.00  
    
Honduras 455 1,067 1,522  
 29.89 70.11 100.00  
    
Nicaragua 1,267 273 1,540  
 82.27 17.73 100.00  
    
Costa Rica 1,089 411 1,500  
 72.60 27.40 100.00  
    
Panama 886 650 1,536  
 57.68 42.32 100.00  
    
Colombia 1,459 44 1,503  
 97.07 2.93 100.00  
    
Ecuador 1,704 1,296 3,000  
 56.80 43.20 100.00  
    
Bolivia 1,289 211 1,500  
 85.93 14.07 100.00  
    
Peru 911 255 1,166  
 78.13 21.87 100.00  
    
Paraguay 1,023 504 1,527  
 66.99 33.01 100.00  
    
Chile 1,117 383 1,500  
 74.47 25.53 100.00  
    
Uruguay 1,385 112 1,497  
 92.52 7.48 100.00  
    
Brazil 875 625 1,500  
 58.33 41.67 100.00  
    
Venezuela 908 578 1,486  
 61.10 38.90 100.00  
    
Argentina 1,293 214 1,507  
 85.80 14.20 100.00  
    
Dominican Republic 19,865 7,066 26,931  
 73.76 26.24 100.0 
    
Total    
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Table E16.  Internal political efficacy 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 49.102648 29.787247 1523 
Guatemala 42.142298 29.752604 1279 
El Salvador 53.196792 30.521199 1538 
Honduras 45.861049 24.64641 1353 
Nicaragua 47.989143 34.881734 1351 
Costa Rica 56.245662 29.79366 1441 
Panama 53.81806 27.629243 1506 
Colombia 49.609733 29.916813 1452 
Ecuador 48.243492 25.900934 2894 
Bolivia 50.718954 24.730639 2805 
Peru 47.684865 25.703112 1447 
Paraguay 40.292397 31.810584 1140 
Chile 49.382716 29.074806 1458 
Uruguay 55.582524 31.241372 1442 
Brazil 41.531664 28.897319 1358 
Venezuela 51.867816 30.709445 1392 
Argentina 47.443534 29.598245 1343 
Dominican Rep. 52.906287 33.582514 1405 
    
Total 49.316789 29.32839 28127 
 
 
 
Table E17.  External political efficacy 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 41.40591 31.982649 1534 
Guatemala 34.716103 30.579434 1362 
El Salvador 34.782608 33.377535 1541 
Honduras 33.759208 26.288695 1448 
Nicaragua 33.529956 36.011614 1441 
Costa Rica 43.106639 35.036063 1441 
Panama 36.680098 28.25627 1489 
Colombia 43.44788 31.418923 1455 
Ecuador 42.712596 29.610505 2932 
Bolivia 43.429487 27.790893 2808 
Peru 35.183923 27.544698 1468 
Paraguay 21.466905 27.035918 1118 
Chile 43.662607 30.121445 1478 
Uruguay 50.51511 33.577597 1456 
Brazil 32.608695 31.031904 1403 
Venezuela 42.444923 33.089706 1392 
Argentina 31.783225 28.90568 1387 
Dominican Rep. 48.669517 36.708194 1403 
    
Total 39.209506 31.620057 28556 
 
 
 224
Table E18. Exposure to TV news 
Country Mean    Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 80.747863    28.361458 1560 
Guatemala 66.536542    36.621427 1537 
El Salvador 80.2238    30.848027 1549 
Honduras 63.835856    39.355487 1519 
Nicaragua 77.235243    37.051999 1536 
Costa Rica 89.201249    24.961117 1494 
Panama 86.083931    27.815906 1533 
Colombia 88.112663    24.309546 1503 
Ecuador 84.870766    24.844964 2992 
Bolivia 73.237393    34.484612 2988 
Peru 82.554517    27.725611 1498 
Paraguay 85.591766    25.506739 1166 
Chile 87.972058    23.183664 1527 
Uruguay 86.777777     26.60577 1500 
Brazil 87.967914    24.339361 1496 
Venezuela 82.044444    28.848344 1500 
Argentina 77.545044    30.685606 1480 
Dominican Rep. 77.866312    32.741021 1506 
    
Total 80.752241    30.646564 29884 
 
 
Table E19.  Interpersonal trust 
Country Mean    Std. Dev.        Freq. 
    
Mexico 57.334842 28.661026 1547 
Guatemala 60.233422 29.229112 1508 
El Salvador 64.916721 32.13946 1537 
Honduras 51.783212 29.89398 1513 
Nicaragua 58.091931 33.009697 1512 
Costa Rica 68.069036 30.844054 1463 
Panama 57.992079 29.584238 1515 
Colombia 62.553378 29.874153 1480 
Ecuador 55.718001 30.284839 2961 
Bolivia 52.880556 28.919005 2947 
Peru 47.062458 27.346212 1489 
Paraguay 66.06304 27.725946 1158 
Chile 56.638667 30.441187 1500 
Uruguay 62.423393 28.283726 1462 
Brazil 53.721345 29.458819 1457 
Venezuela 60.512113 29.775719 1486 
Argentina 54.150209 24.927753 1438 
Dominican Rep. 59.376812 30.725867 1449 
    
Total 57.821596 30.018861 29422 
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Table E20.  Education 
Country None Elementary High School College Total 
      
Mexico 97 517 757 189 1,560  
 6.22 33.14 48.53 12.12 100.00  
      
Guatemala 254 726 449 105 1,534  
 16.56 47.33 29.27 6.84 100.00  
      
El Salvador 138 529 582 276 1,525  
 9.05 34.69 38.16 18.10 100.00  
      
Honduras 102 770 541 107 1,520  
 6.71 50.66 35.59 7.04 100.00  
      
Nicaragua 133 498 615 270 1,516  
 8.77 32.85 40.57 17.81 100.00  
      
Costa Rica 48 640 603 191 1,482  
 3.24 43.18 40.69 12.89 100.00  
      
Panama 23 361 845 298 1,527  
 1.51 23.64 55.34 19.52 100.00  
      
Colombia 36 446 717 303 1,502  
 2.40 29.69 47.74 20.17 100.00  
      
Ecuador 40 868 1,380 710 2,998  
 1.33 28.95 46.03 23.68 100.00  
      
Bolivia 101 982 1,060 844 2,987  
 3.38 32.88 35.49 28.26 100.00  
      
Peru 19 290 594 596 1,499  
 1.27 19.35 39.63 39.76 100.00  
      
Paraguay 12 473 481 200 1,166  
 1.03 40.57 41.25 17.15 100.00  
      
Chile 35 217 928 329 1,509  
 2.32 14.38 61.50 21.80 100.00  
      
Uruguay 20 498 732 249 1,499  
 1.33 33.22 48.83 16.61 100.00  
      
Brazil 84 588 669 139 1,480  
 5.68 39.73 45.20 9.39 100.00  
      
Venezuela 2 336 773 347 1,458  
 0.14 23.05 53.02 23.80 100.00  
      
Argentina 11 342 716 413 1,482  
 0.74 23.08 48.31 27.87 100.00  
      
Dominican 
Republic 
97 721 461 219 1,498  
 6.48 48.13 30.77 14.62 100.00  
      
Total 1,252 9,802 12,903 5,785 29,742  
 4.21 32.96 43.38 19.45 100.00 
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Table E21.  Effective number of political parties 
Country Mean   Freq. 
   
Mexico 3.54            1560 
Guatemala 4.8600001            1538 
El Salvador 3.04            1549 
Honduras 2.3699999            1522 
Nicaragua 3.1500001            1540 
Costa Rica 3.3199999            1500 
Panama 2.9200001            1536 
Colombia 6.9000001            1503 
Ecuador 5.8400002            3000 
Bolivia 2.3900001            3003 
Peru 3.78           1500 
Paraguay 3.1800001          1166 
Chile 5.5799999         1527 
Uruguay 2.3900001    1500 
Brazil 9.3199997            1497 
Venezuela 1            1500 
Argentina 3.6199999   1486 
Dominican Rep. 2.3800001   1507 
   
Total 3.8951938   1.9116219 29934 
 
 
Table E22. Party system polarization (citizens’ self placement) 
Country Mean    Freq. 
   
Mexico .23            1560 
Guatemala .03   1538 
El Salvador .46000001            1549 
Honduras .03   1522 
Nicaragua .19           . 1540 
Costa Rica .07           . 1500 
Panama .03   1536 
Colombia .2            1503 
Ecuador .31            3000 
Bolivia .17            3003 
Peru .02            1500 
Chile .30000001            1527 
Uruguay .43000001            1500 
Brazil .04            1497 
Venezuela .30000001     1500 
   
Total .19363376  25775 
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Table E23. Party system polarization (experts’ judgments) 
Country Mean Freq. 
   
Mexico 29 1560 
Guatemala 43 1538 
El Salvador 89 1549 
Honduras 12 1522 
Nicaragua 96 1540 
Costa Rica 13 1500 
Panama 27 1536 
Colombia 68 1503 
Ecuador 44 3000 
Bolivia 59 3003 
Peru 24 1500 
Chile 59 1527 
Uruguay 73 1500 
Brazil 67 1497 
Venezuela 47 1500 
   
Total 50.206945 25775 
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Table E24. Partisan identification (parties’ roots in society) 
Country No Yes Total 
    
Mexico 1,042 494 1,536  
 67.84 32.16 100.00  
    
Guatemala 1,258 237 1,495  
 84.15 15.85 100.00  
    
El Salvador 909 630 1,539  
 59.06 40.94 100.00  
    
Honduras 750 713 1,463  
 51.26 48.74 100.00  
    
Nicaragua 908 613 1,521  
 59.70 40.30 100.00  
    
Costa Rica 1,025 445 1,470  
 69.73 30.27 100.00  
    
Panama 1,028 485 1,513  
 67.94 32.06 100.00  
    
Colombia 1,049 432 1,481  
 70.83 29.17 100.00  
    
Ecuador 2,401 561 2,962  
 81.06 18.94 100.00  
    
Bolivia 2,155 810 2,965  
 72.68 27.32 100.00  
    
Peru 1,206 286 1,492  
 80.83 19.17 100.00  
    
Paraguay 476 685 1,161  
 41.00 59.00 100.00  
    
Chile 1,152 314 1,466  
 78.58 21.42 100.00  
    
Uruguay 731 744 1,475  
 49.56 50.44 100.00  
    
Brazil 1,102 371 1,473  
 74.81 25.19 100.00  
    
Venezuela 979 473 1,452  
 67.42 32.58 100.00  
    
Argentina 1,061 349 1,410  
 75.25 24.75 100.00  
    
Dominican Republic 438 1,035 1,473  
 29.74 70.26 100.00  
    
Total 19,670 9,677 29,347  
 67.03 32.97 100.00 
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Table E25. GDP per capita 
Country Mean Freq. 
   
Mexico 6322.8 1560 
Guatemala 1610.8 1538 
El Salvador 2188.3 1549 
Honduras 1365.6 1522 
Nicaragua 863.0 1540 
Costa Rica 4792.4 1500 
Panama 4749.1 1536 
Colombia 2674.4 1503 
Ecuador 1608.1 3000 
Bolivia 1058.9 3003 
Peru 2555.8 1500 
Paraguay 1396.4 1166 
Chile 5873.3 1527 
Uruguay 6770.2 1500 
Brazil 4021.3 1497 
Venezuela 5429.6 1500 
Argentina 8733.4 1486 
Dominican Rep. 3240.3 1507 
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Table E26. Crime victimization 
 
Country Victim No victim Total 
    
Mexico 251 1,306 1,557  
 16.12 83.88 100.00  
    
Guatemala 261 1,268 1,529  
 17.07 82.93 100.00  
    
El Salvador 294 1,253 1,547  
 19.00 81.00 100.00  
    
Honduras 207 1,304 1,511  
 13.70 86.30 100.00  
    
Nicaragua 254 1,282 1,536  
 16.54 83.46 100.00  
    
Costa Rica 237 1,250 1,487  
 15.94 84.06 100.00  
    
Panama 128 1,399 1,527  
 8.38 91.62 100.00  
    
Colombia 233 1,269 1,502  
 15.51 84.49 100.00  
    
Ecuador 622 2,361 2,983  
 20.85 79.15 100.00  
    
Bolivia 527 2,464 2,991  
 17.62 82.38 100.00  
    
Peru 381 1,117 1,498  
 25.43 74.57 100.00  
    
Paraguay 193 971 1,164  
 16.58 83.42 100.00  
    
Chile 339 1,186 1,525  
 22.23 77.77 100.00  
    
Uruguay 330 1,167 1,497  
 22.04 77.96 100.00  
    
Brazil 242 1,240 1,482  
 16.33 83.67 100.00  
    
Venezuela 318 1,170 1,488  
 21.37 78.63 100.00  
    
Argentina 401 1,059 1,460  
 27.47 72.53 100.00  
    
Dominican 
Republic 
223 1,284 1,507  
 14.80 85.20 100.00  
    
Total 5,441 24,350 29,791  
 18.26 81.74 100.0 
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Table E27. Corruption victimization 
 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 30.320513 45.979049 1560 
Guatemala 19.570871 39.687432 1538 
El Salvador 14.848289 35.569284 1549 
Honduras 13.797635 34.498851 1522 
Nicaragua 16.623377 37.241128 1540 
Costa Rica 17.466667 37.980836 1500 
Panama 9.1796875 28.883303 1536 
Colombia 9.5143047 29.351008 1503 
Ecuador 24.8 43.192382 3000 
Bolivia 31.268731 46.366534 3003 
Peru 27.066667 44.445238 1500 
Paraguay 18.181818 38.586011 1166 
Chile 11.656843 32.101046 1527 
Uruguay 8.8666667 28.435681 1500 
Brazil 11.489646 31.900351 1497 
Venezuela 10.6 30.794028 1500 
Argentina 27.456258 44.644384 1486 
Dominican Rep. 16.323822 36.970556 1507 
    
Total 18.751253 39.032892 29934 
 
 
 
 
Table E28. Support for a democracy without political parties 
 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 51.092515 33.216352 1434 
Guatemala 49.718165 33.100559 1301 
El Salvador 47.218528 36.521698 1504 
Honduras 40.205547 29.26243 1346 
Nicaragua 46.860436 39.39117 1359 
Costa Rica 37.902462 38.638938 1408 
Panama 53.155339 33.046754 1442 
Colombia 53.664731 33.952062 1378 
Ecuador 53.017444 31.257282 2828 
Bolivia 50.718761 30.889977 2713 
Peru 46.107572 30.352204 1413 
Paraguay 41.296296 37.761972 990 
Chile 51.759981 31.294837 1411 
Uruguay 38.427896 39.065999 1410 
Brazil 44.693932 34.0827 1247 
Venezuela 35.34166 35.666615 1361 
Argentina 31.502423 34.677363 1238 
Dominican Rep. 41.066282 38.071131 1388 
    
Total 46.054617 34.823664 27171 
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Table E29. Respect for the law 
Country Can act on the 
margins 
Should always 
respect the law 
Total 
Mexico 469 1,061 1,530  
 30.65 69.35 100.00  
    
Guatemala 603 819 1,422  
 42.41 57.59 100.00  
    
El Salvador 682 848 1,530  
 44.58 55.42 100.00  
    
Honduras 748 685 1,433  
 52.20 47.80 100.00  
    
Nicaragua 789 691 1,480  
 53.31 46.69 100.00  
    
Costa Rica 619 808 1,427  
 43.38 56.62 100.00  
    
Panama 550 934 1,484  
 37.06 62.94 100.00  
    
Colombia 517 950 1,467  
 35.24 64.76 100.00  
    
Ecuador 1,326 1,610 2,936  
 45.16 54.84 100.00  
    
Bolivia 1,109 1,804 2,913  
 38.07 61.93 100.00  
    
Peru 637 821 1,458  
 43.69 56.31 100.00  
    
Paraguay 544 574 1,118  
 48.66 51.34 100.00  
    
Chile 723 764 1,487  
 48.62 51.38 100.00  
    
Uruguay 726 731 1,457  
 49.83 50.17 100.00  
    
Brazil 424 1,043 1,467  
 28.90 71.10 100.00  
    
Venezuela 463 983 1,446  
 32.02 67.98 100.00  
    
Argentina 527 885 1,412  
 37.32 62.68 100.00  
    
Dominican 
Republic 
497 976 1,473  
 33.74 66.26 100.00  
    
Total 11,953 16,987 28,940  
 41.30 58.70 100.00  
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Table E30. Support for democracy 
Country      Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
Mexico 68.481183 28.955912 1488 
Guatemala 60.507523 31.800208 1307 
El Salvador 68.387381 28.566095 1511 
Honduras 59.870435 29.519286 1415 
Nicaragua 72.879684 31.330525 1352 
Costa Rica 78.189876 28.257658 1429 
Panama 71.558817 27.956562 1499 
Colombia 72.966339 26.443764 1426 
Ecuador 64.759278 28.274119 2901 
Bolivia 70.501004 24.053582 2821 
Peru 65.523215 25.668021 1443 
Paraguay 62.912088 33.411848 1092 
Chile 69.517544 26.647422 1444 
Uruguay 85.345612 23.67309 1466 
Brazil 70.479705 28.499447 1355 
Venezuela 83.835961 23.581027 1459 
Argentina 86.914995 22.255934 1396 
Dominican 
Rep. 
74.908826 29.460921 1371 
    
Total 71.267672 28.565517 28175 
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Table AI.1. Main characteristics of Latin American Legislatures 
Country Denomination of 
Legislative Power 
Number 
of 
Chambers 
Name of legislative 
bodies 
Size of 
legislative 
body 
Legislative 
term 
(years) 
Mexico 
Honorable Congreso 
de la Unión 
2 Cámara de Diputados 500d 3e 
 
  Senado de la 
República 
128b 6b 
Guatemala 
Congreso de la 
República 
1 Congreso de la 
República 
158c 4e 
El Salvador Asamblea Legislativa 1 Asamblea Legislativa 84d 3e 
Honduras Congreso Nacional 1 Congreso Nacional 128d 4e 
Nicaragua Asamblea Nacional 1 Asamblea Nacional 90d 5e 
Costa Rica Asamblea Legislativa 1 Asamblea Legislativa 57d 4e 
Panama Asamblea Legislativa 1 Asamblea Legislativa 71b 5e 
Colombia 
Congreso de la 
República 
2 Cámara de 
Representantes 
166d 4e 
   Senado 102 d 4h 
Ecuador Congreso Nacional 1 Congreso Nacional 100d 4e 
Bolivia 
Honorable Congreso 
Nacional 
2 Cámara de Diputados 130d 5e 
   Cámara de Senadores  27b 5i 
Peru 
Congreso de la 
República 
1 Congreso de la 
República 
120d 5e 
Paraguay Congreso 2 Cámara de Diputados 80d 5e 
   Cámara de Senadores 45b 5j 
Chile Congreso Nacional  2 Cámara de Diputados 120 4e 
 
  Senado de la 
República 
38b 8b 
Uruguay 
Asamblea 
General/Parlamento 
2 Cámara de 
Representantes 
99d 5e 
   Cámara de Senadores 30d 5 e 
Brazil 
 2 Câmara dos 
Deputados 
518d 4e 
   Senado Federal 81f 8f 
Venezuela Asamblea Nacional 1 Asamblea Nacional 167d 5e 
Argentina 
Congreso de la 
Nación 
2 Cámara de Diputados 
de la Nación 
257d 4e 
   Senado de la Nación  72b 6b 
Dominican 
Republic 
Congreso Nacional 2 Cámara de Diputados 178d 4e 
   Senado de la 
República 
32g 4b 
Sources: a. Legislatina 2008b; b. Legislatina 2008a; c. Congreso de la República de Guatemala 2009; d. 
IDEA 2008; e. IIDH 2008; f. Senado Federal do Brasil 2009; E-lecciones.net 2009; h. Wikipedia 2009; i. 
Congreso Bolviano 2009; j. Cámara de Senadores de Paraguay 2009. 
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Table AII.1. Main characteristics of legislative electoral systems in Latin America 
Country Electoral System 
for low chambers 
Average district 
magnitude  
Ballot  
Argentina PR 5.4 Closed and 
blocked list 
Bolivia  PR, and 
personalized 
14.4 Closed and 
blocked list 
Brazil PR 19.0 Closed and 
unblocked list 
Chile Binomial  2.0 One vote per 
candidate 
Colombia PR 4.9 Closed and 
unblocked or 
blocked list 
Costa Rica PR 8.1 Closed and 
blocked list 
Ecuador  PR 4.5 Open list with 
panachage 
El Salvador PR 5.6 Closed and 
blocked list 
Guatemala PR 6.6 Closed and 
blocked list 
Honduras PR 7.1 Open list with 
panachage 
Mexico Mixed  Single candidate in 
uninominal district 
and closed and 
blocked list 
Nicaragua PR 5.0 Closed and 
blocked list 
Panama PR 1.8 Closed and 
unblocked list 
Paraguay PR 4.4 Closed and 
blocked list 
Peru PR 4.8 Closed and 
unblocked list 
Dominican R. PR 3.1 Closed and 
unblocked list 
Uruguay PR 5.2* Closed and 
blocked list 
Venezuela PR, and 
personalized 
6.1 Closed and 
blocked list 
* This value is different from that presented in the original source because the original was incorrect. It has 
been fixed to reflect the actual district magnitude according to the Uruguayan institutional arrangements  
Source: Payne at al. 2006, 48.  
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Table AII.2. Type of government at the time of fieldwork 
Country President’s party Party holding 
legislative majority 
(low chamber) and 
type of majority 
% Party holding 
legislative 
majority (high 
Chamber) and 
type of majority 
 Type of 
government 
Argentina Partido 
Justicialista -
Alianza Frente 
para la Victoria 
Partido 
Justicialista -
Alianza Frente 
para la Victoria 
50 Partido 
Justicialista -
Alianza 
Frente para la 
Victoria 
58 Unified 
Bolivia  Movimiento al 
Socialismo 
Movimiento al 
Socialismo 
50 Poder 
Democrático 
y Social 
48 Non majority 
Brazil Partido dos 
Trabalhadores 
Partido dos 
Trabalhadores 
16 PArtido da 
Frente 
Liberal 
22 Non majority 
Chile Concertación 
Democrática 
Concertación 
Democrática 
54 Alianza 47 Non majority 
Colombia Partido Liberal 
Colombiano 
Partido Liberal 
Colombiano 
21. Partido 
Social de 
Unidad 
Nacional 
20 Non majority 
Costa Rica Partido 
Liberación 
Nacional 
Partido 
Liberación 
Nacional 
44   Non majority 
Ecuador  Alianza País Alianza País    Unified 
El Salvador ARENA ARENA 40   Non majority 
Guatemala UNE UNE 32   Non majority 
Honduras Partido Liberal 
de Honduras 
Partido Liberal 
de Honduras 
45   Non majority 
Mexico Partido Acción 
Nacional 
Partido Acción 
Nacional 
41 Partido 
Acción 
Nacional 
41 Non majority 
Nicaragua Frente 
Sandinista de 
Liberación 
Nacional 
Frente 
Sandinista de 
Liberación 
Nacional 
42   Non majority 
Panama Partido 
Revolucionario 
Democrático 
Partido 
Revolucionario 
Democrático 
54   Unified 
Paraguay Asociación 
Nacional 
Republicana 
Asociación 
Nacional 
Republicana 
46 Asociación 
Nacional 
Republicana 
36 Non majority 
Peru Partido Aprista 
Peruano 
Unión por el 
Perú 
21 Unión por el 
Perú 
38 Non majority 
Dominican 
R. 
Partido de la 
Liberación 
Dominicano 
Partido de la 
Liberación 
Dominicano 
54 Partido de la 
Liberación 
Dominicano 
71 Unified 
Uruguay Encuentro 
Progresista-
Frente Ampio 
Encuentro 
Progresista-
Frente Ampio 
53 Encuentro 
Progresista-
Frente 
Amplio 
53 Unified 
Venezuela Movimiento V 
República 
Movimiento V 
República 
100   Unified 
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Table AIII.1. OLS. Excessive congressional debate as determinant of trust in legislatures 
 Coefficient P>t 
   
Excessive congressional debate .8149162 0.000 
Excessive congressional debate squared -.0069283 0.000 
Intercept 24.94316 0.000 
   
Adjusted R- Square 0.0473  
N 26,357  
     
 
 
Table AIII.2. OLS. Excessive congressional counterbalance as determinant of trust in 
legislatures 
 Coefficient P>t 
   
Congressional counterbalance .523805 0.000 
Congressional counterbalance squared -.0043571 0.000 
Intercept 30.23554 0.000 
   
Adjusted R- Square 0.0301  
N 25,251  
   
 
  
Table AIII.3. Correlation matrix for importance of laws passed by congress,  job approval 
of legislators, and fulfillment of expectations by congress 
 Importance of laws Job approval Fulfilled expectations 
Importance of laws 1.000 - - 
Job approval 0.480 1.000 - 
Importance of laws 0.274 0.375 1.000 
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Table AIII.4. Factor analysis in principal factors of importance of laws passed by Congress 
(ec3r), job approval of legislators (m2r), and fulfillment of expectations by Congress (ec4r). 
 
 
 
Table AIII.5. Comparison of mean levels of trust across partisan identification 
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Table AIII.6. Likelihood-ratio test. Null hypothesis: country-level differences are not 
significant 
(Assumption: . nested in lr1)                     Prob > chibar2   =    0.0000
Likelihood-ratio test                             LR chibar2(01)   =   2991.18
 
Table AIII.7. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 1 
 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   869.53 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     24.11885   .1167818      23.89105    24.34883
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)      4.55141   .7749655      3.259962    6.354473
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     4.092209   1.451911     2.82   0.005     1.246515    6.937902
         edr    -.9830298   .2424801    -4.05   0.000    -1.458282   -.5077776
        it1r     .0329161   .0056331     5.84   0.000     .0218755    .0439567
         a2r     .0037031   .0061927     0.60   0.550    -.0084344    .0158406
    extpolef     .0567919    .006047     9.39   0.000       .04494    .0686438
    intpolef     .0400057    .006345     6.31   0.000     .0275697    .0524417
          pk    -.0202767   .0063892    -3.17   0.002    -.0327994    -.007754
      soct1r      .021263   .0082267     2.58   0.010      .005139     .037387
         m1r     .0418984   .0085097     4.92   0.000     .0252198    .0585771
      idcong     .5217832   .1845392     2.83   0.005     .1600931    .8834733
       epp1r      .177365   .0070522    25.15   0.000     .1635429    .1911872
        ec4r     .2129541   .0078525    27.12   0.000     .1975635    .2283446
         m2r     .1977315   .0087371    22.63   0.000     .1806071    .2148559
        ec3r     .0918635   .0069251    13.27   0.000     .0782905    .1054366
      ec1rsq    -.0008404   .0001947    -4.32   0.000     -.001222   -.0004587
        ec1r     .0836582   .0201396     4.15   0.000     .0441853    .1231312
      ec2rsq    -.0013452   .0002049    -6.56   0.000    -.0017468   -.0009435
        ec2r     .1235627   .0242279     5.10   0.000     .0760769    .1710486
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -98261.729                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(17)      =   8196.53
                                                               max =      2458
                                                               avg =    1185.8
                                                Obs per group: min =       784
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        18
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =     21345
Computing standard errors:
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -98261.729  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -98261.729  
Performing gradient-based optimization: 
Performing EM optimization: 
>  mle
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq ec3r m2r ec4r epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pais:,
. *Model 1. Full Model with PK
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Table AIII.8. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 2 
end of do-file
. 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   955.64 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     24.24271   .1154935       24.0174    24.47013
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)      4.67331   .7945193       3.34896    6.521375
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     4.738842   1.452944     3.26   0.001     1.891124     7.58656
         edr    -1.076155   .2394023    -4.50   0.000    -1.545375   -.6069349
        it1r      .031912   .0055647     5.73   0.000     .0210055    .0428186
         a2r      .002623   .0060691     0.43   0.666    -.0092723    .0145183
    extpolef     .0631202   .0059632    10.58   0.000     .0514325    .0748078
    intpolef     .0369088   .0062595     5.90   0.000     .0246405    .0491771
          pk    -.0244229   .0063079    -3.87   0.000    -.0367862   -.0120596
      soct1r     .0265558   .0081009     3.28   0.001     .0106782    .0424333
         m1r     .0498445   .0082252     6.06   0.000     .0337235    .0659656
      idcong     .5310527   .1827093     2.91   0.004      .172949    .8891564
       epp1r     .1826935   .0069113    26.43   0.000     .1691476    .1962394
      conper     .4722478   .0102022    46.29   0.000     .4522518    .4922437
      ec1rsq    -.0008772   .0001925    -4.56   0.000    -.0012545   -.0004998
        ec1r     .0848624   .0198845     4.27   0.000     .0458895    .1238353
      ec2rsq    -.0014567   .0002017    -7.22   0.000     -.001852   -.0010614
        ec2r     .1211844   .0238473     5.08   0.000     .0744446    .1679242
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -101610.48                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(15)      =   8119.56
                                                               max =      2569
                                                               avg =    1224.9
                                                Obs per group: min =       818
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        18
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =     22048
Computing standard errors:
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -101610.48  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -101610.48  
Performing gradient-based optimization: 
Performing EM optimization: 
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pais:, mle
. *Model 2. Parsimonious Model with PK
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Table AIII.9. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 3 
 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   802.35 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     24.23152   .1237135      23.99026    24.47522
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     4.589912   .8043539      3.255641    6.471012
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     3.061012   1.510636     2.03   0.043     .1002186    6.021805
         edr    -1.078659   .2459637    -4.39   0.000    -1.560739   -.5965788
        it1r     .0271153   .0059514     4.56   0.000     .0154507    .0387798
         a2r     .0027934    .006636     0.42   0.674     -.010213    .0157998
    extpolef     .0589342   .0063447     9.29   0.000     .0464988    .0713696
    intpolef     .0355918   .0066089     5.39   0.000     .0226385    .0485451
       pkcon    -.9562588   .4374694    -2.19   0.029    -1.813683   -.0988346
      soct1r     .0259861   .0086337     3.01   0.003     .0090643    .0429079
         m1r     .0455033   .0089755     5.07   0.000     .0279117    .0630948
      idcong     .5226057   .1936163     2.70   0.007     .1431247    .9020867
       epp1r     .1703902   .0074173    22.97   0.000     .1558526    .1849278
        ec4r     .2191638   .0083077    26.38   0.000     .2028809    .2354467
         m2r     .2010822   .0091481    21.98   0.000     .1831523    .2190122
        ec3r     .0942794   .0072564    12.99   0.000     .0800572    .1085016
      ec1rsq    -.0008262   .0002047    -4.04   0.000    -.0012274    -.000425
        ec1r     .0840744   .0211303     3.98   0.000     .0426597    .1254891
      ec2rsq    -.0012824   .0002155    -5.95   0.000    -.0017049     -.00086
        ec2r     .1176044   .0254019     4.63   0.000     .0678176    .1673912
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -88473.351                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(17)      =   7684.22
                                                               max =      2458
                                                               avg =    1129.4
                                                Obs per group: min =       784
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        17
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =     19199
Computing standard errors:
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -88473.351  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -88473.351  
Performing gradient-based optimization: 
Performing EM optimization: 
> s:, mle
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq ec3r m2r ec4r epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pkcon intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pai
. *Model 3. Full Model with PKCON
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Table AIII.10. Multilevel regression (xtmixed) Model 4 
 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   882.40 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     24.36415   .1223568      24.12551    24.60515
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     4.722388   .8262945      3.351379    6.654259
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     3.596423    1.51337     2.38   0.017     .6302731    6.562573
         edr    -1.224112   .2426044    -5.05   0.000    -1.699608   -.7486164
        it1r     .0258435   .0058812     4.39   0.000     .0143166    .0373703
         a2r     .0011989   .0065005     0.18   0.854    -.0115419    .0139397
    extpolef     .0659534   .0062555    10.54   0.000     .0536929     .078214
    intpolef     .0326795   .0065205     5.01   0.000     .0198996    .0454593
       pkcon    -.9853169   .4330854    -2.28   0.023    -1.834149    -.136485
      soct1r     .0309352   .0085067     3.64   0.000     .0142623    .0476081
         m1r     .0533361   .0086748     6.15   0.000     .0363339    .0703383
      idcong     .5376123   .1917098     2.80   0.005      .161868    .9133566
       epp1r     .1753059   .0072672    24.12   0.000     .1610625    .1895493
      conper     .4834534   .0106885    45.23   0.000     .4625043    .5044024
      ec1rsq    -.0008789   .0002024    -4.34   0.000    -.0012755   -.0004823
        ec1r     .0863091   .0208619     4.14   0.000     .0454206    .1271976
      ec2rsq     -.001402    .000212    -6.61   0.000    -.0018176   -.0009865
        ec2r     .1160275   .0249907     4.64   0.000     .0670466    .1650083
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -91544.353                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(15)      =   7589.16
                                                               max =      2569
                                                               avg =    1167.2
                                                Obs per group: min =       818
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        17
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =     19842
Computing standard errors:
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -91544.353  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -91544.353  
Performing gradient-based optimization: 
Performing EM optimization: 
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pkcon intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr|| pais:, mle
. *Model 4. Parsimonious Model with PKCON
 
Table AIII.11. Hausman test for endogeneity (Model 2) 
end of do-file
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      160.92
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         edr     -1.069662    -1.254415         .184753        .0333427
        it1r      .0319427     .0316225        .0003202               .
         a2r      .0026275      .001963        .0006645        .0001072
    extpolef      .0630815     .0625609        .0005206               .
    intpolef      .0368044     .0393501       -.0025457               .
          pk     -.0244275      -.02311       -.0013175        .0013188
      soct1r      .0263884     .0294688       -.0030804        .0009316
         m1r       .049642     .0488819        .0007602        .0014634
      idcong      .5353088     .4629064        .0724024        .0406449
       epp1r      .1824226     .1887738       -.0063512               .
      conper      .4711668     .5028124       -.0316457        .0014381
      ec1rsq     -.0008738     -.000987        .0001132               .
        ec1r      .0847152     .0902213       -.0055061               .
      ec2rsq     -.0014611    -.0013423       -.0001188               .
        ec2r      .1217382     .1072981        .0144401               .
                                                                              
                  HAUFIX2      HAURAN2       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        scale.
        for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar
        sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (14) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (15); be
. hausman HAUFIX2 HAURAN2
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Table AIII.12. Fixed effects regression (Model 2) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     14.65685   1.172395    12.50   0.000     12.35887    16.95483
  DominicanR    -6.966405   1.075022    -6.48   0.000    -9.073525   -4.859285
   Argentina    -11.95002   1.123543   -10.64   0.000    -14.15224   -9.747793
   Venezuela    -7.364923   1.057562    -6.96   0.000     -9.43782   -5.292026
      Brazil    -10.43391   1.052426    -9.91   0.000    -12.49674   -8.371075
     Uruguay    -7.114122   1.048446    -6.79   0.000    -9.169152   -5.059092
       Chile    -4.917135   .9975874    -4.93   0.000    -6.872478   -2.961793
    Paraguay    -16.34818   1.126563   -14.51   0.000    -18.55632   -14.14004
        Peru    -13.12369   .9867956   -13.30   0.000    -15.05788    -11.1895
     Bolivia    -7.411648   .8867776    -8.36   0.000    -9.149796     -5.6735
     Ecuador    -22.80094    .871054   -26.18   0.000    -24.50827   -21.09361
    Colombia    -7.249887   1.016227    -7.13   0.000    -9.241766   -5.258009
      Panama    -11.16923   .9991723   -11.18   0.000    -13.12768   -9.210776
   CostaRica    -7.299142   1.007743    -7.24   0.000     -9.27439   -5.323894
   Nicaragua    -12.61645   1.048368   -12.03   0.000    -14.67133   -10.56158
    Honduras    -9.467303   1.070648    -8.84   0.000    -11.56585   -7.368757
  ElSalvador    -11.29823   .9777472   -11.56   0.000    -13.21468   -9.381775
   Guatemala    -9.975058   1.084528    -9.20   0.000    -12.10081   -7.849306
         edr    -1.069662    .239696    -4.46   0.000    -1.539483   -.5998404
        it1r     .0319427   .0055685     5.74   0.000      .021028    .0428574
         a2r     .0026275   .0060741     0.43   0.665    -.0092781    .0145331
    extpolef     .0630815   .0059661    10.57   0.000     .0513875    .0747755
    intpolef     .0368044   .0062622     5.88   0.000     .0245301    .0490787
          pk    -.0244275   .0063193    -3.87   0.000    -.0368138   -.0120411
      soct1r     .0263884   .0081102     3.25   0.001     .0104919    .0422849
         m1r      .049642   .0082378     6.03   0.000     .0334954    .0657886
      idcong     .5353088   .1830745     2.92   0.003     .1764697    .8941479
       epp1r     .1824226   .0069152    26.38   0.000     .1688682     .195977
      conper     .4711668   .0102135    46.13   0.000     .4511475     .491186
      ec1rsq    -.0008738   .0001926    -4.54   0.000    -.0012513   -.0004962
        ec1r     .0847152   .0198967     4.26   0.000     .0457163    .1237141
      ec2rsq    -.0014611   .0002018    -7.24   0.000    -.0018567   -.0010656
        ec2r     .1217382   .0238583     5.10   0.000     .0749743    .1685021
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    19895628.9 22047  902.418874           Root MSE      =  24.251
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3483
    Residual    12947264.4 22015  588.111036           R-squared     =  0.3492
       Model    6948364.46    32  217136.389           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 32, 22015) =  369.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   22048
> a DominicanR
> vador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentin
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr  Guatemala ElSal
. *Model 2. Parsimonious Model with PK
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Table AIII.13. Fixed effects regression (Model 2) with robust standard errors 
 
 
end of do-file
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     14.65685    1.22747    11.94   0.000     12.25092    17.06278
  DominicanR    -6.966405   1.154653    -6.03   0.000    -9.229608   -4.703202
   Argentina    -11.95002   1.087513   -10.99   0.000    -14.08162   -9.818416
   Venezuela    -7.364923   1.019109    -7.23   0.000    -9.362449   -5.367397
      Brazil    -10.43391   1.101837    -9.47   0.000    -12.59359   -8.274225
     Uruguay    -7.114122   1.043886    -6.82   0.000    -9.160213   -5.068031
       Chile    -4.917135   .9930572    -4.95   0.000    -6.863599   -2.970672
    Paraguay    -16.34818   1.116895   -14.64   0.000    -18.53737   -14.15899
        Peru    -13.12369   .9747492   -13.46   0.000    -15.03427   -11.21311
     Bolivia    -7.411648   .8932886    -8.30   0.000    -9.162558   -5.660738
     Ecuador    -22.80094   .9009916   -25.31   0.000    -24.56695   -21.03493
    Colombia    -7.249887   1.057753    -6.85   0.000    -9.323159   -5.176615
      Panama    -11.16923    .999668   -11.17   0.000    -13.12865   -9.209805
   CostaRica    -7.299142   1.070133    -6.82   0.000     -9.39668   -5.201603
   Nicaragua    -12.61645   1.181462   -10.68   0.000     -14.9322    -10.3007
    Honduras    -9.467303   1.019412    -9.29   0.000    -11.46542   -7.469182
  ElSalvador    -11.29823   1.019812   -11.08   0.000    -13.29713   -9.299324
   Guatemala    -9.975058    1.13911    -8.76   0.000     -12.2078    -7.74232
         edr    -1.069662   .2421354    -4.42   0.000    -1.544264    -.595059
        it1r     .0319427    .005829     5.48   0.000     .0205175    .0433679
         a2r     .0026275   .0063167     0.42   0.677    -.0097537    .0150088
    extpolef     .0630815   .0066608     9.47   0.000     .0500259    .0761371
    intpolef     .0368044   .0068231     5.39   0.000     .0234306    .0501782
          pk    -.0244275   .0064837    -3.77   0.000    -.0371361   -.0117189
      soct1r     .0263884   .0084447     3.12   0.002     .0098362    .0429406
         m1r      .049642   .0087987     5.64   0.000     .0323959    .0668881
      idcong     .5353088   .1834813     2.92   0.004     .1756723    .8949453
       epp1r     .1824226   .0081117    22.49   0.000     .1665231    .1983221
      conper     .4711668   .0112953    41.71   0.000     .4490272    .4933063
      ec1rsq    -.0008738   .0002062    -4.24   0.000    -.0012779   -.0004696
        ec1r     .0847152   .0213384     3.97   0.000     .0428904      .12654
      ec2rsq    -.0014611   .0002106    -6.94   0.000    -.0018739   -.0010483
        ec2r     .1217382    .025166     4.84   0.000      .072411    .1710654
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  24.251
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3492
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 32, 22015) =  424.06
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   22048
> a DominicanR, vce(robust)
> vador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentin
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr  Guatemala ElSal
. **Model 2. Fixed Effects with Robust Standard Error
 
 
 
 
Table AIV.1 Comparison of mean levels of trust across type of government (all cases) 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =    28265
    diff = mean(Not unif) - mean(Unified)                         t =  10.9435
                                                                              
    diff              4.112873    .3758264                3.376235    4.849511
                                                                              
combined     28267    41.34208    .1800089    30.26453    40.98926    41.69491
                                                                              
 Unified      9984    38.68189    .3095676    30.93198    38.07508    39.28871
Not unif     18283    42.79476    .2203497    29.79451    42.36286    43.22667
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest b13r, by (unigov)
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Table AIV.2 Comparison of mean levels of trust across type of government (excluding 
Ecuador) 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =    25324
    diff = mean(Not unif) - mean(Unified)                         t =  -5.6549
                                                                              
    diff             -2.377748     .420473               -3.201899   -1.553597
                                                                              
combined     25326      43.456    .1885122    30.00011    43.08651    43.82549
                                                                              
 Unified      7043    45.17251    .3629842    30.46258    44.46095    45.88407
Not unif     18283    42.79476    .2203497    29.79451    42.36286    43.22667
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest b13r, by (unigov), if pais !=9
 
 
 
Table AIV.3 Comparison of mean levels of trust across Federalism 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =    28265
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -5.2758
                                                                              
    diff             -2.379032    .4509314                -3.26288   -1.495185
                                                                              
combined     28267    41.34208    .1800089    30.26453    40.98926    41.69491
                                                                              
       1      5616    43.24846    .4031579    30.21264    42.45811     44.0388
       0     22651    40.86942    .2010563    30.25947    40.47534    41.26351
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. ttest b13r, by (fed)
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Table AIV.4 Random effects regression (Model 5) 
end of do-file
. 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =    71.94 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     24.23854   .1231601      23.99835    24.48113
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     1.775817   .3730641      1.176461    2.680518
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     11.58316   5.962449     1.94   0.052    -.1030267    23.26934
       crime    -.3056351   .1613145    -1.89   0.058    -.6218058    .0105356
  corruption    -.0424091   .0923912    -0.46   0.646    -.2234924    .1386743
      gdpcap     .0017694    .000327     5.41   0.000     .0011284    .0024103
         fed     1.875966   1.490241     1.26   0.208    -1.044853    4.796784
      unigov    -8.356591   1.383814    -6.04   0.000    -11.06882   -5.644365
   countryID    -.0438286   .0807124    -0.54   0.587     -.202022    .1143648
     polgkSS     4.717447   4.819981     0.98   0.328    -4.729543    14.16444
        enlp    -.9730017   .3535938    -2.75   0.006    -1.666033   -.2799706
         edr    -1.075525   .2553154    -4.21   0.000    -1.575934   -.5751161
        it1r     .0325065   .0058708     5.54   0.000     .0209998    .0440131
         a2r     3.04e-06   .0064633     0.00   1.000    -.0126648    .0126709
    extpolef     .0593612    .006368     9.32   0.000     .0468802    .0718423
    intpolef     .0394609   .0067791     5.82   0.000     .0261741    .0527478
          pk    -.0218639   .0066517    -3.29   0.001     -.034901   -.0088267
      soct1r     .0239824   .0086335     2.78   0.005     .0070611    .0409037
         m1r     .0514517   .0088008     5.85   0.000     .0342025     .068701
      idcong     .4592165    .200071     2.30   0.022     .0670846    .8513485
       epp1r     .1826659   .0073953    24.70   0.000     .1681713    .1971604
      conper     .4736834   .0108751    43.56   0.000     .4523686    .4949983
      ec1rsq    -.0009242   .0002064    -4.48   0.000    -.0013288   -.0005196
        ec1r     .0892966   .0214694     4.16   0.000     .0472174    .1313757
      ec2rsq    -.0014117   .0002161    -6.53   0.000    -.0018351   -.0009882
        ec2r     .1147615   .0256056     4.48   0.000     .0645754    .1649476
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -89301.256                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =   7199.67
                                                               max =      2569
                                                               avg =    1292.1
                                                Obs per group: min =       882
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        15
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =     19381
Computing standard errors:
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -89301.256  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -89301.256  
Performing gradient-based optimization: 
Performing EM optimization: 
> p polgkSS countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime|| pais:, mle
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
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Table AIV.5 Random effects regression (Model 6) 
 
end of do-file
. 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =    59.53 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     24.23863   .1231615      23.99843    24.48123
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     1.718904   .3679423      1.129917     2.61491
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     9.609959    5.22291     1.84   0.066    -.6267559    19.84667
       crime    -.2956502    .142134    -2.08   0.038    -.5742277   -.0170727
  corruption    -.0057725   .0915201    -0.06   0.950    -.1851486    .1736036
      gdpcap     .0019562   .0003342     5.85   0.000     .0013012    .0026112
         fed     1.565358   1.450555     1.08   0.281    -1.277678    4.408395
      unigov     -7.93331   1.270966    -6.24   0.000    -10.42436   -5.442262
   countryID    -.0418654   .0742594    -0.56   0.573    -.1874111    .1036802
      polgkC     .0316757   .0240341     1.32   0.188    -.0154303    .0787817
        enlp     -1.04372    .353145    -2.96   0.003    -1.735871   -.3515681
         edr    -1.083041   .2553639    -4.24   0.000    -1.583545   -.5825372
        it1r     .0325057   .0058689     5.54   0.000     .0210028    .0440087
         a2r    -.0000877   .0064632    -0.01   0.989    -.0127553    .0125799
    extpolef     .0593681   .0063679     9.32   0.000     .0468872     .071849
    intpolef     .0394525   .0067789     5.82   0.000     .0261662    .0527389
          pk    -.0216553   .0066525    -3.26   0.001    -.0346939   -.0086166
      soct1r     .0241635   .0086338     2.80   0.005     .0072415    .0410855
         m1r     .0517435   .0087976     5.88   0.000     .0345006    .0689865
      idcong     .4556119   .2000453     2.28   0.023     .0635303    .8476935
       epp1r     .1827454   .0073932    24.72   0.000     .1682549    .1972359
      conper     .4734095   .0108804    43.51   0.000     .4520842    .4947348
      ec1rsq    -.0009244   .0002064    -4.48   0.000     -.001329   -.0005198
        ec1r     .0893048   .0214685     4.16   0.000     .0472274    .1313823
      ec2rsq    -.0014146   .0002161    -6.55   0.000    -.0018381   -.0009911
        ec2r     .1148851   .0256054     4.49   0.000     .0646994    .1650707
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -89300.906                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =   7217.25
                                                               max =      2569
                                                               avg =    1292.1
                                                Obs per group: min =       882
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        15
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =     19381
Computing standard errors:
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -89300.906  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -89300.906  
Performing gradient-based optimization: 
Performing EM optimization: 
> p polgkC countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime|| pais:, mle
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
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Table AIV.6 Random effects regression (Model 7) 
\. 
end of do-file
. 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   189.26 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     24.24284   .1154955      24.01753    24.47027
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     2.743821   .4937829      1.928288    3.904267
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     10.22677   5.743325     1.78   0.075    -1.029935    21.48348
       crime    -.3609838   .1868392    -1.93   0.053    -.7271819    .0052143
  corruption    -.0355496   .1139812    -0.31   0.755    -.2589486    .1878495
      gdpcap     .0017077   .0004485     3.81   0.000     .0008287    .0025867
         fed     .7820851   2.156515     0.36   0.717    -3.444607    5.008778
      unigov    -6.597358   1.716344    -3.84   0.000     -9.96133   -3.233385
   countryID      .016086   .0612553     0.26   0.793    -.1039722    .1361441
        enlp    -.7862705   .4466407    -1.76   0.078     -1.66167    .0891292
         edr    -1.061834   .2391701    -4.44   0.000    -1.530599   -.5930693
        it1r     .0316248   .0055624     5.69   0.000     .0207226     .042527
         a2r     .0023824   .0060672     0.39   0.695     -.009509    .0142738
    extpolef     .0633991   .0059623    10.63   0.000     .0517132    .0750851
    intpolef     .0368116   .0062593     5.88   0.000     .0245437    .0490795
          pk    -.0248411   .0062968    -3.95   0.000    -.0371826   -.0124997
      soct1r     .0265803   .0080997     3.28   0.001     .0107052    .0424555
         m1r     .0508522   .0082203     6.19   0.000     .0347407    .0669637
      idcong     .5340514   .1829533     2.92   0.004     .1754695    .8926332
       epp1r     .1827615   .0069102    26.45   0.000     .1692177    .1963053
      conper     .4724614   .0102007    46.32   0.000     .4524684    .4924544
      ec1rsq    -.0008768   .0001925    -4.55   0.000    -.0012541   -.0004995
        ec1r     .0848279   .0198847     4.27   0.000     .0458547    .1238012
      ec2rsq    -.0014599   .0002017    -7.24   0.000    -.0018551   -.0010646
        ec2r     .1213686   .0238454     5.09   0.000     .0746325    .1681047
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -101601.41                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(22)      =   8242.63
                                                               max =      2569
                                                               avg =    1224.9
                                                Obs per group: min =       818
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        18
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =     22048
Computing standard errors:
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -101601.41  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -101601.41  
Performing gradient-based optimization: 
Performing EM optimization: 
> p countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime|| pais:, mle
. xtmixed b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
. *Model 7. Without Polarization
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Table AIV.7 Hausman Test for Random Effects  (Model 5) 
 
 
end of do-file
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      133.26
                 chi2(15) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         edr     -1.083874    -.9779942       -.1058795        .0533471
        it1r      .0328756     .0297327        .0031429        .0004478
         a2r      .0005145     -.002845        .0033594        .0006561
    extpolef      .0592358      .060338       -.0011022               .
    intpolef      .0397831     .0373852        .0023979               .
          pk      -.022666    -.0164733       -.0061926        .0016305
      soct1r      .0231994     .0303118       -.0071123        .0012314
         m1r      .0509891     .0532322        -.002243        .0013495
      idcong      .4560947     .4983156       -.0422209               .
       epp1r      .1828769      .180485        .0023919        .0001488
      conper      .4716061      .488913       -.0173069        .0016323
      ec1rsq     -.0009157    -.0009769        .0000612        .0000112
        ec1r      .0888686     .0922222       -.0033536        .0006674
      ec2rsq     -.0014005    -.0014997        .0000993        .0000174
        ec2r      .1143594      .118946       -.0045866               .
                                                                              
                 HAUFIXSS_2   HAURANSS_2     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman HAUFIXSS_2 HAURANSS_2
 
 
Table AIV.8 Hausman Test for Random Effects  (Model 6) 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      122.64
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         edr     -1.083874    -1.052826       -.0310476        .0507252
        it1r      .0328756     .0298347        .0030408        .0006152
         a2r      .0005145    -.0032333        .0037478        .0006694
    extpolef      .0592358     .0603761       -.0011403               .
    intpolef      .0397831     .0374633        .0023199               .
          pk      -.022666     -.015526         -.00714        .0016201
      soct1r      .0231994     .0313361       -.0081366        .0012709
         m1r      .0509891     .0552697       -.0042805        .0014539
      idcong      .4560947     .4669944       -.0108997        .0082163
       epp1r      .1828769      .181144        .0017329        .0005038
      conper      .4716061     .4846287       -.0130226        .0012591
      ec1rsq     -.0009157     -.000974        .0000582        .0000137
        ec1r      .0888686     .0918626        -.002994        .0009533
      ec2rsq     -.0014005    -.0015121        .0001116         .000018
        ec2r      .1143594     .1192376       -.0048782         .000592
                                                                              
                 HAUFIXC_2    HAURANC_2      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so
        (15); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (14) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested
. hausman HAUFIXC_2 HAURANC_2
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Table AIV.9 Hausman Test for Random Effects (Model 7) 
 
end of do-file
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      246.40
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         edr     -1.069662    -.9092756       -.1603862        .0478519
        it1r      .0319427     .0270702        .0048726        .0005733
         a2r      .0026275    -.0010549        .0036824        .0005999
    extpolef      .0630815     .0669776       -.0038961               .
    intpolef      .0368044     .0363252        .0004792               .
          pk     -.0244275    -.0278194         .003392        .0017546
      soct1r      .0263884     .0313207       -.0049323        .0010858
         m1r       .049642     .0631832       -.0135412         .001572
      idcong      .5353088     .5493458        -.014037               .
       epp1r      .1824226     .1854656        -.003043         .000123
      conper      .4711668     .4921889       -.0210222        .0014503
      ec1rsq     -.0008738    -.0009261        .0000523               .
        ec1r      .0847152     .0874952         -.00278               .
      ec2rsq     -.0014611     -.001494        .0000328        6.93e-06
        ec2r      .1217382     .1207218        .0010164               .
                                                                              
                  HAUFIXNP     HAURANNP      Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        that the coefficients are on a similar scale.
        output of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so
        (15); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (13) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested
. hausman HAUFIXNP HAURANNP
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Table AIV.10 Fixed effects regression (Model 5) 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     5.297376   2.667555     1.99   0.047     .0687372    10.52601
  DominicanR    (dropped)
   Argentina    (dropped)
   Venezuela    (dropped)
      Brazil    (dropped)
     Uruguay    (dropped)
       Chile    (dropped)
    Paraguay    (dropped)
        Peru    -2.345984   1.133958    -2.07   0.039     -4.56864   -.1233286
     Bolivia     4.278554   1.054149     4.06   0.000     2.212332    6.344777
     Ecuador    (dropped)
    Colombia     4.797337   .9519222     5.04   0.000     2.931487    6.663187
      Panama    (dropped)
   CostaRica    -3.138926   .9468077    -3.32   0.001    -4.994751   -1.283101
   Nicaragua     -.699332   1.099539    -0.64   0.525    -2.854525    1.455861
    Honduras    (dropped)
  ElSalvador    -2.200442    .969764    -2.27   0.023    -4.101264    -.299621
   Guatemala     2.934748    1.17338     2.50   0.012     .6348211    5.234676
       crime    -.0881805    .057213    -1.54   0.123    -.2003229    .0239619
  corruption     -.034531   .0386417    -0.89   0.372    -.1102721      .04121
      gdpcap     .0020862   .0001587    13.15   0.000     .0017752    .0023972
         fed     1.588443   .6237928     2.55   0.011     .3657556    2.811131
      unigov    -8.322751   .6227908   -13.36   0.000    -9.543475   -7.102027
   countryID     .0282758    .036157     0.78   0.434    -.0425951    .0991467
     polgkSS    (dropped)
        enlp    -1.041463   .1719351    -6.06   0.000    -1.378471   -.7044553
         edr    -1.083874   .2564227    -4.23   0.000    -1.586484    -.581263
        it1r     .0328756   .0058779     5.59   0.000     .0213543    .0443968
         a2r     .0005145   .0064742     0.08   0.937    -.0121756    .0132045
    extpolef     .0592358   .0063712     9.30   0.000     .0467476     .071724
    intpolef     .0397831   .0067833     5.86   0.000     .0264873     .053079
          pk     -.022666   .0066879    -3.39   0.001    -.0357749   -.0095571
      soct1r     .0231994   .0086521     2.68   0.007     .0062406    .0401582
         m1r     .0509891   .0088233     5.78   0.000     .0336946    .0682837
      idcong     .4560947   .2002209     2.28   0.023     .0636445    .8485449
       epp1r     .1828769   .0074011    24.71   0.000     .1683701    .1973836
      conper     .4716061   .0108982    43.27   0.000     .4502446    .4929676
      ec1rsq    -.0009157   .0002067    -4.43   0.000    -.0013208   -.0005107
        ec1r     .0888686   .0214877     4.14   0.000     .0467508    .1309863
      ec2rsq    -.0014005   .0002163    -6.47   0.000    -.0018245   -.0009764
        ec2r     .1143594    .025626     4.46   0.000     .0641302    .1645886
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    17225627.9 19380   888.83529           Root MSE      =  24.248
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3385
    Residual    11377686.3 19351  587.963737           R-squared     =  0.3395
       Model    5847941.65    29   201653.16           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 29, 19351) =  342.97
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   19381
> Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR
> p polgkSS countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica 
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
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Table AIV.11 Fixed effects regression (Model 6) 
 
end of do-file
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     4.791343   2.601622     1.84   0.066    -.3080618    9.890747
  DominicanR    (dropped)
   Argentina    (dropped)
   Venezuela    (dropped)
      Brazil    (dropped)
     Uruguay    (dropped)
       Chile    (dropped)
    Paraguay    (dropped)
        Peru    -2.384306   1.154345    -2.07   0.039    -4.646921   -.1216907
     Bolivia     4.816553   1.037548     4.64   0.000     2.782868    6.850237
     Ecuador    (dropped)
    Colombia     4.999367   .9239179     5.41   0.000     3.188408    6.810326
      Panama    (dropped)
   CostaRica    -3.250964   .9985266    -3.26   0.001    -5.208162   -1.293765
   Nicaragua    (dropped)
    Honduras    (dropped)
  ElSalvador    -1.665324   .9202357    -1.81   0.070    -3.469066    .1384173
   Guatemala     3.168777   1.123944     2.82   0.005     .9657491    5.371806
       crime    -.0688308   .0683796    -1.01   0.314    -.2028608    .0651992
  corruption    -.0400414   .0407959    -0.98   0.326    -.1200048     .039922
      gdpcap     .0021238   .0001387    15.31   0.000     .0018519    .0023957
         fed     1.602658   .6236519     2.57   0.010     .3802465     2.82507
      unigov    -8.196506   .5716425   -14.34   0.000    -9.316975   -7.076037
   countryID     .0329931   .0371971     0.89   0.375    -.0399164    .1059026
      polgkC    -.0086411   .0135861    -0.64   0.525     -.035271    .0179888
        enlp    -.9826599   .1724695    -5.70   0.000    -1.320715   -.6446048
         edr    -1.083874   .2564227    -4.23   0.000    -1.586484    -.581263
        it1r     .0328756   .0058779     5.59   0.000     .0213543    .0443968
         a2r     .0005145   .0064742     0.08   0.937    -.0121756    .0132045
    extpolef     .0592358   .0063712     9.30   0.000     .0467476     .071724
    intpolef     .0397831   .0067833     5.86   0.000     .0264873     .053079
          pk     -.022666   .0066879    -3.39   0.001    -.0357749   -.0095571
      soct1r     .0231994   .0086521     2.68   0.007     .0062406    .0401582
         m1r     .0509891   .0088233     5.78   0.000     .0336946    .0682837
      idcong     .4560947   .2002209     2.28   0.023     .0636445    .8485449
       epp1r     .1828769   .0074011    24.71   0.000     .1683701    .1973836
      conper     .4716061   .0108982    43.27   0.000     .4502446    .4929676
      ec1rsq    -.0009157   .0002067    -4.43   0.000    -.0013208   -.0005107
        ec1r     .0888686   .0214877     4.14   0.000     .0467508    .1309863
      ec2rsq    -.0014005   .0002163    -6.47   0.000    -.0018245   -.0009764
        ec2r     .1143594    .025626     4.46   0.000     .0641302    .1645886
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    17225627.9 19380   888.83529           Root MSE      =  24.248
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3385
    Residual    11377686.3 19351  587.963737           R-squared     =  0.3395
       Model    5847941.65    29   201653.16           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 29, 19351) =  342.97
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   19381
> anama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR
> p polgkC countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica P
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
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Table AIV.12 Fixed effects regression (Model 7) 
. 
end of do-file
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     13.03651   2.574124     5.06   0.000     7.991046    18.08198
  DominicanR    (dropped)
   Argentina    (dropped)
   Venezuela    (dropped)
      Brazil    (dropped)
     Uruguay    -.4031285   1.121446    -0.36   0.719    -2.601244    1.794987
       Chile    (dropped)
    Paraguay    -16.84279   1.475083   -11.42   0.000    -19.73406   -13.95152
        Peru        -6.23   1.345542    -4.63   0.000    -8.867359   -3.592641
     Bolivia    -2.795088   1.511573    -1.85   0.064    -5.757878    .1677029
     Ecuador    (dropped)
    Colombia     .6849186   .9738844     0.70   0.482    -1.223965    2.593802
      Panama    (dropped)
   CostaRica    -6.255312   1.043671    -5.99   0.000    -8.300982   -4.209643
   Nicaragua    -10.05306   1.442956    -6.97   0.000    -12.88136   -7.224764
    Honduras    -10.30366   1.466858    -7.02   0.000    -13.17881   -7.428511
  ElSalvador    -10.14292   1.302744    -7.79   0.000    -12.69639   -7.589444
   Guatemala    -1.324502   1.304625    -1.02   0.310    -3.881661    1.232658
       crime    -.0653974   .0604991    -1.08   0.280    -.1839801    .0531853
  corruption    -.0966619   .0351041    -2.75   0.006    -.1654685   -.0278552
      gdpcap     .0008496      .0002     4.25   0.000     .0004575    .0012417
         fed     1.066519   .6619657     1.61   0.107    -.2309816    2.364019
      unigov     -12.2924   .8052056   -15.27   0.000    -13.87066   -10.71414
   countryID     .1500636   .0227735     6.59   0.000      .105426    .1947012
        enlp    -1.598613   .1911342    -8.36   0.000     -1.97325   -1.223976
         edr    -1.069662    .239696    -4.46   0.000    -1.539483   -.5998404
        it1r     .0319427   .0055685     5.74   0.000      .021028    .0428574
         a2r     .0026275   .0060741     0.43   0.665    -.0092781    .0145331
    extpolef     .0630815   .0059661    10.57   0.000     .0513875    .0747755
    intpolef     .0368044   .0062622     5.88   0.000     .0245301    .0490787
          pk    -.0244275   .0063193    -3.87   0.000    -.0368138   -.0120411
      soct1r     .0263884   .0081102     3.25   0.001     .0104919    .0422849
         m1r      .049642   .0082378     6.03   0.000     .0334954    .0657886
      idcong     .5353088   .1830745     2.92   0.003     .1764697    .8941479
       epp1r     .1824226   .0069152    26.38   0.000     .1688682     .195977
      conper     .4711668   .0102135    46.13   0.000     .4511475     .491186
      ec1rsq    -.0008738   .0001926    -4.54   0.000    -.0012513   -.0004962
        ec1r     .0847152   .0198967     4.26   0.000     .0457163    .1237141
      ec2rsq    -.0014611   .0002018    -7.24   0.000    -.0018567   -.0010656
        ec2r     .1217382   .0238583     5.10   0.000     .0749743    .1685021
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    19895628.9 22047  902.418874           Root MSE      =  24.251
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3483
    Residual    12947264.4 22015  588.111036           R-squared     =  0.3492
       Model    6948364.46    32  217136.389           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 32, 22015) =  369.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   22048
> olombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR
> p countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama C
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
. **Fixed effects Model 7 . without polarization
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Table AIV.13 Fixed effects regression with Robust standard errors  (Model 6) 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     4.791343   2.562864     1.87   0.062    -.2320923    9.814778
  DominicanR    (dropped)
   Argentina    (dropped)
   Venezuela    (dropped)
      Brazil    (dropped)
     Uruguay    (dropped)
       Chile    (dropped)
    Paraguay    (dropped)
        Peru    -2.384306   1.100734    -2.17   0.030    -4.541841   -.2267714
     Bolivia     4.816553   1.107033     4.35   0.000     2.646672    6.986433
     Ecuador    (dropped)
    Colombia     4.999367   .9654359     5.18   0.000     3.107029    6.891705
      Panama    (dropped)
   CostaRica    -3.250964   1.018802    -3.19   0.001    -5.247904   -1.254023
   Nicaragua    (dropped)
    Honduras    (dropped)
  ElSalvador    -1.665324   1.019041    -1.63   0.102    -3.662734    .3320849
   Guatemala     3.168777   1.161438     2.73   0.006      .892258    5.445297
       crime    -.0688308   .0668136    -1.03   0.303    -.1997912    .0621297
  corruption    -.0400414   .0403751    -0.99   0.321      -.11918    .0390972
      gdpcap     .0021238   .0001373    15.47   0.000     .0018547     .002393
         fed     1.602658   .5948665     2.69   0.007     .4366682    2.768648
      unigov    -8.196506   .5618842   -14.59   0.000    -9.297848   -7.095164
   countryID     .0329931    .035806     0.92   0.357    -.0371897    .1031759
      polgkC    -.0086411   .0142644    -0.61   0.545    -.0366006    .0193185
        enlp    -.9826599   .1758078    -5.59   0.000    -1.327258   -.6380615
         edr    -1.083874   .2593563    -4.18   0.000    -1.592234    -.575513
        it1r     .0328756   .0061393     5.35   0.000     .0208419    .0449092
         a2r     .0005145   .0067193     0.08   0.939    -.0126559    .0136848
    extpolef     .0592358   .0070428     8.41   0.000     .0454313    .0730403
    intpolef     .0397831   .0073827     5.39   0.000     .0253123    .0542539
          pk     -.022666   .0068637    -3.30   0.001    -.0361193   -.0092126
      soct1r     .0231994   .0090059     2.58   0.010      .005547    .0408518
         m1r     .0509891   .0093716     5.44   0.000       .03262    .0693583
      idcong     .4560947   .1984377     2.30   0.022     .0671397    .8450498
       epp1r     .1828769   .0086471    21.15   0.000     .1659279    .1998259
      conper     .4716061   .0119934    39.32   0.000     .4480979    .4951143
      ec1rsq    -.0009157   .0002209    -4.15   0.000    -.0013488   -.0004827
        ec1r     .0888686   .0230709     3.85   0.000     .0436476    .1340896
      ec2rsq    -.0014005   .0002273    -6.16   0.000     -.001846   -.0009549
        ec2r     .1143594   .0272848     4.19   0.000     .0608788      .16784
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  24.248
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3395
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 29, 19351) =  393.02
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   19381
> t)
> anama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR, vce(robus
> p polgkC countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica P
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
end of do-file
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Table AIV.14 Fixed effects regression with Robust standard errors  (Model 7) 
 
end of do-file
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     13.03651   2.471463     5.27   0.000     8.192268    17.88076
  DominicanR    (dropped)
   Argentina    (dropped)
   Venezuela    (dropped)
      Brazil    (dropped)
     Uruguay    -.4031285   1.108152    -0.36   0.716    -2.575185    1.768928
       Chile    (dropped)
    Paraguay    -16.84279   1.465542   -11.49   0.000    -19.71536   -13.97022
        Peru        -6.23   1.302371    -4.78   0.000     -8.78274    -3.67726
     Bolivia    -2.795088   1.485725    -1.88   0.060    -5.707215    .1170397
     Ecuador    (dropped)
    Colombia     .6849186   .9886053     0.69   0.488    -1.252819    2.622656
      Panama    (dropped)
   CostaRica    -6.255312   1.076625    -5.81   0.000    -8.365575    -4.14505
   Nicaragua    -10.05306   1.489301    -6.75   0.000     -12.9722   -7.133925
    Honduras    -10.30366   1.381439    -7.46   0.000    -13.01138   -7.595939
  ElSalvador    -10.14292   1.289338    -7.87   0.000    -12.67011   -7.615722
   Guatemala    -1.324502   1.308013    -1.01   0.311    -3.888301    1.239298
       crime    -.0653974   .0582956    -1.12   0.262    -.1796609    .0488661
  corruption    -.0966619   .0342328    -2.82   0.005    -.1637606   -.0295632
      gdpcap     .0008496   .0001864     4.56   0.000     .0004843    .0012149
         fed     1.066519   .6386033     1.67   0.095    -.1851898    2.318227
      unigov     -12.2924    .780116   -15.76   0.000    -13.82148   -10.76332
   countryID     .1500636   .0243728     6.16   0.000     .1022913     .197836
        enlp    -1.598613   .1858999    -8.60   0.000     -1.96299   -1.234236
         edr    -1.069662   .2421354    -4.42   0.000    -1.544264    -.595059
        it1r     .0319427    .005829     5.48   0.000     .0205175    .0433679
         a2r     .0026275   .0063167     0.42   0.677    -.0097537    .0150088
    extpolef     .0630815   .0066608     9.47   0.000     .0500259    .0761371
    intpolef     .0368044   .0068231     5.39   0.000     .0234306    .0501782
          pk    -.0244275   .0064837    -3.77   0.000    -.0371361   -.0117189
      soct1r     .0263884   .0084447     3.12   0.002     .0098362    .0429406
         m1r      .049642   .0087987     5.64   0.000     .0323959    .0668881
      idcong     .5353088   .1834813     2.92   0.004     .1756723    .8949453
       epp1r     .1824226   .0081117    22.49   0.000     .1665231    .1983221
      conper     .4711668   .0112953    41.71   0.000     .4490272    .4933063
      ec1rsq    -.0008738   .0002062    -4.24   0.000    -.0012779   -.0004696
        ec1r     .0847152   .0213384     3.97   0.000     .0428904      .12654
      ec2rsq    -.0014611   .0002106    -6.94   0.000    -.0018739   -.0010483
        ec2r     .1217382    .025166     4.84   0.000      .072411    .1710654
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  24.251
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3492
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 32, 22015) =  424.06
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   22048
> Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR, vce(robust)
> p  countryID unigov fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica Panama 
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
. **Fixed effects - Model 7 with robust STD ERR
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Table AIV.15 Fixed effects regression with Robust standard errors  (Model 7: Ecuador 
considered non unified government) 
 
       _cons    -9.798469   2.352314    -4.17   0.000    -14.40921    -5.18773
  DominicanR    (dropped)
   Argentina    (dropped)
   Venezuela    (dropped)
      Brazil    (dropped)
     Uruguay    (dropped)
       Chile     9.257795   1.054426     8.78   0.000     7.191028    11.32456
    Paraguay    (dropped)
        Peru    (dropped)
     Bolivia     3.395807    1.12268     3.02   0.002     1.195258    5.596357
     Ecuador    -8.135528   .8221951    -9.89   0.000    -9.747102   -6.523955
    Colombia      8.17325   1.027372     7.96   0.000     6.159511    10.18699
      Panama    (dropped)
   CostaRica     2.534918   .9493229     2.67   0.008     .6741629    4.395673
   Nicaragua    (dropped)
    Honduras    (dropped)
  ElSalvador     .5219772   .9899768     0.53   0.598    -1.418463    2.462417
   Guatemala     6.335844   1.157267     5.47   0.000       4.0675    8.604189
       crime    -.1198171   .0591822    -2.02   0.043    -.2358193   -.0038149
  corruption     .2965746   .0431271     6.88   0.000     .2120418    .3811075
      gdpcap     .0009714   .0001563     6.21   0.000      .000665    .0012779
         fed     4.306581   .6726457     6.40   0.000     2.988137    5.625025
    unigovsE    (dropped)
   countryID     .2401265   .0348289     6.89   0.000     .1718589    .3083941
      polgkC    -.0128629   .0134282    -0.96   0.338    -.0391833    .0134576
        enlp     -.064921   .1585513    -0.41   0.682    -.3756954    .2458534
         edr    -1.083874   .2593563    -4.18   0.000    -1.592234    -.575513
        it1r     .0328756   .0061393     5.35   0.000     .0208419    .0449092
         a2r     .0005145   .0067193     0.08   0.939    -.0126559    .0136848
    extpolef     .0592358   .0070428     8.41   0.000     .0454313    .0730403
    intpolef     .0397831   .0073827     5.39   0.000     .0253123    .0542539
          pk     -.022666   .0068637    -3.30   0.001    -.0361193   -.0092126
      soct1r     .0231994   .0090059     2.58   0.010      .005547    .0408518
         m1r     .0509891   .0093716     5.44   0.000       .03262    .0693583
      idcong     .4560947   .1984377     2.30   0.022     .0671397    .8450498
       epp1r     .1828769   .0086471    21.15   0.000     .1659279    .1998259
      conper     .4716061   .0119934    39.32   0.000     .4480979    .4951143
      ec1rsq    -.0009157   .0002209    -4.15   0.000    -.0013488   -.0004827
        ec1r     .0888686   .0230709     3.85   0.000     .0436476    .1340896
      ec2rsq    -.0014005   .0002273    -6.16   0.000     -.001846   -.0009549
        ec2r     .1143594   .0272848     4.19   0.000     .0608788      .16784
                                                                              
        b13r        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  24.248
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3395
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 29, 19351) =  393.02
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =   19381
> ust)
>  Panama Colombia Ecuador Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina DominicanR, vce(rob
> p polgkC countryID unigovsE fed gdpcap corruption crime   Guatemala ElSalvador Honduras Nicaragua CostaRica
. regress b13r  ec2r ec2rsq ec1r ec1rsq conper epp1r idcong m1r soct1r pk intpolef extpolef  a2r it1r edr enl
 
 
 
Table AV.1 Comparison of mean levels of trust across attitudes of respect for the law 
 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =    27492
    diff = mean(Can act) - mean(Always r)                         t =  -8.6171
                                                                              
    diff             -3.182677    .3693461               -3.906614    -2.45874
                                                                              
combined     27494    41.45086    .1823101    30.22941    41.09352     41.8082
                                                                              
Always r     16048    42.77584    .2397462    30.37121    42.30591    43.24577
 Can act     11446    39.59316    .2797767    29.93218    39.04475    40.14157
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
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Table AV.2 Random effects logistic regression on preference for authorities to always 
respect the law when attempting to apprehend criminals 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) =   426.61 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000
                                                                              
         rho     .0273512   .0092094                       .014067    .0525123
     sigma_u      .304158   .0526464                      .2166535     .427005
                                                                              
    /lnsig2u    -2.380416    .346178                     -3.058912   -1.701919
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0847941   .0993552    -0.85   0.393    -.2795267    .1099384
         edr    -.0313223   .0201086    -1.56   0.119    -.0707344    .0080899
      female     .0402719   .0266778     1.51   0.131    -.0120155    .0925594
          q2     .0064411   .0008996     7.16   0.000     .0046779    .0082043
        it1r      .002865   .0004412     6.49   0.000     .0020002    .0037298
    extpolef     .0004786   .0004477     1.07   0.285    -.0003988    .0013561
    intpolef     .0005714    .000486     1.18   0.240    -.0003811     .001524
          pk    -.0006632   .0005033    -1.32   0.188    -.0016496    .0003233
       vic1d    -.0024278   .0003319    -7.32   0.000    -.0030782   -.0017773
        b13r       .00214    .000473     4.52   0.000      .001213     .003067
                                                                              
       aoj8r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  = -16909.345                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =    236.46
                                                               max =      2748
                                                               avg =    1410.4
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =      1048
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        18
Random-effects logistic regression              Number of obs      =     25388
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -16909.345  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -16909.345  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -16909.347  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16911.371  
tau =  0.2     log likelihood = -16938.875
tau =  0.1     log likelihood = -16912.552
tau =  0.0     log likelihood = -17122.652
Fitting full model:
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -17122.652
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -17122.711
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17252.938
Fitting comparison model:
. xtlogit aoj8r b13r vic1d pk intpolef extpolef it1r q2 female edr , i(pais)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 259
Table AV.3 Random effects linear regression on support for democracy 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =  1321.65 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                sd(Residual)     26.51584   .1186157      26.28437    26.74934
                                                                              
                   sd(_cons)     7.052096   1.224234      5.018233    9.910273
pais: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     42.94553   1.911508    22.47   0.000     39.19904    46.69202
         edr     .9778948   .2600088     3.76   0.000     .4682869    1.487503
      female     .5736274   .3462248     1.66   0.098    -.1049609    1.252216
          q2     .1151158   .0115895     9.93   0.000     .0924009    .1378307
        it1r     .0653495   .0057372    11.39   0.000     .0541048    .0765942
    extpolef    -.0166803   .0059467    -2.80   0.005    -.0283357   -.0050249
    intpolef     .2034658   .0063282    32.15   0.000     .1910628    .2158688
          pk     .0530197   .0065271     8.12   0.000     .0402268    .0658126
         m1r     .0712565   .0076719     9.29   0.000     .0562197    .0862932
        b13r     .0292851    .006237     4.70   0.000     .0170608    .0415094
                                                                              
       ing4r        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood = -117541.93          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(9)       =   1961.06
                                                               max =      2735
                                                               avg =    1389.6
                                                Obs per group: min =       992
Group variable: pais                            Number of groups   =        18
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =     25013
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Figure AIII.1. Trust in legislature by levels of perceived excessive congressional debate, 
scatterplot with linear and quadratic fits 
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Figure AIII.2. Trust in legislature by levels of perceived excessive congressional 
counterbalance, scatterplot with linear and quadratic fits 
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